Aims & Scope

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Said Nursi's Risale-i Nūr and Critical Theory:

Finding a Common Cause between Religion and Materialist Philosophy

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Abstract

The Islamic scholar Bediüzzaman Said Nursi wrote his famous book *Risale-i Nūr* partially in the hopes of rescuing the *dar al-Islam* from the ravages of secular western materialist thought. Later in the 20th century, the Frankfurt School for Social Research developed within their Critical Theory a critical-political philosophy of religion, which attempted to rescue the West from the perverse *dialectic of the enlightenment*, wherein reason became irrational, science became myth and humanity practiced inhumanity upon itself. Both schools of thought could see the ultimate outcome of the world sliding into modernity's ethical vacuousness and pervasive nihilism. As such, this article looks to those points of contact where the religious work of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and the secular Frankfurt School can make alliances in the struggle against this movement towards catastrophe, even when it acknowledges that they cannot be reconciled; where Said Nursi condemns "materialist philosophy" as a plague that is afflicting the Muslim world, and looks to the Qurʾān for guidance, the Frankfurt School determinately negates material philosophy by allowing certain religious semantic and semiotic materials to migrate from the depth of the religious mythos into their secular-critical philosophy. Nevertheless, there is a "overlapping consensus" among both schools as they both aim to rescue humanity from itself.

Keywords: Risale-i Nūr, Marxism, Freudianism, Logical Positivism, Frankfurt School, Taqlīdi Islam

Introduction: Diagnosing the Problem

Bediüzzaman Said Nursi is one of the most significant Islamic scholars to observe and articulate the potential dangers inherent within the growing antagonism between the secular and the religious, the sacred and the profane in the modern period. Living in a transitional time within the Muslim world, especially in post-Ottoman Turkey, he dedicated himself to not only the preservation of Islam and the Islamic way-of-being, but also its rejuvenation; rejecting both the encroaching secular western worldview, as well as what we may describe as "cultural Islam" – Islam without investigation (*taqlīdi Islam*) – he challenged the Muslim world to engage its own sources of identity, its own sacred traditions, and advocated a revivification of a way of life congruent with the Qurʾān and Sunnah. However, the kind of being-in-the-world that Said Nursi advocated was becoming increasingly more difficult as secularity, positivistic scientism, and materialist philosophy continued to influence the *dar al-Islam* in ways that he believed would leave the *ummah* spiritual distorted, stunted, and/or wilted. From the perspective of Said Nursi, the western world had already abandoned its religious heritage in favor of a rapacious form of secular materialism, which manifested itself in predatory capitalism and atheist communism; it had radically privatized religion and therefore depleted it of its prophetic social force; it had adopted a relativistic stance towards ultimate truth and made itself alien to revealed religion; and in doing these it had descended into a *zeitgeist* of hedonistic selfishness and unbelief. With this in mind, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi directed his life and work to make sure this same phenomenon did not occur in the Muslim world. Nursi wished that the prophetic life – based on the *seerah* of the Prophet Muhammad – was not discarded for Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche, that the Qurʾān was not replaced by secular science and revelation was not abandoned in favor of autonomous reason.

When looking upon the condition of the modern West, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi diagnosed the problem to be rooted particularly in materialist philosophy, and accused the modern philosophers of "deviat[ing] from the straight path" by introducing a materialist metaphysics into civilization that leads to meaninglessness, egoism, moral vacuousness, and the idolatry of wealth, power, and status.[1] However, not all forms of secular-materialist philosophy share the characteristics that Said Nursi identifies as being inherent within materialist philosophy; to the contrary, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, also known as "Critical Theory," shares much of the same concerns as Said Nursi. It is my contention that there is, to borrow a phrase from John Rawls, an "overlapping consensus" between the Frankfurt School and Said Nursi, despite their epistemological differences. However, this shared critique does not

allow the two to reconcile their worldviews; one remains a critique rooted in revealed religion while the other views its authority in autonomous reason, i.e. reason divorced from divine legitimization or revelation.

In this article I will identify and evaluate the potential for reconciliation between Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's Qurʾān inspired *Risale-i Nūr* and the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory who, in agreement with their Islamic critics, are aware that something is missing in the contemporary secular world. I will argue that the common struggle against the modern drift towards unlimited consumerism, the depletion of spiritual life, the way-of-life that values "having" over "being," that glorifies selfishness and radical individualist autonomy over altruism and social solidarity, is a struggle that both Said Nursi and the Frankfurt School can engage in together even if they cannot come to an agreement about God. In essence, they can find a "common cause" in which to direct both their prophetic and Socratic critiques, but nevertheless remain unreconciled behind their religious and philosophical borders.

The Materialism of the Frankfurt School: Philosophy of Religion without Religion

Said Nursi may have underestimated materialist philosophy's goals, motivations, and critique of itself. On the surface of his critique of philosophy, it appears that he has mistakenly transformed philosophy into a series of monolith and essentialist ideas, similar to what many critics of Islam do. It is certainly true that many philosophers have contributed devastating critiques of religion to our intellectual history, but it is also as true that many "materialist" philosophers have recognized the importance of religion in the enlightenment project of human history; that religion, despite its pathological and often criminal history, cannot simply be discarded as a *gestalt des geistes* of a prior age, but must be *preserved* through its translation into modern secular, albeit "philosophical" language. This is especially true for the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory as articulated by the first generation of scholars, i.e. Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Walter Benjamin, whose modern secular political-economic project was not only rooted in classical "materialists" like Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, but also rooted in the combination of Moses and Kant: the "image ban" (*Bilderverbot*) of the Decalogue's 2nd commandment and the inherent limits of reason as articulated by Kant's philosophy. Religion, and its prophetically revealed origins, was most appreciated by these secular-atheist philosophers even if they followed Nietzsche's lead into a world without God. Although they could no longer remain faithful to their inherited religious traditions for many of the same

reasons that Said Nursi articulates as being threatening to Muslims, they nevertheless did not fold into the crass materialism that Said Nursi accused philosophers of. From their dialectical perspective, not even Karl Marx completely abandoned religion; rather he attempted to articulate prophetic religion's theological vision of a *utopic* society via secular philosophical language. Because they believed revealed religion could not simply be discarded wholesale into the dustbin of history, the Frankfurt School translated certain religious semantic and semiotic material into their critical Socratic philosophy. Although their critique remains entirely secular, those translated religious potentials often serve as a basis for their critique of modern civil society, especially their critique of capitalism, positivism, and Soviet style communism. In this sense, the Frankfurt School's "rescue" of the prophetic religious potentials makes it a philosophy of religion without religion – a philosophy of religion that presents itself a wholly secular. It is within this translated material that Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and the Frankfurt School may find a common source for their critique of modernity.

Said Nursi on Materialist Philosophy versus the Qurʾānic Path

 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi spared no condemnatory remark when discussing what he believed to be the source of the world's ailments: the turning away from the divine and turning towards man-made "materialist" ideologies (Nursi, 2010: 145-151).[2] Materialism, emanating from the secular West, was inherently atheistic, as it rejected the reality of the creator's role in all of existence. The materialist maintained a worldview that understood ultimate reality to be limited to that which *is the case*, i.e. that which can be scientifically verified by the senses, that which corresponds to the laws of nature, and that which can be empirically known through objective experiences: the "world of appearances." Therefore, the world of the unseen, the angels, the jinn, and of the one who governs the world of appearances, that which cannot be verified to the satisfaction of materialist science and philosophy is either 1) systematically ignored, or 2) denied any real existence by materialist philosophers. For Said Nursi, this method of determining the ultimate truth of reality, which rejects any intervention into history by a divine being through revelation and or prophets, undermines the Islamic epistemological idea that the world makes sense only within a framework that posits a divine being at its center. Materialist philosophy, being that it is the product of finite beings and epistemologically limited to appearances, and does not account for the infinite, lacks *absolute* legitimacy and is therefore subject to error and falsehood. If not sourced within the divine – the source and author of absolute truth – it is only a matter of *preference*, as it is hopelessly tainted with human

subjectivity as opposed to *absolute* objectivity. If "truth" is determined by human philosophy, via rational deliberation, then it is subject to change, modification, and negation: it is therefore subject to human will and remains recalcitrantly independent of divine authority. This epistemological stance inherently places human will above the notion of a fixed "ultimate" truth as truth becomes pliable whenever there is a change in thinking. While divine truth is absolute and therefore constant and stable, relative truth is the product of man-made philosophy and suffers from temporality. Consequently, when the epistemological anchor that is provided by revelation is removed, individuals are left morally adrift, living lives without secure guidance and subject to the irrational authority of their own subjective desires, whims, and instinct: the *nafs*. Because secular materialist philosophy is man-made and takes itself as its own authority and can only see the "decorations of creation's letters," Said Nursi describes it as "falsehood, an insult to creation," as it denies the creator behind the creation and posits that all of history, including pre-history, is a matter of chance and contingency (Nursi, 2010: 147).

Ever since Prometheus "stole the fire from the Gods" and thereby had their knowledge – setting mankind up as their rivals; since Socrates separated human reasoning from the Greek mythos; since the Enlightenment deified autonomous reason and consigned religious worldviews to the ditch of history, philosophy has been at odds with those who claim to speak "in the name of the Lord." What Said Nursi sees as philosophy's *hubris*, philosophy itself often sees mythology, religious metaphysics and mystical thought as humanity's *nemesis,* and directs itself towards the emancipation of humanity from its mythological pre-history. The Critical Theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno stated in the first page of the seminal book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, that,

> *Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters... Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 1).*

This liberational intent of Enlightenment thought was also the case for Freud who saw religion as the "universal obsessional neurosis," and an illness to be remedied, and Feuerbach who believed the divine to be nothing but a psychological projection into a heavenly figure (Gay, 1995: 435; Feuerbach, 1989: 11). Yet, this rejection of any divine authority and its replacement with human autonomous *ratio* had an *ethical* import for Nursi: it transforms men into a "Pharaoh-like tyrant[s]" who follows only

their *nafs* (desires) (Nursi, 2010: 147). He says,

> *...he is a contemptible who bows in adoration before the meanest thing, if he perceives it to be in his interest. That irreligious student is obstinate and refractory; but he is so wretched that he accepts endless degradation for one pleasure. He is unbending but so mean as to kiss the feet of devilish people for a base advantage. He is also conceited and domineering, but, unable to find any point of support in his heart, he is an utterly impotent and vainglorious tyrant. That student is a self-centered egoist who only strives to gratify his material and carnal desires: a sneaky egoist who pursues the realization of his personal interest in certain national interests (Nursi, 2010: 147).*

Released from the ethical constraints of divine ordained morality, the individual is able to create for themselves their own ethical-system that is governed by their "self-centered ego" and aimed towards the satisfaction of "material and carnal desires" (Nursi, 2010: 147). The *ethical egoist* follows a line of thinking that posits ultimate good as being subject to individual tastes, desires, and interests; when the ethical egoist believes they are faithfully satisfying their own interests, then, in their opinion, they are engaged in ethical behavior. However, from the standpoint of Said Nursi – and the Qurʾān – not all behavior can be legitimated via personal morality, especially that which is governed by carnal desires and exclusionary self-interest. Without the anchor of revelation and the moral constraints contained therein, anything can be legitimated via the ego as being ethical. This relativist position cannot be reconciled with Said Nursi's conception of the religiously devoted ethical-life, which is bound to Qurʾānic norms, as he writes,

> *a sincere student of the Qurʾān is a worshipping servant of God, but he does not degrade himself by bowing in worship before even the greatest of the created. He is a dignified servant who does not take even a supreme benefit like Paradise as the aim of his worship. He is modest, mild and gentle, yet he does not lower himself voluntarily before anybody other than his Originator, unless He allows him to do so. He is also aware of his innate weakness and need, but he is independent due to the other-worldly wealth that his Munificent Owner has stored up in him; and he is powerful because he relies on his Master's infinite Power. He acts and strives purely for God's sake and good pleasure, and to be equipped with virtue. The training given by the Qurʾān and philosophy may be understood through the above comparison (Nursi,*

2010: 147).

What the religious life – devoted to the Qurʾān and the prophetic example – can provide the believer is both a complete and "perfected" interpretation of reality and an orientation of action; one that allows for creative and critical reflection while remaining ultimately secure and stable in the authority of divine revelation (Qurʾān 5:3). For Said Nursi, this anchoring of one's being in the Qurʾān gives the believer the power to resist the temptation of the egotistical life: what the egoist experiences as liberation from Qurʾānic ethical restraints, the devout Muslim would experience as *enslavement* to the *nafs*. To be sure, Bediüzzaman places the blame for this devastating release from ethical constraints squarely on the alien influences of materialist philosophy, which he says "take[s] up the reins and gallop[s] into error" and has "swallowed up more than half of humanity" in the process (Nursi, 2010: 559).

Among the dominant "materialist" schools of thought that contributed to Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's general concern for western philosophy, were Marxism, Freudianism, and Logical Positivism. Although he doesn't discuss them explicitly, never citing chapter and verse of key materialist texts, the core arguments within these systems do serve as the primary objects for Nursi's critique of materialist philosophy (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 35, 49; Vahide, 2005: 224, 278, 280).[3]

Marxism

First, Marxist communism was a real and growing political threat for Said Nursi, especially after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (Vahide, 2005: 276, 279-280, 307, 325). He feared that its ever-increasing expansion could uproot Islam and deliver Muslims to a secular way of thinking that was devoid of *taqwā,* which he already witnessed happening among government officials in the 1920's (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 25). Determined not to let this happen, he accused historical materialism (Marxism) of being *al-Dajjal* (the anti-Christ) (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 24; Nursi, 2010: 364). In the spiritual void that accompanied the collapse of western Christianity in Europe – the "sick old man" – the secularization of society, as well as the failure of the bourgeois revolutions to adequately embody their own claims of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité,* Marxism began to fulfill many of the needs of the masses who yearned to escape from their social atomization, their feeling of existential meaninglessness, and the drudgeries of life under industrial capitalism (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 17). In the West, Marxism became the new quasi-religion that filled the expanding void left by modernity's first religion: capitalism. Thus, Marxism can be seen as a "modern" religion of reason and science that threatened to destabilize

the Muslim world not only because of its atheistic outlook, but also because it emphasized *class solidarity*, which cuts across national and religious boundaries, dividing communities by their social ranks. This is in stark contrast to the Islamic notion of *ʿaṣabīya* (solidarity) in the form of the *ummah* (religious community), in which religion serves as the social adhesive that binds the entire Muslim community together regardless of class differences.[4] Yet, according to Marx, if all world history is the history of class struggle, naturally this would also pertain to the Muslim world, whose working class should also liberate itself from its Muslim ruling elites (Marx and Engels, 1978: 500).[5]

Said Nursi didn't experience the potential dangers of atheistic communism as liberation from class chains, but as a growing threat of *fitnah* (divisions within the Muslim community). Intra-ummah conflicts in an already fractured and weakened Muslim world would be the last thing the Muslims would need as it would be the inevitable result if the Muslim world were infected *en masse* by such class-antagonistic thought. Additionally, communism, Nursi believed, would lead to *unbelief* – turning away from Islam as a comprehensive worldview that guided the Muslim peoples. Predicated on Feuerbach's projection thesis, Marx wished to liberate mankind from the chains of religion as the precondition for their political-economic liberation (Marx and Engels, 1978: 32). Said Nursi recognized this threat and believed his *Risale-i Nūr* to be a potential "Qurʾānic barrier" to communism and the social chaos that would inevitably accompany it (Vahide, 2005: 278-279).

Freud's Naturalist Philosophy

Although Muslim scholars had long sense developed a science of psychology ('*Ilm al-Nafs*), the materialist-anthropocentric and atheistic form of psychology first developed by Sigmund Freud can be seen as another example of the modern materialist threat to Qurʾānic epistemology by Said Nursi (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 49-50).[6] Freud, holding anti-religious attitudes – although he did subsume some aspects of religion into his philosophy – understood religion to be a psychological illness, a threat to man's development and progress, and a barrier that needed to be negated. For Freud, religion was a necessary illusion constructed by the psychological needs of man: the original "universal obsessional neurosis" (Gay, 1995: 435). He says that religious ideals are "illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes" (Freud, 1964: 47). For Freud, the origins of religion lay not with a divine being who wishes to be known, worshiped, or heeded, but to the psychological needs of man

which stems from man being a material *product of nature* (as in the "natural world"). In this sense, nature and the evolutionary history of mankind is the author of man's mind, which in turn author's his psychological needs, as well as the religious traditions that fulfill those psychological needs. For Freud, man's objective psychological needs are the genesis of his concept of God, thus making man the creator of God, not the other way around. To this type of "naturalist" belief, Said Nursi retorts,

> Philosophy also has attributed a creative effect to cause and thereby attributing creative power to nature. Since it does not see the clear stamp upon everything signifying the Creator of all things, philosophy assumes nature to be the originator. It ignores the facts that nature, whose supposed power is ascribed to blind chance and necessity, is impotent, inanimate, unconscious, and blind. It attributes a part of creation to nature, although every element is but a missive from God, the Eternally Besought, relaying thousands of instances of exalted wisdom (Nursi, 2010: 562).

Freud does not believe that the theological claims of religion are the chief motivation for mankind's adherence. He thinks it is not because man is *convinced* of the claims of religion that he is *homo religiosus,* but because he has real *needs* that religion addresses (albeit falsely). If secular society could address those needs in a rational and scientific way then religion would inevitably vacate the life of humanity, as it is only because those needs are not addressed in secular society that religion remains. Additionally, in a rebuttal to Said Nursi's form of thinking – that social chaos would consume humanity without the constraints of revealed religion to guide us – Freud writes,

> If men are taught that there is no almighty and all-just God, no divine world-order and no future life, they will feel exempt from all obligations to obey the precepts of civilization. Everyone will, without inhibition or fear, follow his asocial, egoistic instincts and seek to exercise his power; Chaos, which we have banished through many thousands of years of the work of civilization, will come again. Even if we knew, and could prove, that religion was not in possession of the truth, we ought to conceal the fact and behave in the way prescribed by the philosophy of "As if" - and this in the interest of the preservation of us all... *I shall assert the view that civilization runs a greater risk if we maintain our present attitude to religion than if we give it up* (Freud,

1964: 56-57).

Likening his and other "scientific" theories of religion to the story of Saint Boniface, who cut down the Saxon's sacred tree – *Thor's Oak* – to demonstrate that no divine retribution would come, so too Freud wishes to cut down the tree of religion to prove to the world that not only is man more free without it, but is ultimately healthier. No longer would they live in eschatological terror and anxiety about the retribution of the divine father-figure (Freud, 1964: 65). For Freud, religion ultimately is a poison that *once* was a potent cure; where it was appropriate for humanity in a by-gone age, as it provided comfort, security, and way to meaningfully order the universe, it is now outdated and an impediment to man's potential flourishing; science, logic, and reason must replace religion in Freud's thought, if man is to progress beyond his historical infancy. Additionally, Freud believed psychoanalysis could serve many of the same functions as religion did in the past. Instead of confiding in the local Imam, Priest, Rabbi, or even sacred scripture, the individual should seek out the secular psychoanalyst for advice, comfort, and absolution, thus stripping away the authority and social role that religious clerics once had. Psychoanalysis, like Marxism, has become a new quasi-religion in the West. However, there is a dark side to humanity's civilization; in his 1930 book *Civilization and its Discontents* or *Das Unbehagen in der Kulture* (Uneasiness in Culture), Freud makes the argument that the more "civilized" we become, in other words the more religious and bound to social norms we become, the more humanity must repress its natural instincts, drives, and inclinations, thus causing us to become increasingly neurotic (Freud, 1962).[7] In his final judgment on religion, he saw it not as a liberational phenomenon, but one that enslaves us to irrationality, aggression, and mental sickness, even if in that sickness we feel consoled and anesthetized.

Logical Positivism

The last of the major worrisome materialist philosophies that was dominant in the West was Logical Positivism (Vahide, 2005: 192, 279; Nursi, 2010: xiv, xvii).[8] Hailing from Berlin and Vienna, logical positivism is a social theory that attempts to appropriate the scientific method from the natural sciences and apply it to the social sciences and humanities. Rooted in Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) social theories and Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) philosophy of language, the logical positivists insist that truth can only be determined by sound logic and or empirical scientific verification. Always anxious about the charge that social sciences are not really scientific because they cannot measure and verify the phenomenon they studied in

the same physical and exact way in which matter itself can be verified, the logical positivists attempted to overcome that critique by insisting on the primacy of the scientific method and logic. Outside of this method, truth cannot be established, as that which is unverifiable cannot be consider scientific, and that which is unscientific cannot be consider as truth. Clearly, logical positivism cuts deeply both into philosophy and religion, as both are often predicated on ideals, values, and principles that are not "verifiably" true through empirical scrutiny. In light of this position, religion, and its sacred "revealed" texts, can no longer establish the truthfulness of their claims simply by pronouncing them to be given from the divine; indeed, the divine itself is beyond the possibility of the "Bunsen burner." i.e. it is not subject to physical experimentation and verification. The problem for Said Nursi and other critics of Logical Positivism is that the scientific method itself reduces all that exists to simple appearances; the *world of appearances* – the *signifier* in Said Nursi thought – is the sole entity which is grappled with and that which is *signified*, i.e. the divine, is rejected as untruth because it escapes the scientific method (Nursi, 2010: 570). Positivism is the *metaphysics of what is the case*, a stance towards ultimate reality that rejects any existence or cognitive meaningfulness to anything that which cannot be comprehended by science or logic, thus it serves as the basis of *scientism* – an ideological belief and worldview which declares that only science can determine truth.[9] Science, for the positivist, becomes an absolute; no other way of knowing is legitimate in its purview. Therefore, if science cannot verify the claims of religion, then religion has to abandon its claims as being baseless and a product of man's imagination. For Said Nursi, the result of this rejection of the "unseen" was the degeneration of society, family, and brotherliness and a move towards selfishness, racism, and the breakdown of familial bonds, as it was these metaphysical norms that bound society together (Nursi, 2010: 558-563). Being rooted in a sterile form of Aristotelian logic, logical positivism emphasized *instrumental rationality* – the form of reasoning that deifies efficiency, technological thought, and mathematics at the expense of *communicative rationality,* which emphasizes moral goodness, discourse, self-reflexivity, and the logic of family, community, and nationhood. This reduction of the world to simple matter through the inculcation of calculative and numerate thought into the lifeworld led the German sociologist Max Weber to posit that modern (western) man has become "disenchanted" with the world; the sacredness, the otherness of religious experience, and the bonds of being-with-others evaporated at the hands of the inherent meaninglessness of mere materialism (Weber, 1976: 155). As society went through the totalizing process of rationalization, the less it understood its communicative basis. Said Nursi could see how the West excelled in

instrumental rationality through the advancement of their technology, but was simultaneously decaying morally from within. This, he believed, was the result of the abandonment of God and the turn to the human-self – the "self-referential" – as ultimate concern and the center of existence (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 67-71). Upon this turn-to-self came the collapse of the theological legitimation that served as the basis for moral norms.

The three essential characteristics that Marxism, Freudianism, and Logical Positivism all have in common are 1) the belief that man is the ultimate authority in regards to the life of mankind and has the ability to determine his own history, 2) that religion in general is a hindrance to man's freedom, his mental capacity, and his ability to understand the real world, and 3) all three release the individual from the constraints of traditional morality as found in the Abrahamic faith traditions; in other words, their unbelief leads to egoism, idolatry, naked aggression and unjust force (Nursi, 2010: 558-559). Whereas the social-historical context of post-Enlightenment Europe, with its abandonment of religion as a guiding force in society, makes these three phenomenon understandable – and even suitable to some degree – within the western context, they were seen by Said Nursi as completely "alien" to the Muslim world which had not abandoned its theo-centric worldview even if it had slipped into an age of *taqlīdi-īman* (faith by imitation). Appalled by the Muslim world's continual blind adoption of European ways-of-being as its own, Said Nursi invested all he knew about the perceived negative aspects of the West – especially it's materialist philosophies and its aggressive politics – towards abating, arresting, and or even reversing the trend, a trend he was seeing before his eyes in Turkey as the new Republic forced its secularization process upon the former Ottoman lands post WWI.

The Frankfurt School and Said Nursi – Determinate Negation or Revivification of Religion

World War I and World War II sparked an intense discussion about the nature of modernity, secularity, nationalism, racism, class struggle, and religion. In the middle of the discussion in Europe was the Frankfurt School for Social Research, what the Third Reich dubbed "Café Marx," a group of mainly Jewish intellectuals schooled in the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Among the first generation was critical theorists were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Leo Löwenthal. Although some had more of a religious background than others, all had some form of religious influence or education in their early years. Despite the fact that there were no conventional

believers within the group, their materialist philosophy, heavily indebted to Marx, nevertheless was rooted in the religious sentiment that is expressed both in Judaism and Islam: the *Bilderverbot* (image ban) of the Hebraic 2nd commandment.[10] Writing a letter to Otto O. Herz on the occasion of Theodor Adorno's funeral in 1969, Max Horkheimer attempted to explain the "complicated relationship" Adorno had with religion, but also how a core Jewish theological claim animated their critical political philosophy.[11] He states,

His father was of Jewish origin...[but] Teddie Adorno was baptized a Catholic, and because of the influence of a Protestant religious teacher, he was confirmed in the Protestant Church. I tell you this in order to make Adorno's complicated relationship to religion, to religious allegiance, comprehensible. On the other hand, may I say that the critical theory that we both had a hand in developing has its roots in Judaism. It arises from the idea: Thou shalt not make any graven image of God (Horkheimer in Claussen, 2008: 365).

The ban on constructing any ideological edifices that could serve as "images" of the absolute was the guiding spirit of the Frankfurt School, as they refused to ossify the materialist philosophies that they were the heirs of. This theological ban on images, which Said Nursi also ascribed to, was radicalized by the Frankfurt School to include any political-economic or utopian philosophies; never would they posit a positive articulation of the way the world should be in such a manner that it could be rendered into a new political-absolute which could later serve as an ideology of domination.[12] Adorno states in his *Negative Dialectics* that

The materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the opposite: it is only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived. Such absence concurs with the theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured; this is the substance of its negativity. At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree with theology (Adorno, 1999: 207).

They in fact *translated* the very religious Bilderverbot into secular liberational philosophy and directed its critical potential against all forms of oppressive ideology. No nation, no state, no political-economic system could be positively identified as a really existing utopia, nor can it be given a positive theological legitimation.[13]

Not only was the Jewish commandment a constitutional notion within this secular philosophy, but religion itself – especially its quest for a more reconciled future society as expressed in the longing for the totally other, paradise, heaven, Elysium, etc. – was deeply respected by the Frankfurt School. Although they understood an authentic and real religious life to be impossible in a post-Christian secular Europe,

for all the reasons that Nietzsche's "God is dead" maxim expressed, they nevertheless found it impossible to simply discard religion to the dustbin of history; for them religion had to be determinately negated (*bestimmte negation* or *aufheben*); some aspects of religion had to be *preserved within philosophy* while other parts had to be *negated.* The Critical Theorist Walter Benjamin, probably the most theologically inclined in the Frankfurt School – as he wrote "my thinking is related to theology as blotting pad is related to ink... it is saturated with it" – believed that theology (and therefore religion) had become too ugly in remain within the public sphere and thus had "wizened" and now "keeps out of sight" (Benjamin, 1999: 471; Benjamin 2007: 253). It is important to notice that Benjamin doesn't say religion/theology is *gone*; it is just *hidden*. Benjamin expressed in his thesis/story on the "little hunchback" within the Turkish puppet, that theology has been subsumed into historical materialism; it had become the animus that guides the praxis of revolutionary Marxism (as understood by the Frankfurt School).[14] Although Hannah Arendt described her friend Walter Benjamin as the "most peculiar Marxist ever produced by this movement," he nevertheless articulated a core principle of Critical Theory, that religious ideals, norms, and values, including the longing for absolute justice, peace, and unconditional love, which can no longer find legitimation in the divine, must be allowed to migrate from the depth of the *mythos* (sacred story) into secular philosophy; religious liberational potentials must be translated into secular philosophy if they are to 1) survive into modernity, and 2) to aid in the liberation of man from the degradation of modern capitalism, consumerism, selfishness, and the necrophilic society that has overtaken the West and is threatening the rest of the world (Arendt, 1968: 163).[15]

One should not make the mistake of thinking that the Frankfurt School was a religious institution; it was not a yeshiva. It remained deeply indebted to the same materialist philosophies condemned by Said Nursi, but understood those philosophies to have erred when engaging in an *abstract negation* of religion as opposed to a *determinate negation*. They threw "the baby out with the bathwater" and had nothing to adequately replace it with. Because modernity no longer respected the *longing for the Totally Other*, the sentiment that often animates religion and religious experiences, and found that that same longing remains despite the increasing secularity of society, modern man became aware that *something was missing* and that the necrophilic accumulation of commodities could not placate the longing for transcendence.[16] Reason alone could not adequately address the spiritual needs of a people that were liberated from traditional religious institutions but were still longing for spiritual nourishment. Recognizing the spiritual vacuum created by the

secularization of the lifeworld, Said Nursi stated in his 1911 *Damascus Sermon,* that "everybody has begun to realize that this narrow and transient world is not sufficient and cannot meet their boundless hopes and desires. After forty-five years and the appearance of irreligion, like a human being regions and states on the earth have begun to perceive this intense need of mankind" (Nursi, 2010a: 33). The Frankfurt School recognized this paradox within the Enlightenment and made it a central part of their theory. Thus they were never hostile towards religion even if they themselves couldn't return to its fold. Indeed, Horkheimer, in his book *Dawn and Decline* writes,

> *Faced with the sciences and the entire present situation, my idea of expressing the concept of an omnipotent and benevolent Being no longer as a dogma but as a longing that unites all men so that the horrible events, the injustice of history so far would not be permitted to be the final, ultimate fate of the victims, seems to come close to the solution of the problem: the role of faith becomes central.[17]*

For Horkheimer, the sense of the religious – rooted in the universal experience of longing for the totally other – is preserved within philosophy as it is the only thing that can simultaneously express religious sensitivities but do so through autonomous reason and secular language. Where religion fails to express itself outside of its own theologically closed universe of weighted semantics, philosophy now seizes that burden and articulates man's longing to be liberated from the barbarity and brutality of nature and history.

Yet for Adorno, the antagonism between reason and revelation was one that structured the secular-religious divide in modern secular society, for, as Old Said Nursi once proposed, if revelation and religious ideas were to be defended within the public sphere, they would have to be defended via reason, science, and logic and not through the closed semantic world of revelation.[18] However, that which impels the religious believer to articulate their positions through *post-metaphysical* and *publicly accessible reasoning* (reason autonomous from faith) and not through statements of belief, already presupposes the primacy of reason, which is a major concession on religion's part. Adorno states that,

> Such a defense against *ratio* had to be carried out with rational means and was in this respect, as Hegel pronounced in the *Phenomenology*, hopeless from the very start: with the means of argumentation it used, the very defense already assumed the principle that belonged to its adversary. Today the turn toward faith in revelation is a desperate reaction to just these very means, to *ratio* (Adorno, 2005: 136).

According to Adorno, autonomous reason's triumph in the West has already thoroughly secularized the lifeworld; it has delivered the society to rational and discursive decision making that no longer draws its strength, legitimacy, or motivation from religious traditions or sacred texts. In the shadow of Nursi's insistence on the relevancy of revelation, especially the Qurʾān, Adorno believes that the modern religious believers' loyalty to revelation is solely motivated by the hope of halting the "fury of destruction" brought about by autonomous reason (Adorno, 2005: 137). It is the transformation of society from a religious worldview into a secular *zeitgeist* that serves as the context for man's "return to religion." Again, echoing Freud, Adorno believes the abandonment of the secularity of autonomous reason and the consequent returning to revealed religion is motivated out of human *needs* and not the individual's being *convinced* of the claims of religion. He asserts that,

> *In the best case, that is, where it is not just a question of imitation and conformity, it is desire that produces such an attitude: it is not the truth and authenticity of the revelation that are decisive but rather the need for guidance, and confirmation of what is already firmly established, and also the hope that by means of a resolute decision alone one could breathe back that meaning into the disenchanted world under whose absence we have been suffering so long, as though we were mere spectators staring at something meaningless (Adorno, 2005: 137).*

For Adorno, those who have already succumbed to the primacy of reason, the secular way-of-being, and the realization that the world is meaningless – that which they learned from materialist philosophy – their new "religious attitude" is one motivated out of their existential anxiety about existing in a world without God, without meaning, and without a telos. What religion in the secular context provides are comfort, confirmation, and a feeling that meaning is imbued into reality, that history has a goal, and that the divine is present and in control. However, religion fails to adequately convince the believer of its own claims because it cannot do so via autonomous reason without abandoning the primacy of revelation; what is most important is what it *does* for the individual and not the *merits* of its own claims. The believer will believe the religious claim if and only if it is affective in wiping away or anesthetizing their anxiety, pain, or hopelessness concerning life. This is what gives religion its power in a thoroughly secularized world and this is precisely what Said Nursi was aware of. For Nursi, *taqlīdi Islam* is a faithless-faith due to its superficial and blind "emulation" of forebears that does not insist on authentic belief. It is rather an *identity defense mechanism* that is satisfied with a surface adherence to

Islam simply as a means of resisting westernization, secularization, and materialist ideologies. Nursi rejects such an *uneigentlichkeit* (inauthentic) form of Islam as it is devoid of the prophetic *geist des Islam* (spirit of Islam) and therefore cannot adequately serve as the foundation for renewal (*tajdīd*) of faith in the Muslim world; it is what Adorno claimed it to be: a religious renaissance that is more *philosophy of religion* – an intellectual curiosity devoid of true belief – than religion itself (Adorno, 2005: 137). Nursi rather advances the idea of a *tahqīq Islam*, one that is rooted in both conviction and investigation in order to avoid what Adorno articulated as being the problem with religious adherence in the modern world: its basis in *need* and not *conviction* (Turner and Horkuc, 2009: 47). In a statement that Nursi would surely agree with, Adorno wrote that "if religion is accepted for the sake of something other than its own truth content, then it undermines itself," and Islam, in Nursi's view, had already been undermined enough by alien ideologies and thus warranted no viability to the *taqlīdi* approach to faith (Adorno, 2005: 139). For Nursi, *tahqīq Islam* was the only true defense against both the corrosive effects of Western modernity and blind *taqlīd.* As such, the *Risale-i Nūr* was both a religious expression of *tahqīq Islam* and a philosophy of religion that was both intellectual and imbued with true faith.

For many Muslims unaware of the history of the West and its constant struggle between religion and the secular, there is a sense of amazement that European society found it liberational to sever the ties between the sacred and the profane, temporal power from religious institutions, morality from legality, and God from man. For many, it seems that Europe's fight to free itself from the bounds of religion was motivated by a selfish desire to liberate the *nafs* from the restrictions of religious morality. The evidence for such an analysis can be found in the historical developments that came about after Enlightenment: the rise of industrial capitalism, atheist communism, two world wars, the genocide of Europe's unwanted, the Cold War with its nuclear armaments, and the idolatrous consumer society that has now become globalized. Although that argument may have some intellectual merit, for the Frankfurt School, the liberation of society from religion was not an *abstract negation* of all religion, but a way of divesting institutional and state power from what the Frankfurt School called *positive religion* – religion that legitimates the given.

For the first generation of Critical Theorists, religion, especially Abrahamic religion, expressed the negative longing for a world more saturated with justice that this one; God, according to Horkheimer, was "for a long time the place where the idea was kept alive that there are other norms besides those to which nature and society give expression in their operation" (Horkheimer, 2002: 129). Dissatisfaction with the horror and terror of nature and history drove many to look to an other-worldly

alternative to the reality of the misery of the temporal life; in this sense, "religion is the record of the wishes, desires, and accusation of countless generations" (Horkheimer, 2002: 129). However, the Abrahamic tradition most dominant in the West, Christianity, quickly transformed from a religion of a persecuted minority to the religion of the empire, the religion that remembered the poor, hungry, and broken to the religion that glorified the rich, the satisfied, and the powerful, the religion of those who suffer in poverty to the legitimation of those who rule on opulence. From the perspective of the historical materialist, Christianity abandoned its *negative*-critical function, which was at odds with the ways of the world, and adorned itself with a *positive* function: it blessed the status quo. No longer were religious voices the voices of protest *against* the abuse of power, the oppression of the weak, the abandonment of orphans and widows, but rather the voices *of* power, *of* the oppressors, and *of* the orphan and widow makers. "Christianity," according to Horkheimer, "lost its function of expressing the ideal, to the extent that it became the bedfellow of the state" (Horkheimer, 2002: 129). Said Nursi himself, in his *Damascus Sermon,* attests to a similar argument; that the farther the West moved from its dominant religion – in this case the religion of positive Christianity – the more progressive and civilized it got. He states, "History shows that they [other religions] increased in civilization and progressed in relation to their weakness in adhering to their religions and bigotry," where he maintains it was opposite for the Muslim world (Nursi, 2010a: 30).

What the liberal Bourgeois Enlightenment, and later the Marxian Enlightenment, inherited from Christianity was not only the notion of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* – which were religious ideals before they were secularized by revolutionary philosophy – but also the *negative* aspect of the revealed Abrahamic faiths: that they represented the ideal of what society and the relations between men *ought* to be. In their utopic visions of paradise and heaven – the sum of all *oughts* – they maintained the possibility of a better and more reconciled future world, an ideal that stood in opposition to the world *as-it-is*. What materialist philosophy tried to remedy was the sin that both positive religion and idealist philosophy often commit: the abandonment of the finite individual in all his corporal pain and agony. In their zeal for the ideal, the spirit, the ephemeral, they forgot the realness of material deprivation, bodily misery, and the suffering that accompanies the world of nature and history. Where religion failed to prophetically articulate the alternative; where it failed to remain on the side of the victims of history; where it failed to resist the temptation of the "riches of this world," it inadvertently handed over those tasks to its secular heirs: historical materialists. For Horkheimer, western religion has been determinately negated by

secular praxis. He states,

> *Good will, solidarity with wretchedness, and the struggle for a better*
> *world have now thrown off their religious garb. The attitude of today's*
> *martyrs is no longer patience but action; their goal is no longer their*
> *own immortality in the afterlife but the happiness of men who come*
> *after them and for whom they know how to die... Mankind loses religion*
> *as it moves through history, but the loss leaves its mark behind. Part of*
> *the drives and desires which religious belief preserved and kept alive*
> *are detached from the inhibiting religious form and become productive*
> *forces in social practice (Horkheimer, 2002: 131).*

It was the failure of a once prophetic-negative religion – now turned priestly-affirmative – to embody its own liberational norms that led to its determinate negation by historical materialism. This was not motivated out of hatred for religion, but out of solidarity for the suffering.

Despite the fact that materialist philosophers such as Marx and Freud, and their heirs in the Frankfurt School could not "return to religion" in the way that Said Nursi advocated the Muslim world to do, they nevertheless preserved within their critical philosophy the desire to create a more peaceful and friendly relationship between mankind, including with the Muslim world. Their critique of the ills of modern society and the reasons believed to be the causes of such illness would have astonished Said Nursi had he been able to come into a discourse with them, as he would have recognized their overlapping consensus. Although he would not have approved of the idea of translating religious semantic and semiotic material into secular philosophy, he may have been able to recognize the wisdom in doing so in Europe where religion had already, for intents and purposes, died out.

Finding Common Cause: Preventing a New Era of Barbarism and Unbelief

Said Nursi diagnosed the problem of the modern world, especially within the Muslim majority countries, as being twofold, 1) the abandonment of an authentic Islamic life, and 2) the adoption of various alien ideologies, especially secular materialist philosophies. These philosophies had already overcome Christianity in Europe, had given birth to atheistic natural science as well as atheist politics, were being implemented in Muslim countries such as Turkey, and posed a real threat to the existence of Islam. For Nursi and other Islamic intellectuals, imams, *fuqahā'* (jurists), *mutakallimūn* (theologians), and activists, never before had Islam been so threatened

by another way-of-being-in-the-world as they were by secular materialism. Said Nursi made it the core mission in his work, especially in his *Risale-i Nūr*, to struggle against such infectious thinking by bolstering authentic *īman* (faith) in Islam by both proving its truthfulness and beneficial nature via reason and logic and doing so in a peaceful non-violent way. Said Nursi was well aware of the spiritual and social chaos that accompanied a life detached from religious truths and was determined to make sure that such a worldview and way-of-being didn't penetrate into the *dar al-Islam* and create a new age of barbarism and unbelief.

The Frankfurt School scholars were the products of the Enlightenment and the heirs, as well as the critics, to the materialist philosophers that Said Nursi condemned. However, instead of following them into their abstract negation of religion, the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists chose to engage in a determinate negation of religion and thus preserve the prophetic, liberational, and negative-critical aspects of the Abrahamic faith traditions, while allowing the pathological, criminal, and destructive elements of religion to be discarded. Alarmed by the death and destruction that was unleashed by the two World Wars, which they saw as the logical outcome of the industrial capitalism's expansion as well as the counter-veiling but just as destructive force of the Soviet Union, they warned the West about the moral and ethical dangers of reducing the world down to meaningless matter which was the worldview quickly being adopted through the secularization of the lifeworld via logical positivism. This worldview, they also believed, made mechanized genocide possible. Although they couldn't return to the religions of the forbearers, they nevertheless didn't want the West to move closer towards a world that was morally castrated and ethically debilitated: the world that could produce another Auschwitz. For the Frankfurt School, the West had already become fundamentally secular; the Enlightenment had forced the West to abandon its religious metaphysics for one that was grounded in reason and science as opposed to faith and revelation. Nevertheless, they were determined to rescue the Enlightenment from its own destructiveness by reintroducing translated religious semantics into it; the *awareness that something is missing* had to be remedied and a new way of thinking about religion and its potentials had to be considered.

In this sense, both Said Nursi and the Frankfurt School viewed the problems of the world in similar ways; first, the world is becoming increasingly secular and religious faith is becoming more untenable due to certain ideologies. Second, the vacuum that is created by the destruction of the religious – and therefore a meaning infused world – is being filled by crass consumerism, commercialization of life, and pseudo-religions that fail to offer an authentic and meaningful alternative to the world

of meaningless materialism. Third, both Said Nursi and the Frankfurt School recognize that *nationalism, racism,* and other forms of *incestuous political barbarity* are the result of these materialist ideologies and their loosening up of man's moral compass and his relationship with the divine. Because the secular way of life has no concrete legitimation and justification for their ethical norms, as they have liberated themselves from Biblical and Qurʾānic principles, values, and laws, they are able to justify any action through a relativist and man-made ethical systems. The divine and its commands have no place in man's ethical-life in a thoroughly secularized society. Although they cannot agree on the solution to the problem, as Said Nursi sees the proper Muslim response to such chaos to be the "revivification" (*tajdīd*) of religion – Islam – and the Frankfurt School sees the proper response to be in secular philosophy – Critical Theory – they can nevertheless engage in a comprehensive and robust dialogue, discourse, and debate as how they can work together to stymie, arrest, and or abate a global slip towards greater antagonisms between the West and the Muslim world as well as the reduction of the world down to simple material and the slide towards barbarity. They both experience the *necrophilic* nature of the modern society as being destructive to the true nature of mankind; modern man is deprived of his ability to live a spiritual life, a life of contemplation, a life of philosophical and religious speculation: an unalienated life; indeed, modern man has become spiritually and intellectually malnourished.

Conclusion

Although Said Nursi's message was not limited to Muslims, it may be the case that the Frankfurt School's secularization of religious semantics and semiotics into critical philosophy is more appropriate for the West where religion has long lost its veracity among the general population. Therefore, his recommendation for the revival of an authentic religion may simply be limited to the Muslim community where religion is still a fundamental component in the average lifeworld. According to Horkheimer, in the post-religious world of the West, philosophy becomes a form of consolation – a secular alternative to religion. He states that,

> *Right away, people always ask what should be done now, they demand an answer from philosophy as if it were a sect. They are in distress and want practical pointers... it has replaced theology but found no new heaven to which it might point, not even a heaven on earth. But it is true that it cannot rid itself of that idea, which is the reason people always ask it for the way that could take them there. As if it were not*

> *precisely the discovery of philosophy that that heaven is none to which*
> *a way can be shown (Horkheimer, 1978: 148).*

Although no "new heaven" can be found in philosophy, its role as the moral consciousness, the Socratic grand inquisitor of the world-as-it-is, and its potential to point, if not in the right direction, then at least in the direction away from social and global collapse, has not only been preserved but has also been strengthened by its appropriation of that role from prophetic and revealed religion. In the West, a self-reflexive critical philosophy that is rooted in materialism but takes seriously the revolutionary and liberational geist of religion, from which it appropriates into itself, maybe the only bulwark against the mad destructiveness of capitalism, crass materialism, and the consumer society. Additionally, on the individual level, it may be the case that the secular citizens of the West don't have to become morally deficient persons because they can no longer maintain faith in a divine being, but can adopt the attitude of the "x-experience." According to the Critical Theorist and psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, in his book *You Shall be as Gods,* the x-experience is a feeling of transcendence, a longing for "otherness" that is not expressed in this material world except through the being-with-others via the giving up of narcissism, ego-centrism, and the attachment to material things (Fromm, 1969: 47-51). Although it doesn't presuppose a relationship with a divine being, or even its existence, it does nevertheless preserve the sense of connectedness both to something beyond the mundane as well as with others. In this sense, secularity is not necessarily the precondition for the return to barbarity, but can rather open up a space for translated religious solidarity.

For Said Nursi, no such secular materialist philosophy, even if it does take into account the prophetic role of revealed religion, can suffice to save the Muslim world from the encroachment of secular materialism. Because the Muslim world is still rooted in a religious worldview and in faith – a faith that does not reject reason – and therefore still maintains that the world is meaningful, life has a purpose, history has a telos, and faith is rational, Said Nursi's attempts to re-invigorate authentic Islam among the Muslims is more appropriate than the Muslim world's attempt to adopt a philosophy and or ideology from the West to cure its spiritual and social illnesses. Coming into closer contact with the religious and historical resources from within the Islamic tradition is the most effective way of re-nourishing a faith community that has, at least since the beginning of colonialism, been starved of its own cultural sustenance. In his *Damascus Sermon*, Said Nursi speaks of the despair that has plagued the Muslim world. He states,

> *Despair is a most grievous sickness and it has entered the hearts of the world of Islam. It is despair that has as though killed us so that a small state of one or two million in the west has as though made twenty million Muslims in the east its servants and their country, its colony. And it is despair that has killed our high morals and causing us to abandon the public good, has restricted our sight to personal benefits.*

He continues,

> *And because of this despair, Muslims even suppose the indifference and despondency of others to be an excuse for their own laziness and say: "What is it to me?" Saying, "Everybody is contemptible, like me," they abandon the courageousness of belief and fail to perform their Islamic duties. Since the sickness of despair has inflicted so much tyranny on us and is killing us, we shall totally shatter it with the verse, do not despair of God's mercy! (Qurʾān, 39:53) (Nursi, 2010a: 48-49).*

This is a perfect illustration of Said Nursi's ability to diagnose the illness within Muslim society and then proceed to offer its cure: *al-Qurʾān.* The Ummah should refuse to fall into despair over the state of the Muslim world but should instead turn to the Qurʾān for guidance and renewal.

Said Nursi therefore insists on a religious response to the growing epidemic of materialist philosophy in the Muslim world. Interestingly, it is not the same religious response that so many "Islamists" today advocate: a violent "jihād" against the West, both within western and Muslim countries. Said Nursi completely rejected any form of violence that would disrupt public order; such chaos within the Muslims world, 1) demonstrates a lack confidence in Islam itself, 2) makes calling Muslims back to Islam more difficult, and 3) it opens the door for the West's most effective colonial tool: *divide et impera* (divide and conquer). Instead he advocated *mânevî jihād* – a "jihād of the word" as opposed to *jihād al-saif* (armed struggle) (Vahide, 2005: 323-324). This jihād (struggle) was to be waged primarily within the *dar al-Islam* as it attempted to return Muslims to their faith by invoking in them a sense of spiritual and intellectual inquisitiveness, an ability to recognize the divine proofs within the Qurʾān, and the desire to want to live in accordance to Allah's law. Said Nursi understood that warfare too often hardens the heart towards the divine and religion; that it often makes others deaf and blind to the benefits of the religious life, and that it poisons the soil from which *inter*-religious discourse and *intra*-religious discourse can take root. For Nursi, what was most important was that the Muslims return to Islam and the Qurʾānic way-of-being; he did not want to compromise this desire by

engaging in petty feuds, civil wars, or inter-civilizational conflicts.

In the end, both Said Nursi and the Frankfurt School represent two very different intellectual traditions, one that cannot agree on the role of religion in the modern world but can agree on the devastating effects caused by a world directed by crass materialism, human ego-centricity, necrophilic values, and rapacious ideologies that divide humanity as opposed to unite it. Despite their common cause, they both remain within their own intellectual boundaries, unable to reach across to the other in a meaningful way that could reconcile secular materialist philosophy and the prophetic religion on Islam. Although their shared critique of the modern world, with its descent into materialist meaninglessness and crass consumerism, is striking, their projects remain however too different to substantively integrate beyond the level of their common concern for the contemporary condition of humanity; while one calls for a return to religion via a honest and robust grappling with the sacred texts, traditions, etc., the other embraces the western secular Enlightenment while attempting to overcome its deficiencies through the translation of religious semantic and semiotic material into secular philosophy. Ultimately, one remains secular and the other religious. Despite their insurmountable differences, both can serve as a source of abundant potential towards producing a more-reconciled future society, if only in the form of an alliance.

Note

1. According to Nursi, "philosophy's deviation from the Straight Path, in disobedience to religion, caused Selfhood to take up the reins and gallop into error." Nursi, Said Bediüzzaman. The Words: The Reconstruction of Islamic Belief and Thought. Trans. Hüseyin Akarsu. (Clifton, NJ: The Light, Inc., 2010), 559.
2. For purposes of this article, the majority of Said Nursi's views on materialist philosophy will be taken from The Twelfth Word, in which he constructs a "brief comparison between the Qurʾān's wisdom and human philosophy and scientism." Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. Risale-i Nūr: The Words: The Reconstruction of Islamic Belief and Thought. (New Jersey: The Light, Inc., 2010), 145-151.
3. According to Vahide, Said Nursi argued against "uprooting religion and imposing philosophy in the form of positivism and nationalism" in Turkey, which had already a tremendous effect on Mustafa Kemal Pasha. See pg. 192 and 279.
4. Indeed, the word "religion" itself derives from the Latin religare, "to bind."

5. There is considerable debate about what Marx and Engels meant in the last statement on their Manifesto. In other writings they make it clear that only countries that have gone through a period of capitalism are capable of communist revolutions. However, with Vladimir Lenin and other subsequent Marxist reorienting Marx along the lines of global revolution, this phrase has taken a definite "international" interpretation, including by some in the Muslim world such as 'Ali Shari'ati, Jalal Al-i Ahmad, and Tan Malaka.

6. Turner and Horkuc quote Muhammad Rushdi Ubayd's "Methods of teaching in the Risale-i Nur" in International Symposium: The Reconstruction of Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. (Istanbul: Sözler Publications, 2000), 466-487. Despite Nursi's lack of specific discussion of Freud's work, Freud's materialist psychology is important to the argument I'm presenting especially because his work serves as one of the bases of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory.

7. One should note that Freud doesn't say it is exclusively religion that makes us neurotic, rather it is the clash of social norms and our biological/mental drives that create this mental illness. Religion, as an architect of social norms, is one among many forces within "civilization" against which the instincts rebel.

8. Again, it should be noted that although Said Nursi is critical of the effects and worldview associated with Logical Positivism, he does not directly address its primary texts or theorists.

9. One should distinguish between "truth" and "correctness" here. It is "correct" to say Muslims believe in God, but it would not be true to say that the Muslim God exists in reality according to Logical Positivists. The first is a descriptive protocol-sentence that expresses correctness; the second is a statement about ultimate reality. Logical Positivism rarely argues against correctness of any given description but rather limits what we can know about ultimate reality beyond the realm of appearances. Indeed, for the Logical Positivism, the realm of appearances is all that exists because it is all that can be verified.

10. Said Nursi speaks of the image ban saying, "The Qurʾān severely prohibits idolatry and condemns the adoration of images, which can be an imitation of idolatry." The Words. 428.

11. Theodor Adorno was the towering genius of the first generation of Frankfurt School scholars and along with Max Horkheimer, is most responsible for the philosophical trajectory of the Critical Theory of Social Research.

12. See my chapter entitled "Bilderverbot and Utopia: God without Image – Other World Unannounced" in Michael R. Ott's edited volume The Dialectics of the Religious and the Secular: Studies on the Future of Religion. Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2014.

13. The Frankfurt School displays a rather humble attitude towards man's capacity for "progress"; this attitude prevents them from adopting the common triumphalist

arrogance of the Western Enlightenment; an attitude that Said Nursi remained skeptical of. Although the Frankfurt School recognizes the great accomplishments of the Enlightenment, it is a key component in their philosophy that it also holds within itself the seed of its own destruction: enlightenment becomes myth, reason becomes irrational, and progress becomes barbarity. See Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, Theodor. The Dialectical of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Ed. Grunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

14.   However, the entire membership of the Frankfurt School rejected the idea that "vulgar Marxism," as embodied by Stalin's Soviet Union, was an honest reflection of Marx or religion. For them it was as much as an abomination as capitalism.

15.   By "necrophilia" we mean the "love of death," or the "love of what's dead," i.e. devotion to dead material things.

16.   Even Said Nursi himself said, "even the most irreligious person is compelled to take refuge in religion," a sentiment that the Frankfurt School could fully understand. See Said Nursi. The Damascus Sermon. (Istanbul: Nur Publishers, 2010a), 32.

17.   My emphasis. Horkheimer has in mind here a more abstract sense of the word "religion," one closer to the original "religare": to bind. He believes that the longing for the totally other is a longing that binds all men without making them subject to dogmas and religious institutions. See Max Horkheimer. Dawn and Decline. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978), 239.

18.   One should note that it is not Said Nursi who posits reason and revelation as being particularly antagonistic, but rather it is the Frankfurt School who sees the distinction between the two to be a problem for the modern world. However, it is not true that Said Nursi privileged reason above faith. Rather, faith and/or belief in Allah, Muhammad's Prophethood, and the Qurʾān, were "objective truth" regardless of whether reason could demonstrate and/or prove their objectivity to anyone's satisfaction. In other words, had Said Nursi's attempt to prove the necessity of revelation via reason gone awry, he would not have rejected the divine origin of Islam, but would have attempted to rethink (via reason) his arguments. Therefore, for Nursi, the objective truth of Islam remains objective regardless of whether or not he or anyone else can prove it via reason. We can only conclude from this that Said Nursi privileged revelation over reason; as reason was but a tool to understand the truth of revelation and can be fallible unlike the Kalam Allah (God's word).

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Hizbullah's Religious Ideology and the differences with Sunni Islam

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Abstract

The "Party of God", Hizbullah, or the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon plays an important role in domestic as well as regional politics. Hizbullah witnessed remarkable transformations in the past three decades or so. From its rudimentary founding as an Islamic movement of social and political protest during 1978-1985, it evolved into a full-fledged social movement between 1985 and 1991, and then to a parliamentary political party since1992. Since its inception, Hizbullah has adopted Imam Khumayni's theory of *wilayat al-faqih* (guardianship of the jurisprudent) and sought its ideological application in Lebanese social and political conditions. As such, Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih* was imported to Lebanon, serving as a blue print of a 'progressive' Islamic state to be emulated by Hizbullah in its constituencies. This article studies – in considerable doctrinal detail – the religious elements in Hizbullah's ideology, while making a heuristic comparison with the tenets of Sunni Islam. The constituents of Hizbullah's religious ideology are the following: (1) belief in Shi'a Islam; (2) *wilayat al-faqih* (guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); (3) and jihad (struggle) in the way of God. Ever since its emergence, Hizbullah has been a party in which the *'ulama* (Muslim religious scholars) played, and still play, an important role. I endeavour to find out what is so specific and different about Hizbullah's interpretation of the Shi'ite religious ideology. In particular, I gauge the role of the *'ulama* in the formation and development of Hizbullah's Islamist ideology under *wilayat al-faqih*'s varying influence.

Keywords: Religious ideology; Shi'ite Islam; wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent); Imamate; hujja (apodictic proof).

Introduction

Some scholars believe that ideological twists seldom influence actual political behaviour, which are generally motivated by contingent factors. Ideology becomes handy principally to justify actions after they are decided upon, or implemented. However, that might not be the case for two reasons: (1) the treatment of ideology is central to a proper understanding of Hizbullah. In this sense, it is adequate, even though it desisted from the demystification of the ideological; (2) without that treatment, Hizbullah's profile becomes simply that of a regional force, with little indication by way of its distinctive political language, the elements that make Hizbullah distinctive, and not merely as a regional actor.

   The constituents of the Shi'ite religious ideology, which form the background of Hizbullah's religious ideology are the following: (1) belief in Shi'ite Islam (Zemni and Maréchal, 2012)[1]; (2) *wilayat al-faqih* (guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); (3) and *jihad* (struggle) *fi sabili Allah* (in the way of God). (Qasim, 2002: 25-78).[2] "Section I" describes the classical Shi'ite doctrines or the fundamentals of the Shi'ite faith and its basic historical development in order to determine which lines and outlook Hizbullah follows; "Section II" discusses Imam Khumayni's elaboration of the Shi'ite religious ideology; "Section III" outlines Sayyid Fadlallah's possible contribution to Hizbullah's ideology and thinking; and "Section IV" highlights Hizbullah's acceptance, choice, and application of this heritage indicating on what does Hizbullah put emphasis on. This will be followed by a summary of the basic constituents of Hizbullah's religious ideology.

Section I: The Basic Shi'ite Foundational Religious Ideology

1. Belief in Shi'ite Islam

Traditionally, Twelver Shi'ite communities − in addition to their belief in the   (1) *Imama* (doctrine of the Imamate) as a fundamental requirement of faith − believed also in the necessity of practicing (2) *taqiyya* (expedient dissimulation) as a quietist practice for protecting the self, and (3) *ta'bi'a* (mobilization), at a later stage, as an activist practice for defending the self. These three principles offer an insight into the basic Shi'ite religious ideology.

1.1 Imama

All Muslims believe in *arkan al-Islam* (five pillars of Islam) and *usul al-din* (the fundamental principles of religion or the foundations of faith). The *arkan* are the following: *al-shahadatayn*[3] (Muslim confession or declaration of faith); *salat* (the five daily ritual prayers); *sawm* (fasting in the holy month of Ramadan); *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca); and *zakat* (alms giving: 2.5% or 1/40). For Sunnis, *usul al-din* comprise the following three doctrines: *tawhid* (divine unity); *nubuwwa* (Prophethood or the message of the Prophet); and *al-ma'ad* (resurrection). To *usul al-din*, the Shi'ites add the following two doctrines: *Imama* (Imamate) and *'adl* (justice): "... the exclusive Shi'i principles of *imama* and *'adl*, the belief in the authority of the Imams and their special qualities and the notion of justice, to be fulfilled only with the return of the vanished Imam at the end of days [day of judgement] ... are the core Imami principles...". (Machlis, 2014: 62). Furthermore, all Muslims believe in practicing *jihad* (struggle in the way of God) and *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahi 'ann al-munkar* (enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil). However, Shi'ites stress the need to practice *khums*[4] (one-fifth religious tax). Thus, *khums* is another distinguishing feature of Shi'ism since the Sunnis confine themselves to *zakat*. Nevertheless, *Imama* (Imamate) remains for the Shi'ites the most salient distinguishing tenet that sets them apart from Sunni Islam. (Mughniyyé, 1966: 7; Shamseddine, 2000: 105; 382; Momen, 1985: 175-180; Machlis, 2014: 4, 60-62, 84, 137, 142).

   Imama, the most distinctive mark of Shi'ite Islam, stipulates that the essential, primary, and sufficient attributes of the Imam boil down to three principles, which form the essence of the Shi'ite theocratic dogma: (1) apostolic succession; (2) *al-'isma* (immunity from sin and error); and (3) perenniality or perpetuity of the Imamate.

1.1.1 Apostolic Succession

The Shi'ites believe that God instructed the Prophet to select 'Ali as his successor and designate him and his two sons, Hasan and Husayn, as Imams down to the Twelfth Imam; as such, the Prophet would have named the eleven Imams that would succeed 'Ali in the Imamate (Arjoumand, 1989: 110ff). Thus, from that time onwards, the Imams always designated their successors. However 'Ali, the first Imam, accepted Mu'awiya's *tahkim* (arbitration) in order to salvage Islam from internal or civil strife. After 'Ali was killed in January 661, Mu'awiya became Caliph. (Haykal, 1982: 105-108).

According to Shi'ite doctrine, the succession of the Imamate is determined only by *nass* (divinely inspired designation). *Nass* refers to the specific designation of an Imam by the preceding Imam. According to Shi'ite traditions, the *nass* is stipulated in the Qur'an (4:58): "God has ordered you to make over the trust to those who are entitled to them". (Shamseddine, 2000: 105-136). Thus, apostolic succession means that the Imams succeed each other exclusively in the Household of the Prophet. This first principle is labelled as *Imamat al-nass* (divine designation or textual *Imamat*) or "the conferment of the Imamate by designation or covenant". *Imamat al-nass* was first practiced when God conferred the title upon the Prophet. In a similar vein, the Imamate after the Prophet should be established solely by designation in order to determine his successors.[5] According to Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam, every Imam has foreknowledge of the Imam who is going to succeed him. That is why he designates him by *nass*. (Momen, 1985: 154). Thus, *nass* is blended with *'ilm* (religious knowledge), a subsidiary characteristic or attribute of the Imam. *'Ilm* stipulates that the Imam is the most learned in all branches of religious knowledge (*al-'ilm al-muhit or al-ihatah fi al-'ilm*), and he transmits his special religious knowledge to his successor. (Jafri, 1979: 291).

Since God, the Prophet, and the members of the House are the only ones knowledgeable about the Truth of Islam (Enayat, 1982: 22), the Imam, in his capacity as being designated by God through his Prophet as being the most learned in all branches of religious knowledge, is the only one entitled and capable of providing *ta'wil* (hermeneutics or an esoteric interpretation of the Qur'an), which is of fundamental importance and is the principal source of *shari'a* (divine law, Islamic law). Like the Mu'tazala and most mystics, the Twelver Shi'ites consider the Qur'an as created in time, the *created* Word of God, thus open to allegorical interpretation. (Jafri, 1979: 312). And so, for the Shi'ites, religion, and especially the Qur'an, has besides the exoteric meaning an esoteric meaning that can be only known through spiritual contact with Imam al-Mahdi. (Morris, 1987: 317). On these grounds, the Shi'ites believe that the twelve Imams are endowed with both esoteric and exoteric knowledge of the Qur'an and *hadith* (Prophetic Traditions). The divergence with the Sunnis is that the latter consider solely the Qur'an and Traditions as the primary sources of *shari'a*, while the Shi'ites consider that religion cannot be perfected except through the pursuit of both the exoteric (Qur'an and Traditions) and the esoteric (the Imam). The departure from the Sunnis in this respect is in the belief that Islam is not revealed to man once and for all in the Qur'anic text; rather, it is a continuous process awaiting the successive rise of the Imams. Thus, the Imam being the legatee and guardian of the *Shari'a*, the source of trust in the interpretation and the understanding

of both the esoteric and exoteric meanings of the Qur'an and *hadith*, is definitely the most erudite in religious matters. The Imam is the *hujja* (apodictic proof) of God to mankind, thus engendering a mandatory obedience on each and every Shi'ite. (Dabashi, 2011: 62-90). Kamali eloquently attributes this 'moderate' reasoning to the notion of graduality (*tadarruj*). He writes,

> The Shi'ite *'ulama* have advanced an additional understanding of gradualism (*tadarruj*) in the context of Shi'ite theology concerning the institution of Imamate. Thus, it is stated that the Prophet Muhammad was the repository of the complete treasure of religious precepts, he revealed some of them, leaving the rest undeclared because of the inexpediency of that particular period of history. It was necessitated thus by the 'wisdom of gradualness' (*hikmat al-tadrij*) for him to entrust the "undeclared precepts to his Executors, namely the Imams, and through them to the *mujtahid*s so that they would progressively reveal them at appropriate junctures". This analysis is further extended to the Shi'ite understanding of revelation, which is described as the process of growing religious consciousness of Man, as the evolution of his knowledge from the universal to the particular, from the abstract to the concrete through the agency of the Imams and the *mujtahid*s. This unfolding of revelation occurs gradually in course of time. (Kamali, 2015: 52).

Indeed, the Shi'ites consider the Imamate a divine appointment by designation (*al-istikhlaf bi al-nass wa al-ta'yyin*) or appointment of the successor or vicar by a divine designation, unlike the Sunnis who consider the Caliphate a product of consensus, thus a political process (*al-istikhlaf bi al-shura wa al-bayy'a*) or appointment of the successor or vicar by consultation and mutual homage. The Shi'ites abide by the following *hadiths*: "The Imams will not concur upon an error"; "Islam is still a fortress of the Twelve Imams", while the Sunnis adhere to the following *hadith*: "The *umma* will not concur upon an error". (Shamseddine, 2000: 380-382; Brunner and Ende, 2001).

1.1.2 Al-'isma (immunity from sin and error)

The second principle is *al-'isma* or infallibility and impeccability of the prophets and the Imams, which only God has foreknowledge of. The source of this infallibility from errors and immunity from sins is the Divine Light, which in turn will lead to *hikma* (divine wisdom). (Momen, 1985: 148-49; 151). The Shi'ite Imams, the guardians of the *shari'a*, who are deemed perfect and do not suffer from any defect,

are infallible and pure from any defilement; they do not commit sins whether major or minor. According to Shi'ite traditions this is substantiated by the Qur'an (33:33): "People of the House, God only desires to put away from you abomination and to cleanse you" ['make you really pure' according to other renderings].[6] This has been interpreted to signify the sinlessness of the Prophet, Fatima and the twelve Imams, which has also been demonstrated by tradition, the most eminent being: "I [Prophet Muhammad], 'Ali, Hasan, Husayn and nine of the descendants of Husayn are pure and sinless". (Shamseddine, 2000: 263). Moreover, *'isma* entails impeccability, sinlessness, and infallibility of the Imams. As Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq maintains: "The one who is sinless (*ma'sum*) is the one who is prevented by God from doing anything that God has forbidden. For God has said: 'He who cleaves to God is guided to the Straight Path' [*al-Sirat al-Mustaqim*]". (Momen, 1985: 155).

1.1.3 Perenniality or perpetuity of the Imamate

The third principle is perenniality or perpetuity of the Imamate, namely, the necessity for the permanent existence of an Imam. Thus, the earth is not left without a living Imam who is the *hadi* (guide) and *hujja* of God. The theory of the Imamate stipulated the necessity of the perpetual existence of a living Imam to guide mankind. The occultation of the Imam made him aloof from politics without encroaching on the principle of his perenniality. Ja'far al-Sadiq placed the Imam above the ruler, who must abide by what the Imam's religious edicts since he is the supreme religious authority. (Barut, 1994: 49-58).

A corollary of this category is the necessity of recognizing the living Imam. Shaykh Saduq or Ibn Babawayh[7] (306/918-381/991) asserted that remuneration is for belief in the Imam and recognizing him. Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq stressed that God prepares the ground for the death of a prophet only after He has ordered him to appoint a successor from his lineage… The Shi'ites should always recognize their Imam and obey him as a religious duty. Therefore, the existence of the Imam is a necessary grace. Indeed, it is the religious obligation of every Shi'ite to recognize and obey the Imam of his time. He who perishes without recognizing the Imam of his age – even though he has recognized past Imams – is doomed to eternal damnation, condemnation, and *jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic pagan) death. Thus, a Shi'ite cannot ascend to heaven without acknowledging the living Imam.[8]

Recognizing the Imam has been a complicated process for the Shi'ite community after the disappearance of the Twelveth Imam, al-Mahdi, at the age of seven, thus starting the Lesser Occultation in 874 AD. With this eventuality, the line of the twelve Imams came to an end. For the next 67 years Imam al-Mahdi maintained

communication with the Shi'ite community through four directly appointed intermediaries or private deputies. In 941 AD, a few days before the death of the fourth deputy, Imam al-Mahdi is believed to have declared the end of the Lesser Occultation, thus he severed communication with the Shi'ite community and declared the beginning of the Greater Occultation. (Al-Sadr, Vol. I 1992: 324-341).

In the Greater Occultation no deputies were appointed as intermediaries between Imam al-Mahdi and the Shi'ite community, rather the mode of representation of Imam al-Mahdi changed to a *na'ib 'am* (general deputy) by high-ranking *mujtahids* (Shi'ite jurists) whose integrity is unquestionable and who possess insight into temporal and religious matters. And so, the Shi'ite community has been waiting for the Mahdi's return, who will found justice and peace on earth by establishing an Ideal Islamic order (*nizam Islami*). (Al-Sadr, Vol. II 1992: 1992: 19-45).

Around the end of the eighteenth century[9], the leading *mujtahid* became synonymous with the *faqih* (jurisprudent) or *marja' al-taqlid*, who is considered the supreme Islamic legal authority to be emulated, or accepted for emulation, by the majority of the Shi'a in matters of religious practice and law since he is regarded as the most knowledgeable. (Haykal, 1982: 129ff).

The Development of marja'iyya (religious authority)

Shi'ite history has been replete with or characterised by a plurality, polarity, and multiplicity of *marja's* (religious authorities) who monopolised religious knowledge. *Marja'iyya* came about as a result of a struggle between the *Akhbari* and *Usuli* schools of jurisprudence, a struggle that slumbered for centuries and was only finally adjudicated a few centuries ago in favour of the *Usulis*, who stressed the right of the *'ulama* to *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and the *taqlid* (emulation) of living *mujtahid*s, practices which were totally opposed by the *Akhbaris*. *Marja'iyya* in Shi'ism got its prominence as a real power in society since the Safavid period. In fact, religious knowledge has been for centuries the sole prerogative of the institution of *marja'iyya* that appropriated, constructed, and disseminated that religious knowledge to the faithful Shi'ite populace, and through this process it accumulated and transformed this religious knowledge into religious legitimacy. Since the *marja's'* authority is measured by the following they muster, the relationship between them and the populace has been one of interdependence whereby the populace, through their payment of *al-huquq al-shar'iyya* (legal rights) of *zakat* and *khums* financially sustain the institution of *marja'iyya*, and in return the populace is granted a religious authority to emulate. Since the hierarchy of the *marja's* is measured by the size of

their following and wealth, and is not solely determined by their religious-academic qualifications – adhering to a certain *marja'iyya* not only wielded religious legitimacy, but also conferred a certain religious ideology to the populace. In principle, the Shi'ites follow the *marja'* whom they feel *itmi'nan*[10] (peace of mind) with. (Al-Nufaysi, 1986: 30-86; Wiley, 1992: 121-122; Cole, 2002: 58-77; *Ara' fi Al-Marja'iyya Al-Shi'iyya,* 1994: 481-501).

Stages of ijtihad leading to marja'iyya

The person who intends to become a *marja'*, also called *muqallad* (emulated or followed), should fulfil certain scholarly requirements to attain the degree of *marja'iyya*. Basically, he has to cover the following three levels: *al-muqaddimat* (the prolegomena), *al-sutuh* (corpus of knowledge), and *al-bahth al-kharij* (extracurricular research). In *al-muqaddimat* the student spends an average of three to five years learning grammar, rhetoric and logic. (Mallat, 1993: 39-40). In the *al-sutuh* the student studies jurisprudence and positive law (man-made law).

(Al-Bahadli, 1993: 274). The student spends three to six years in this stage, where he could freely choose his mentor/s who would recommend certain textbooks to be studied, in preparation to exercise independent reasoning. *Al-bahth al-kharij* is the third and final stage of religious study in which the graduate student heavily participates, in a seminar setting, in the ongoing debates taking place in the religious seminary. It is worth mentioning that this stage is referred to as the extracurricular research since there is no specific textbook; rather the mentor would lecture from his own notes, which are based on his knowledge. After fulfilling these criteria, the student acquires the title of *mujtahid*. It is noteworthy to mention that only after the *mujtahid* publishes his judicial decisions or *fatwas* (religious edits), he becomes a *marja'*. (Al-Bahadli, 1993: 194-5; 270-5).

The essential function of the *marja'* is to guide the community of those who "imitate" his teachings and follow his precepts, in particular concerning the following two issues: (1) the application of the rules of the *shari'a* as *furu' al-din* (subsidiary principles of religion) and (2) *ahkam* (judicial solutions or legal qualifications) in regard to the problems of contemporary life. Theoretically, the imitation or following of the *marja'* has no connection with *usul al-din*, which are derived from *iman* (faith) and from *yaqin* (inner conviction). The *mujtahid* established as *marja'* must pronounce judicial decisions and write one or more books as a *risala 'amaliyya* (practical treatise) in order to guide his followers. Only after publishing his *risala*

'amaliyya he becomes recognised as a Grand *marja'* or Grand Ayatullah. (Al-Bahadli, 1993: 201; 214).

Choosing the marja'

This is one of the hotly debated issues in Shi'ite history that has not been resolved yet, simply because there is no clear cut established method for choosing the *marja'*. The process of choosing a *marja'*, i.e. deciding on who is the most knowledgeable among the *mujtahids*, is influenced by many factors such as political, social, and even geographical considerations. Another problematic has to do with ethnicity; for instance, being an Arab or a Farsi (Persian). Being a graduate of the Iraqi Najaf religious seminary or the Iranian Qumm religious seminary is also at stake since the two religious seminaries have been in fierce competition over the leadership of the Shi'ite community. Usually the person who intends to become a *marja'*, who is a *mujtahid*, is "marketed" by a narrow clique that constitutes his entourage, who usually are either his disciples or his relatives. He is often promoted to attract more followers who emulate his religious authority, and thus pay the *khums* to him. Although the religious seminary has not provided a crystal clear method of choosing a *marja'*, nonetheless two very important elements has been accounted for in this regard. First, is the number of followers and their proximity. Second, is the number of *mujtahids* attending his lectures. A third less salient factor to be taken into consideration is his practical treatise and publications. Upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned premises the *marja'* enjoys *shaya'* (wide reputation), which enables him to join the status of grand *marja'*s who could have a say in establishing him as such. (Ibrahim, 1998: *Ara' fi Al-Marja'iyya Al-Shi'iyya*, 1994).

Taqiyya (expedient dissimulation) as a quietist practice

Taqiyya is rendered into English as precautionary, expedient, or religious dissimulation or concealment of one's true convictions or belief. It was practiced when the Shi'ites were facing great perils, which they could not shun or had no prospect of triumphant struggle and victory against. (Tabataba'i, 1988: 204-205). This precept of practice was employed when Shi'ism was still an underground movement in embryonic form struggling to face the Sunnite majority who had the upper hand in political matters. As such, *taqiyya* became part and parcel of Shi'ite tenets (Morris, 1987: 317), to the extent that it was regarded as their primary trait par excellence. (Enayat, 1982: 176; Jafri, 1979: 300).

The legitimisation and justification of taqiyya

In the Qur'an

The legitimisation of *taqiyya* is based on the Qur'an and *hadith*. The Qur'anic injunction of "enjoining the good, and forbidding the evil" (22:41) is regarded as one form of *taqiyya*.   (Strothmann, 1934: 628; Enayat, 1982: 179-80). *Taqiyya* is warranted in the Qur'an in verses such as (3:28), (16:106), and (40:28).

Verse (3:28): "Let not the believers take disbelievers for their friends in preference to believers. Whoso doeth that hath no connection with Allah unless (it be) that ye but guard yourselves against them [*tattaqu minhum*, from the same root as *taqiyya*] taking (as it were) security [*tuqatan*, again from the same root as *taqiyya*]. Allah biddeth you beware (only) of Himself. Unto Allah is the journeying". Thus, God adamantly prohibits any kind of intimate relationship with unbelievers or infidels. Therefore, the believer should use his discretion to scout out danger and avoid a relationship that might unnecessarily endanger his life. (Tabataba'i, 1988: 205).

Verse (16:106): "Whoever disbelieves in God after believing – *except for those who are compelled while their hearts are firm in faith* – and then finds ease in his disbelief, upon him will be the wrath of God' (The section of this verse in italics is held to refer to *taqiyya*)". (Momen, 1985: 183). This verse illustrates Prophet Muhammad's divine forgiveness, redemption, and purification from sin of 'Ammar ibn Yasir, an 'Alid companion of the Prophet, who was coerced under the threat of swords into denouncing his faith in Islam and accepting to worship the gods of Quraysh. 'Ammar did that nominally, outwardly; however, he remained a pious Muslim wholeheartedly which explains why Prophet Muhammad redeemed him.

Verse (40:28): "Then a believing man of Pharaoh's folk, who kept hidden his belief, said: Will you kill a man for saying: 'My Lord is Allah', and he has brought you the clear proofs from your Lord? If he is a liar, his lying will recoil upon him, but if he is truthful, you will be smitten with some of what he is promising you. Allah will not guide one who is an extravagant impostor". This verse exemplifies the story of a pious man, who, while concealing his faith, questioned the benefit of killing a man for the sake of his religion. (Enayat, 1982: 176).

In the Hadith

There is a whole body of *hadith*s attributed to Imam 'Ali and other Imams such as Imam Hasan, Imam al-Baqir, and especially Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq sanctioning *taqiyya* and emphasizing its vital as an integral part of religion and true piety. (Morris, 1987: 337). [11] Imam 'Ali stated: "It is the mark of belief to prefer justice if it injures you,

and injustice if it is of use to you"; "He among you who is most honoured before God is the most fearful (of God)", i.e. he who employs *taqiyya* the most; and "*Taqiyya* is our *jihad*". (Strothmann, 1934: 628). Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq asserted that *taqiyya* was practiced by Joseph and Abraham. (Jafri, 1979: 299). Ja'far al-Sadiq stressed *taqiyya* as the distinguishing trait of Shi'ite faith: "He who has no *taqiyya*, has no religion". (Enayat, 1982: 176). Al-Sadiq affirmed that the person who discloses the concealment and *taqiyya* of the Shi'ite faith is the one who rejects them. (Jafri, 1979: 298).

In addition to the legitimisation and justification of the *taqiyya* practice by the Qur'an and *hadith*, throughout the course of history almost every volume on Shi'ite jurisprudence contains a justification of *taqiyya* or outlines its principles. Ibn Babawayh stressed that whoever leaves the practice of *taqiyya* before the appearance of the Mahdi will be considered as apostatising and disobeying God, His Prophet, and His Imam. And so, *taqiyya* is a religious obligation imposed on every Twelver Shi'ite. (Enayat, 1982: 175-77).

In practicing *taqiyya*, the Shi'ites are guided by the precepts of practice and way of life as exemplified by their Imams, in particular, Ja'far al-Sadiq. The Shi'ites considered the occultation of the Twelfth Imam as the exemplary *taqiyya*. (Strothmann, 1934: 628). Following their Imams' model of political quietism, the Shi'ites practiced *taqiyya* in order to prevent their persecution and oppression, trying to adjust their roles to the various political regimes of the time. In practicing *taqiyya* the Shi'ites, especially the *'ulama*, did not take active part in politics, rather they favoured the practice and observance of religion. In summary the persecution of the Shi'ites as a religious minority led them to resort to *taqiyya*, as an esoteric quietist practice, in life-threatening situations. *Taqiyya* does not only include the concealment of one's convictions, but also the concealment of one's right to politics. Indeed, the *taqiyya* imprisoned the Shi'ites in political quietism, and provided the doctrinal bases for the depolitisation of the sect. (Momen, 1985: 183).

1.3 Ta'bi'a (mobilization) as an activist practice and Imam Husayn's martyrdom

Ta'bi'a is a militant practice in Shi'ism, as in other Muslim sects, although its implementation varies among different sects in accordance with their ideological

background. In the specific Shi'ite case, *ta'bi'a* is defined as an act of mobilization whereby the Shi'ites – emulating Imam Husayn's revolution – rebel, mobilize, and endeavour to seize power and take control of government in order to establish the rule of God or Islamic *shari'a*, in other words, an Islamic order. (Sachedina, 1991: 421).[12] The *ta'bi'a* approach has a major historical precedent. Imam Husayn – *Sayyid al-Shuhada* (the leading martyr) according to Shi'ite doctrine – mobilized his followers and revolted against the Umayyads, who according to him, deviated from Islam, in order to restore the right of the Holy House of the Prophet to government. Imam Husayn marshalled his followers and faced the Umayyads at the eminent battle of *Karbala'* on the tenth of *Muharram[13]* 61 AH (October 9, 680 AD) where he and around 70 of his family, close relatives, companions, and faithful followers were killed and overrun by the Umayyads who outnumbered them and were by far better equipped. It is believed by devout Shi'ites that Imam Husayn was "martyred" in defence of reform in the *umma*, fully knowing that his stance will lead to his martyrdom: "I [Husayn] fought for the reform in my grandfather's [Prophet Muhammad's] *umma*, and in order to uproot the tyrannical, oppressor ruler... God willed to see me killed and slaughtered aggressively and oppressively" (Jafri, 1979: 174-221), as attributed to him.

> *Because this eventuality occurred on the tenth of Muharram, it was dubbed 'Ashura. Since then, the Shi'ites, all over the world, classified Karbala' as one of the greatest incidents in history and commemorated 'Ashura, mourning the martyrdom of imam Husayn by walking barefooted while beating their chests, slashing their scalps with swords, and whipping themselves with chains. (Sachedina, 1991: 407-410).[14] Over the period 750 to 950 AD, the Shi'ites split into Zaydis, Twelvers, and Isma'ili factions. In general, the Zaydis favoured political action, the Twelvers were political quietists, and the Isma'ilis adhered to batin (esoteric) and 'irfan (gnostic) ideas. (Momen, 1985: 220).*

Although some authors (Strothmann, 1934: 629)[15] seem to refer to the martyrdom of Imam Husayn as being "unnecessary and useless" i.e. futile, it is most likely that the classical denotative meaning of *jihad* has been radically transformed through his martyrdom. (Al-Katib, 1998: 292-299).[16] An important significance of Imam Husayn's martyrdom is its mobilizational effect on the Shi'ites through a bitter feeling of injustice, enjoining them to alter that injustice by practicing *ta'bi'a* and activism against unjust governments.[17]

1.4 Conclusion on taqiyya and ta'bi'a: Shi'ism as a religious ideology: quietism and activisim

Historically, Twelver Shi'ism has been characterised by quietism and activisim (Sachedina, 2001: 131-2, 145; Lewis, 1987: 32), which find their respective application in *taqiyya* and what is defined as *ta'bi'a* in Arabic and *basij* in Persian:

> *As a religious ideology Shi'ism functions within a specific sociopolitical order which constantly calls upon it's adherents whether to defend and preserve or to overthrow and transform…Shi'ite religious ideology is both a critical assessment of human society and a program of action, whether leaning toward a quietist authoritarianism or an activist radicalism, as the situation may require, to realize God's will on earth to the fullest extent possible. (Sachedina, 1991: 420).*

Noteworthy, in both practices, namely *taqiyya* and *ta'bi'a*, the Shi'ites are guided by the precepts of practice or ways of life of their Imams. For instance, Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq practiced *taqiyya*, while Imam Husayn practiced *ta'bi'a*. And so, the Shi'ites have been split into two factions: those calling for *taqiyya* and adapting themselves to the various regimes; those calling for *ta'bi'a* with the aim of assuming power under the guardianship and authority of the *'ulama*. During the historical period in which *taqiyya* was practiced, *'Ashura* celebrations were carried underground due to fear of persecution by the successive ruling Sunni regimes. Thus, with the practice of *ta'bi'a*, quietism was replaced by activism. However, this mobilization and activism remained underground – form roughly 680 AD until the period of the Great Occultation in 941 AD – due to the successive Sunni regimes repression on the Shi'ite population. Establishing an Islamic order had not been realized because the Shi'ites, up till the mid-twentieth century, interpreted the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in mystical, lyrical, and emotional terms, which were devoid of any political-activist application:

> [F]ollowing numerous unsuccessful attempts by the Shi'ite leaders at different times in their history to overthrow the ruling power (even when the power was Shi'ite), Shi'ites adopted the quietist attitude rather than the activist one. There is *sufficient historical precedent* to argue that the quietist attitude was at times adopted as a strategy for survival rather than as principle in itself. In the face of unfavorable circumstances it became imperative to protect Shi'ite life from destruction. Moreover, such quietist passivity was justified as a religiously sanctioned strategy *(taqiyya)* to allow for time to regroup

and reorganize for future activism. These realities render difficult the task of charting precisely the ebb and flow of Shi'ite activism, for given the proper sociopolitical conditions, the activist mentality may be seen as merely dormant or latent within Shi'ite quietism... recent Shi'ite activism has, as in the past, emerged after a period of relative quietism in large part because of the central role played by Shi'ite religious leaders and their radical teachings in response to specific sociopolitical conditions. (Sachedina, 1991: 408).

Although it seems that the theory of *ta'bi'a* and activism dates back and can be traced to Imam Husayn's martyrdom, however, the successful implementation of that theory by Twelver Shi'ites in modern times dates back to the third quarter of the twentieth century. *Ta'bi'a* started with Imam Husayn, then it withered away for many centuries (at least exoteric mobilization), and then it was revived again by Imam Khumayni starting the early 1960s. By emulating Imam Husayn, *ta'bi'a* materialised in the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.[18] It should be noted here, however, that following the death of Imam Husayn, the Shi'ite leadership went through a state of quietest resistance that was manifested mainly in the literary and poetic enterprises by Shi'ite scholars. This continued till the sixteenth century when the founder of Safavid Persia, Shah Isma'il, launched his war to unite the country under his rule by employing the slogan of retaining the lost rights of the Prophet's Household (through *ta'bi'a*). Thus, for the first time after a lapse of centuries, Shi'ite militant activism was revived and a Shi'ite state was established in Iran. (Arjomand, 1984: 109-209). In brief, this change that took place by the advent of the Safavids continued to show its impact on the Shi'ites till today. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1905, and before that the Tobacco Crisis a decade earlier, and finally the Islamic Revolution in 1979, were all variant manifestations of what Shah Isma'il has started and changed in the nature of the Shi'ite *ta'bi'a*. (Momen, 1985: 246-249).[19]

2.   Wilayat al-Faqih (Governance of the Jurisprudent or Jurisconsult)

2.1 Definition of wilaya (governance, spiritual guidance)

Wilaya can have two connotations: (1) temporal government or the authority to govern with the right to demand obedience; and (2) spiritual guidance and sanctity.

According to Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq,

> The Imam is seen as the spiritual friend or supporter [*wali*] who guides and initiates mankind into the mystical or inner [esoteric] truth of religion. It is through him that God's grace reaches the Earth... the Imam [guides] mankind onto the path of spiritual enlightenment and progress [he is] master and friend in the journey of spirit. (Momen, 1985: 157).

Thus, *wilaya* is "the primary expression of the Islamic belief system. [It] is not the conventional fundamental pillars of Islamic faith, but rather the comprehensive relationship of the Muslim community to the legitimately constituted authority in Islamic public order. This is the meaning of the cardinal doctrine of wilayah, and it is the sole criterion for judging true faith in Shiism". (Sachedina, 1980: 6).

2.1.2 Historical survey of the wilayat al-faqih doctrine

Wilayat al-faqih refers to the rule of the religious jurist. Throughout the course of history many Shi'ite *'ulama* have contributed to the *wilayat al-faqih* doctrine with varying degrees, from a rudimentary perspective to an evolutionary one. (Kadivar, 2000).[20] The precursor who paved the way and laid the foundation of this doctrine is al-Karaki[21] (1465-1533) who pioneered the suggestion that the *'ulama* were the *na'ib al-'amm* of Imam al-Mahdi. Al-Karaki's disciple, Shahid al-Thani (1506-1558) is considered as the founding father of the doctrine. His contribution to the *wilayat al-faqih* doctrine consists in that he "took the concept of *Na'ib al-'Amm* to its logical conclusion in the *religious* sphere and applied it to all the religious functions and prerogatives of the Hidden Imam. Thus, the judicial authority of the *'ulama* now became a direct reflection of the authority of the Imam himself...". (Momen, 1985: 190).

Bihbahani (1706-1792) had the conviction in the *mujtahid's* ability to establish *hujja*. Prior to that, the title of *hujjat al-Islam* was only confined to Imam al-Mahdi. Moreover, in addition to his endorsement of the Usuli school on the right of the *'ulama* in *ijtihad,* Bihbahani settled the way for recognizing the legitimacy of the transfer of the Hidden Imam's religious authority, but *not* his political authority. A *mujtahid* was no more considered a general deputy of the Hidden Imam; rather, *mujtahid* and *faqih* became one and the same. Thus, Bihbahani considered the *mujtahids* as vicegerents of the Prophet in *religious matters only*. Therefore, his contribution lies in fusing the religious and social dimensions, but not the political. (Haykal, 1982: 127-131)

Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1771-1829), Bihbahani's disciple, supported the legitimacy of the legal speculation on the part of the *faqih* in the absence of the Hidden Imam. His emphasis on Prophet Muhammad's succession as being the prerogative of religious authority is of special importance since it brought the political dimension into the *wilayat al-faqih* doctrine. As such, al-Naraqi was the first to recognise the *faqih*'s right in *political authority*. Moreover, when he compared a *faqih* and a king, he placed the former above – not even juxtaposed to – the latter, thus, making him the supreme political figure of the community. And so, al-Naraqi was the first to stipulate that the political, religious, and social authority of the Hidden Imam can be transferred to and vested in the *faqih*. To recapitulate, his major contribution lies in adding the political dimension to the religious and social ones. (Al-Naraqi, 1995: 107ff).

Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Na'ini (1860-1936) became the leading *marja'* in Iran in 1920. Na'ini[22] stressed that in the Greater Occultation period, the best way to prevent an authority from becoming wayward is to abide by an Islamic constitution that guarantees the rights and duties of the citizens as well as those of the state. He recommended establishing a council comprised of leading mujtahids, intellectuals, and wise men who act in the interest of the people by supervising the implementation of the constitution and the affairs of the state. Na'ini stressed *wilayat al-umma 'ala nafsiha* (the governance of the *umma* by itself) as a legitimate right in the period of the Greater Occultation because this issue falls under the *hisbi* domain (things that God does not allow that we forsake)[23], rather than general *takalif* (delegated responsibilities, plural of *taklif*)[24] i.e. the governance of the *umma* by itself is a *political* and not a *shar'i* (religious-legal) issue. Since it is a practical impossibility for a Shi'ite to have the delegated responsibility to establish God's Governance, then he has delegated responsibility to institute the political-*hisbi* domain in conformity with the interest of the *umma*. This implies that his enrolment in politics is for the sole purpose of transforming a tyrannical power to a democratic authority that represents the *umma*. (Nasr et al, 1989: 314-318).[25]

3. Jihad in the way of God from a Shi'ite perspective[26]

The etymology of the word "*jihad*" is derived from the verb "*jahada*", which means to exert a person's energy or to do ones best to overcome trouble, difficulty, or hardship. *Jihad* is total devotion in performing one's religious duty, be it in action or in intention. (Al-Rikabi, 1997: 15-20; Al-Bahrani, 2003: 39-41).

3.1 The general Shiʻite understanding of jihad and its justification in the Qurʼan and hadith

The following Qurʼanic verse demonstrates the high stature of *jihad* and the *mujahidin* (those who carry out jihad) in Islam (9:88-89): "But the Apostle and those who believe with him struggle [*jahadu*] with their wealth and their lives. To those are the good things reserved, and those are the prosperous. Allah has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers flow, abiding therein forever. That is the great triumph!" The saliency of *jihad* is also noticed in a *hadith* attributed to the Prophet: "Heaven has a door called the 'door of the *mujahidin'*. When it opens, they go toward it, wearing their swords while the Angels are greeting them". (Al-Kulyami, 1961: 2).

Imam ʻAli enjoined *jihad*: "*Jihad* is one of the doors of Heaven, God opened it for his special saints. *Jihad* is the garment of the pious; it is God's shield and his assured Heaven". Another saying attributed to Iman ʻAli that conveys the paramount role of *jihad* is the following: "Belief has four pillars: patience, strong conviction, justice, and *jihad*". Imam Jaʻfar al-Sadiq exhorted believers to conduct *jihad*: "*Jihad* is the best thing after religious duties. (Al-Kulyami, 1961: 4; *Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 135-166).

A different *hadith* stresses that engaging in *jihad* leads to dignity, while not engaging in it leads to humiliation, loss, degeneration, and disintegration of the individual as well as the *umma*: "God clothes a person who leaves *jihad* with humiliation, poverty, and the destruction of his/her religion. God has dignified my [the Prophet's] *umma* with the hoofs of the horses[27] and the centres of the spears". The person who puts *jihad* aside will live humiliated on the personal level because he is crushed and totally impotent in front of his enemies, surrendering to their demands. He lives in paucity because his enemies manipulate his life and the resources of his country. He gradually loses his religion because he was not committed to *jihad*, which strengthens religion and fortifies the believers. (Ibn Babawayh, 1997: 673).

Another *hadith* states that if the believer is incapable of performing *jihad*, or if the objective circumstances preclude him from engaging in it, then, at least, he should live interacting with *jihad* and have the desire or intension to conduct it (as persuasive *jihad*), even if he communicated this desire to perform *jihad* within himself[28]: "If a person died and he did not participate in *jihad*, and did not even talk within himself about it, then he died the death of a hypocrite". This constitutes a different evaluation to life, preferring life with *jihad* in order to stand up for the right and dignity of the *umma*, as opposed to death in humiliation and capitulation, as Imam ʻAli had said:

"Death is living your life crushed with humiliation, and eternal life is granted to you if you die while performing *jihad*". (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 54, 135).[29]

3.1.1 Exoteric and esoteric jihad: smaller and greater jihad

The Qur'an portrays both exoteric and esoteric *jihad*. The former is warranted in (9:36): "…fight [*qatalu*] the polytheists all together just as they fight you all together; and know that Allah is on the side of the righteous". The latter is merited in (29:79): "And those who strive [*jahadu*] in Our cause We shall guide in our ways, and Allah is with the beneficent". The Prophet is reported to have said when he returned from some battles (*ghazawat*, singular of *ghazwa*): "We returned from the smaller *jihad* (*al-jihad al-asghar*) and we still have [to conduct] the greater *jihad* (*al-jihad al-akbar*)". When the Prophet was asked, what is the greater *jihad*? He replied: "the struggle with the self (*jihad al-nafs*)". (Al-'Amili, 2000: 553). God has sanctioned the smaller *jihad* in order to consolidate His religion, uphold His word, disseminate His mercy to whomever he wishes from his faithful servants, and to "… cause the Truth to triumph and nullify falsehood, even though the wicked sinners dislike it "(Qur'an 8:8). God has enjoined the greater *jihad* in order to save and lift up the souls of righteous people to heaven, and rid them from living according to the flesh and its material desires in women and wealth: "Attractive to mankind is made the love of the pleasures of women, children, heaps upon heaps of gold and silver, thoroughbred horses, cattle and cultivable land. Such is the pleasure of this worldly life, but unto Allah is the fairest return". "Say; 'Shall I tell you about something better than that?' For those who are God-fearing, from their Lord are gardens beneath which rivers flow, and in which they abide forever [along with] purified spouses and Allah's good pleasure. Allah sees His servants well!" (Qur'an 3:14-15). (Al-Qummi, 1999: 137-150).[30]

3.1.2 Smaller jihad: initiative (ibtida'i) offensive jihad and defensive (difa'i) jihad

The classical distinction of smaller *jihad*, as offensive and defensive *jihad*, is well known in Shi'a literature and interpretations. It is adequately discussed in the Shi'ite "manual" of *jihad* and martyrdom. (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 31-46).[31] The jurisprudents divide military *jihad* (smaller *jihad*) into the following two categories: (1) initiative offensive *jihad*, and (2) defensive *jihad*. Prophet Muhammad conducted offensive *jihad* in order to get rid of the infidels and build the foundations of the requisite social milieu for propagating Islam and disseminating its teachings. The following Qur'anic verses testify (justify) to that (9: 12-13): "But if they break

their oaths after their pledge [is made] and abuse your religion, then fight the leaders of unbelief; for they have no regard for oaths, and that perchance they may desist"; "Will you not fight a people who broke their oaths and intended to drive the Apostle out, seeing that they attacked first? Do you fear them? Surely, you ought to fear Allah more, if you are real believers". "And fight them, so that sedition might end and the only religion will be that of Allah. Then if they desist, Allah is fully aware of what they do". (8:39). (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 31-32).

3.1.2.1 Defensive jihad: military jihad and persuasive non-military jihad

Defensive *jihad* branches into military *jihad* and persuasive non-military *jihad*. Military *jihad* is carried by the Muslims in defence of Islam and the Islamic *umma*. According to the Shi'ite "manual" of *jihad* and martyrdom, defensive military *jihad* is a religious duty in the following nine contexts or circumstances (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 32ff; Al-Kulyami, 1961: 2):

(1) If the enemies of Islam attack the Muslim countries in order to terminate Islam, or contrived to do so, then: "And fight for the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not be aggressive. Surely Allah does not like the aggressors" (2:190).

(2) If the enemies of Islam attacked any of the Muslim countries in order to control it and colonise it, then: "Permission is given to those who fight because they are wronged. Surely Allah is capable of giving them victory". "Those who were driven out their homes unjustly, merely for their saying: 'Our Lord is Allah'… ". (22: 39-40).

(3) If a Muslim country is attacked by another Muslim country, then other Muslim countries should take the initiative to reconcile the two warring countries. If the aggressor refuses to yield to justice, then other Muslim countries should come to the aid of the aggressed upon Muslim country: "If two parties of the believers should fight one another, bring them peacefully together; but if one of them seeks to oppress the other, then fight the oppressor until it reverts to Allah's command. If it reverts, then bring them together in justice and be equitable; for Allah loves the equitable" (49:9).

(4) If there is an onslaught on the public wealth of Muslims and the national riches of the Muslim countries.

(5) If there is an offensive against the selves, possessions, and dignities of the Muslims.

(6) If there is an onslaught on worshiping God, and the mosques and places of prayer are attacked by the enemies in order to obliterate Islam: "…Had Allah not repelled some people by others, surely monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques, wherein the name of Allah is mentioned frequently, would have been demolished. Indeed, Allah will support whoever supports Him. Allah is surely Strong and Mighty" (22:40).

(7) Conduct *jihad* in order to defend Islamic culture and ethical norms, and preclude anti-Islamic cultural and moral campaigns from targeting the Islamic *umma*.

(8) Conduct *jihad* in order to defend the oppressed (*mustad'afin*) who did not have the capacity to defend themselves against the aggression and injustice of the oppressors (*mustakbirin*): "And why don't you fight for the cause of God [*fi sabili Allah*] and for the down-trodden [*mustad'afin*], men, women and children, who say: 'Lord, bring us out of this city whose inhabitants are unjust and grant us, from You, a protector, and grant us, from You, a supporter" (4:75).

(9) Conduct *jihad* in order to prevent the propagation of materialism and atheism: "So let those who sell the present life for the life to come fight in the way of Allah. Whoever fights in the way of Allah and is killed or conquers, We shall accord him a great reward" (4:74).

In these nine contexts or similar contexts and circumstances, the Shi'ites have the inalienable natural right in defending their honour, pride, dignity, and wealth. For Islam has made this responsibility incumbent upon their shoulders; if they portray any negligence in conducting this delicate responsibility of *jihad*, then the enemies of Islam will exercise despotism on the Muslims by controlling the political, social, economic, cultural, scientific, and military aspects. In addition, those Muslims who shun *jihad* will be punished and severely tortured at the day of judgement because they have deserted and abandoned their faith:

(9:24): "Say: 'If your (1) fathers, your (2) sons, your (3) brothers, your (4) spouses, your (5) relatives, the (6) wealth you have gained, a (7) trade you fear might slacken, and (8) dwellings you love are dearer to you than Allah and His Apostle or than fighting [*jihad*] in his way, then wait until Allah fulfils His decree. Allah does not guide the sinful people' ".[32]

(9:39): "If you do not march forth, He will inflict a very painful punishment on you and replace you by another people, and you will not harm Him in the least; for Allah has power over everything". (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 32-34).

3.1.2.2 Persuasive non-military jihad

Persuasive non-military *jihad* is *jihad* by the tongue and heart, while military *jihad* is *jihad* by the hand. The following *hadiths*, attributed to Imam Ali, support this interpretation: "Practice *jihad* in the way of God with your hands, if you could not, then practice *jihad* by your tongue, if you could not either, then practice *jihad* by your hearts"; "God enjoined you to practice *jihad* with your possessions, selves, and tongues in His way"; "The first type of *jihad* you practice is *jihad* by the hand, then *jihad* by the tongue, then by the heart. He who neither enjoined a good by his heart nor dissuaded an evil, he would be turned upside down"; "If a person engages in *jihad* in way of God, with his hand, tongue, and heart, then God would shower him with victory and dignity". In addition, Imam Ali specifies four categories of persuasive *jihad*: "Enjoin the good, forbid the evil, honesty in appropriate situations, hatred of the sinful. If a person enjoins the good, God will support him; if he forbids the evil, then he humiliates the hypocrites; if he is honest in appropriate situations, then he performed his due; if he despised the sinful and was angered for the way of God, then God's anger would be on his side". The "manual" of *jihad* stresses that Imam Ali's *hadith*s resonate the Prophet's *hadith*s: "The believer practices *jihad* with his sword and tongue"; "If a person among you sees evil, then let him change it with his hand; if he could not, then by his tongue; and if he could not, then by his heart, and this is the weakest of faith". (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 43-46).

3.2 The connection between jihad and martyrdom

According to Shi'ite sources, *jihad* is related to martyrdom. *Jihad* has two glorious fruits (*husnayayyn*). The word *husnayayyn* in (9:52) is taken to refer to martyrdom and victory[33]: "Say: 'Do you expect for us anything other than one of the two fairest outcomes (martyrdom and victory); while we await for you that Allah will smite you with a punishment, either from Him, or at our hands?' So wait and watch, we are waiting and watching you". (*Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 88; Al-Rikabi, 1997: 265; and Al-Hurr Al-'Amili, 1993: 48, Vol. 11, "Jihad").

3.3 Summary of the general Shi'ite understanding of jihad

The major distinction is between the smaller *jihad* (exoteric, external *jihad*) and greater *jihad* (esoteric, inner *jihad*). In addition, the following types of smaller *jihad* have been discussed: (1) Initiative *jihad* or offensive *jihad*, which cannot be practiced

anymore after the death of the Prophet and the Eleven Imams and the occultation of Imam al-Mahdi. Therefore, only Imam al-Mahdi can exercise offensive *jihad* upon his return. (2) Defensive *jihad*, which in turn branches into military *jihad* (fighting the enemy in the battlefield including martyrdom) and non-military *jihad* (persuasive *jihad*, such as by the tongue and heart, for instance). The distinction between greater *jihad* and smaller non-military *jihad* is meticulous. Greater *jihad* is transcendental-metaphysical, spiritual, and inner *jihad*; while non-military smaller *jihad* has to do with this world, with the here and now. Although non-military smaller *jihad* is mainly concerned with material things, however, it could also have a spiritual dimension, but not to the extent of the transcendental-spiritual dimensions of greater *jihad*.

Section II: Imam Khumayni's elaboration on the Shi'ite religious ideology

2. Imam Khumayni's stance on taqiyya and ta'bi'a: quietism and activism

Imam Khumayni blatantly rejected the *taqiyya* practice, which he considered to be one of the major sources of the quietism of the Shi'ites. According to Khumayni, *taqiyya* sanctions a person – in order to safeguard his life, money, honour or those of others – to utter an injunction contrary to factual evidence (reality) or to commit an action against the *shari'a*. He added that *taqiyya* is a non-binding practical necessity, which is an exception to the norm, rather than being a basic *shar'i* principle. His alternative was opting for mobilization and political activism; thus, he rejected the quietism of some *'ulama* who argued that sins should proliferate for the Mahdi to appear in order to redress injustice. By contending that if sins did not proliferate then the Twelveth Imam would not appear, they retreated from their guidance role. And so, Khumayni considered that the practice of *taqiyya* is legitimate only if it is intended to safeguard the self and others from the dangers resulting from the application of religious laws and rituals; however, he stressed that under the Islamic state the necessity and *maslaha* (interest) of resorting to *taqiyya* ceases to be. Khumayni affirmed that if Islam is in danger, then there is no room for *taqiyya* or quietism; he also enjoins the *'ulama* not to practice *taqiyya* and not to work for an unrighteous government. Moreover, according to Imam Khumayni another factor that contributed to the quietism of the Shi'ites was their belief that every government in the absence of the Hidden Imam is perverted and unjust even if it were headed by a Shi'ite.[34] As a result, the Shi'ite *'ulama* used to recommend to their followers not to indulge with government and to refuse governmental positions due to the fact that these governments were deemed unjust and *kuffar* (infidel), apostate governments

anathematising the political order. According to Khumayni, this attitude seems to explain why the Shi'ites until recent decades were not fairly represented in governmental positions; their negative attitude towards established government made them quietists and hampered their active participation in public and political life. (Khumayni, 1992a: 132-134; 192-194; Khumayni, 1996a: 60-65, 138-144,191-199).

Imam Khumayni depicted *Muharram* as the month of the victory of blood over the sword, which he regarded as a characterization of the Islamic Revolution as such. (Algar, 2001: 130). Khumayni argued that everything that the Islamic Revolution has achieved is the result of '*Ashura'*; he enjoined the Shi'ites to generate an *'Ashura'* in their struggle for establishing an Islamic order. He added, if Imam Husayn did not inspire[35] the Islamic Revolution, then it would not have been victorious. Khumayni asserted that Imam Husayn's mourning ceremonies (*majalis al-'aza'*) should not be given up because they give life to the Shi'ites and vitalise them. (Khumayni, 1992a: 167-170). According to Khumayni, *'Ashura'* means the radical change and establishing the community and the state by Islam. That is why any Islamic revolution regards Imam Husayn as its ideal, in the present and the future, by trying to emulate his revolution that rejected partial solutions and was adamant on Islam being the governing (or guiding principle) of all men's activities in this life. (Khumayni, 1992b: 156-169). Khumayni added, if it were not for the leading martyr (*sayyid al-shuhada*), Imam Husayn, then Yazid, his father (Mu'awiya), and his successors would have made the people forget Islam (by their hereditary succession)… Husayn's revolution protected Islam and led the way to the people to mobilize, revolt, and confront anything that would endanger the Message (Islam) through deflection and forgery… *'Ashura'* is the real perpetual revolution till God inherits the earth and everything on it. (Khumayni, 1992b: 303ff).

2.1 Imam Khumayni's contribution to wilayat al-faqih

Imam Khumayni highlighted the crucial role of *al-waliyy faqih* or *faqih*[36] as a leader of the state and people through his theory of *wilayat al-faqih*. According to Imam Khumayni, *wilayat al-faqih* denotes the guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult who is the most just and learned in all branches of religious knowledge. (Khumayni, 1996a: 45ff). Khumayni's contribution to *wilayat al-faqih* doctrine is his bringing the theory of *na'ib al-'am* to its logical end in the *political* sphere by stipulating and sanctioning the right of the *faqih*, not only to religious and social issues, as his predecessors have argued, but also to *political leadership*. (Abdul-Jabar, 2002: 61-89).[37] In line with the doctrine of the Imamate – which stipulates the Imam as the most learned in all theological sciences as well as the legitimate authority in

all religious, social, and primarily political spheres – the *wilayat al-faqih* sanctions the same legitimate authorities to the *faqih.*

In other words, Khumayni's contribution to *wilayat al-faqih* lies in his joining of *Imama* (Imamate) and *Wilaya* in one person for the first time after the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, which made possible, in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the establishment of an Islamic order. As such, *wilayat al-faqih* is bestowed upon and practiced by one person who is the universal authority in all religious, social, and *political* matters during the period of the Greater Occultation on behalf of the Hidden Imam. From this perspective stems its perennial importance to the Shi'ites in the whole Muslim world since they believed that the legal and just government could not be re-established until Imamate and *Wilaya* were united in one person. Moreover, since for them there was no explicit recognition of the separation of temporal and religious authority, the Imams were considered the supreme political and religious leaders of the community. And so, the *faqih,* in line with the Imam, is deemed the *hujja* of God to mankind, thus engendering a mandatory obedience (*wajib*) on each and every Shi'ite. (Khumayni, 1996a: 80ff). Imam Khumayni became the first supreme *faqih* who established the principal and tradition that future supreme *faqihs* should be selected by their predecessors, in line with the Imams who were designated by their predecessors. (Momen, 1985: 196-7; 296).

Indeed, the bestowing of political authority, in addition to religious and social ones, upon a just *faqih* provided the legitimate and religious framework for the establishment of an Islamic order, which was previously considered as a practical impossibility due to the monopoly of political authority by the Imams, and later on due to the Greater Occultation. Imam Khumayni stressed the necessity of establishing an Islamic order: "It is taken for granted or self-evident that the necessity of abiding by the injunctions that stipulated the establishment of Prophet Muhammad's government are not confined or limited to his time; rather they are a continuous process after his death". Basing himself on a host of Qur'anic verses[38], Imam Khumayni added that the injunctions of Islam are not transient, being confined to a specific place and time; rather they are perpetual (religious) duties that should be implemented till eternity. (Khumayni, 1996a: 47). On these grounds, Khumayni stipulated and strongly advocated that Muslims, in general, and Shi'ites, in particular, have an obligation (*wajib*) to establish Islamic order that would enlighten the Muslim populace through the following process: making it conscious of its rights; by halting injustice and oppression: every non-Islamic system is polytheism (*shirk*) and its ruler is regarded as a tyrannical and illegitimate (*taghut*); by stopping the corruption in the

land[39]: eliminating polytheism and illegitimate rule; by guiding people to the right path; and by protecting the Muslims from the tutelage of the enemies and their interference in the affairs of the Muslims. (Khumayni, 1996a: 86-88; 135-138).

And so, the *faqih*, who like the Imam is infallible[40], is the only one who has the final say in all executive, legislative, and judicial matters. As God's representative on earth, the *faqih* supervises the government and has the absolute power to declare its acts null and void. Khumayni affirmed, opposition to *wilayat al-faqih* "is denying the imams and Islam… *I must point out, the government which is a branch of the absolute governance of the Prophet of God is among the primary ordinances of Islam, and has precedence over all secondary ordinances such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage*". (Algar, June 1988, as quoted by Sachedina, 2001: 134, 136; also published in Farsi in *Kayhan* 13223, 16 *Jamadi Al-Awwal* 1409/ 6 January 1989). Therefore, Khumayni stipulated that the *maslaha* of the Islamic order or its agencies gains priority over any other principle in the social and political affairs. As such, Khumayni developed the theory of *al-wilaya al-mutlaqa* (absolute *wilaya*) in a way that could perfectly serve his political ends through giving the *waliyy al-faqih* absolute political and religious power.

In conclusion, although the doctrine of *wilayat al-faqih* cannot be only ascribed to Imam Khumayni since it is deeply rooted in classical Shi'ite thought; however, Khumayni was the first to implement the doctrine by combining the social, religious, and *political* dimensions, thus moving Shi'ism from *Imama* (Imamate) to *wilaya* (governance and spiritual guidance). The *faqih*, in the absence of the Hidden Imam is *the political and a religious leader* of the *umma*. (Mavini, 2001 in Walbridge, 2001: 183-201). Khumayni forcefully asserted that the *faqih* should depose or oust the ruler and rule in his place, thus establishing an Islamic order. And so, Imam Khumayni was the first *faqih* after the Great Occultation and in contemporary history to assume the title of the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi and to establish of an Islamic order through political revolution.

Khumayni practically proved, by the application of his *wilayat al-faqih* theory, that an Islamic order could be established during the period of the Great Occultation, before the return of Imam al-Mahdi. In other words, Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih* made possible the establishment of a just government in the absence of the Hidden Imam. Such possibility turned out to be the springboard of mobilization and political activism since it conferred upon the Shi'ites the religious duty to establish such a government. Khumayni's theory of government delegates a minimal role to the

people (populace) because he passionately believed in the role of the *'ulama* as leaders in both public affairs of the state and as spiritual advisors to the faithful. And so, the *'ulama* were not quietist anymore; on the contrary, they resorted to political activism being regarded as successors of the Hidden Imam, thus, engendering complete allegiance from the masses. Thus, *wilayat al-faqih* embeds and is flavoured by a revolutionary character because it calls for the active involvement (mobilization) of the *'ulama* in politics and government.

Khumayni's innovation was to unequivocally and cogently metamorphose *Wilayat al-Faqih* into a system of political administration. Khumayni in his capacity as *al-waliyy al-faqih* and *marja' al-taqlid* (authority of emulation), blended *Imama* with *wilaya* with *marja'iyya*, which is a precedent in Shi'ite religious ideology. This is of vital importance since in Shi'ite jurisprudence "the ruler's ordinance abrogates the *mujtahid*'s fatwa" (*hukum al-hakim yanqud fatwa al-mujtahid*), if the *maslaha* of the Islamic order requires such a course of action. Thus, Khumayni believed in and practiced absolute *wilaya*.

2.2 Tadhiyat al-Nafs (self-sacrifice) in connection to jihad and martyrdom

2.2.1 smaller military jihad and martyrdom

Imam Khumayni asserted that it is a must to obey *al-waliyy al-faqih* in general matters among it the defence of Islam and the Muslims against the infidels, the tyrants, and the aggressors. (*Tahrir Al-Wasila*, as cited in *Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin*, 1999: 35-37).[41] Khumayni employed sacrifice in the context of smaller *jihad* and martyrdom. He argued that there is nothing to be achieved without sacrifice and martyrdom; martyrdom is eternal bliss and dignity. In line with the classical Shi'ite understanding on the relationship between *jihad* and martyrdom (9:52), Khumayni stressed that pious Muslims who long for martyrdom are inevitably victorious; they have won eternal life, therefore, they are living martyrs. In according the martyrs a special status, Khumayni emphasized that they have sacrificed what God has granted them, so they have received God's blessings and eternal felicity; however he acknowledged that the rest of people, including himself, are different from them.[42] Khumayni added that this conviction in martyrdom is a source of tranquillity and the secret of the triumph of the Islamic Revolution. (Algar, 2001: 161ff).[43]

Khumayni declared that it is a legitimate and religious duty to sacrifice the self and possessions in defending the land and harbours of the Muslims that are besieged by a foe who threatens the Muslim community and territory or pale of Islam. (Khumayni, 1981: 485). According to him the raison d'être or legitimisation for the sacrifice of the self and possessions is found in a host of Qur'anic verses.[44] Khumayni was the first *faqih* to sanction martyrdom operations, for both men and women, arguing that they constitute the highest level of self-sacrifice for the sake of religion (*The Lebanese Council of Muslim Ulama*, 2002: 27-28): "[A]s Shi'ites we welcome any opportunity for sacrificing our blood. Our nation looks forward to an opportunity for self-sacrifice and martyrdom" (Antoun, 2001: 43)[45]; as such, "Red death is much better than black life" (Davis, 2003: 45).[46] During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) Imam Khumayni legitimised and enjoined martyrdom by ordering members of the *Bassidji* (around 1.5 million 12-year-old martyrs), who were wearing the "key to heaven", to walk through Iraqi landmines. He idealized kids who blew themselves in front of enemy tanks as leading martyrs. (Khosrokhavar, 1995: 415).[47]

Greater jihad (esoteric jihad)

According to Khumayni, greater *jihad* is the dynamic process that aims at altering reality by freeing the human being from the chains and bonds of material desires that weaken his soul and threatens his self with disintegration. He exhorts man to transcend worldly pleasures and the love of the world, with all its vices and corruption, and become engaged with spirituality (*ruhaniyyat*), having no aim save the love of God and His service in order to be able to practice greater *jihad*. Khumayni explains that man reaches this Truth when he moves to the hereafter where all the veils are ruptured (3:182) and (18:49). Then man realises the significance of his deeds in the world of the here and now and how they are weighed and reflected in the hereafter (99:7-8). All man's deeds would be exposed (41:21). Khumayni adds that people who believe in these things should restrain their selves in the transitory-transient world they live in and uphold their deeds, safeguard their tongues, watch out where they trod, and invest in reforming, purifying, and rectifying their selves. (Khumayni, 1980: 31-36).

Khumayni describes how this process of change takes place, which ultimately leads to self-refinement and self-purification as well as reformation of character. He stresses that God dispatched his prophets in order to deliver people from vices,

corruption, and moral turpitude, and to inculcate them with virtue, good manners, and noble ethical virtues (*makarim al-akhlaq*). (Khumayni, 1980: 22-23). He explains that the veils of darkness cover man when God is not the fundamental and basic goal as well as when man seeks engagement in vices and corruption (7:176). According to Khumayni, the Truth is hidden from man by a canopy of successive veils, which correspond to man's mortal sins and carnal desires. He explains that man cannot perform smaller *jihad* when his carnal desires have blinded his intellect and blurred his vision of the Truth. He should first transcend the here and now in order to tear down the veils of darkness and live according to the spirit and the love of God. This could only be done when man purifies his intentions, rectifies his deeds, and expels the love of glory, fame, and the self from his heart, directing all his attention to worshiping and prostrating to God, thanking him for His mercy and benevolence. Only then, man reaches a high stature that allows him to penetrate the veils of light and reach the source of Greatness and Truth by being completely detached from everything except God. Thus, the Muslim believer must engage in perpetual, non-abating *jihad* by striving to remove these veils so that God's light may enlighten his heart and mind and purify his soul or self; man has to remove these veils to become closer to God. Khumayni terms the struggle to remove the veils as greater *jihad*. He cautions that the believer cannot engage in smaller *jihad* unless all of these veils have been removed, thus purifying his self. (Khumayni, 1980: 57-58; 67-82).

According to Imam Khumayni, the practitioners of greater *jihad* should be well mannered and well versed in the tenets of Islam so that they could be the party of God (Hizbullah). He added that they ought to hold back themselves from the outer crust and the pleasures of life and be generous in sacrificing their selves in order to please God, uphold His word, advance Islamic ideas, and be of service to the *umma*. (Khumayni, 1980: 29). Khumayni stressed that after the believers build up, reform, purify, and refine their selves, then they could be of service to the *umma*: "Those who believe and do what is right, the Compassionate will favour with love [His love and that of their fellow creatures]" (19:95). On these grounds, Imam Khumayni enjoined the believers to practice *jihad* in the way of God, to exert and sacrifice their selves, and surely they would be handsomely rewarded and remunerated (*ajr*) by God, if not in this life, then in the life to come, which is much better for them since the heavenly remuneration is boundless and infinite. According to Khumayni, exercising greater *jihad* eventually leads these wise individuals (prospective martyrs) to conduct smaller military *jihad* by spilling their immaculate blood in the battlefield of martyrdom on the front lines. (Khumayni, 1980: 24-25).

In conclusion, building on the general Shi'ite understanding that differentiates between smaller military *jihad* (fighting the enemies of Islam in the battlefield), and greater *jihad* (the struggle with the self), Imam Khumayni broadened the mandate of greater *jihad* by arguing that any Muslim who does not engage in greater *jihad* is not a true believer and upholder of the faith. Instead of struggle with the self (*jihad al-nafs*), Khumayni preferred to use self-exertion (*mujahadat al-nafs*)[48] in the sense of a perpetual struggle that aims at annihilating the egocentric self. Khumayni reversed the classical order of practicing smaller *jihad* before greater *jihad*; for him smaller *jihad* is only a very minute dimension in the process of destroying the bonds and obliterating the bulwarks and veils of darkness and light that stand in the way of man's coalescence (*takamul*) with the greater good that bonds the Muslim community and allows him to reach the Truth. He stressed that the Muslim believer should first practice greater *jihad* before engaging in smaller *jihad*, greater *jihad* being the spearhead of change and the human being the fulcrum of this change. Khumayni emphasized that greater *jihad* is Islamic reform, reforming the person, the self, before reforming society. He radically redefined greater *jihad* giving it a mystical (*sufi*) and gnostic ('*irfani*) dimension.

This warrants an explanation. In brief, according to Khumayni gnosticism is delving into the essence of things in order to discover them i.e. convey things and portray them to the realm of vision and foresight. The esoteric and the exoteric can respectively be expressed through the transcendental-supernatural and the reality, which are complementary dimensions according to Khumayni. He based his distinction between exoteric and esoteric on the Qur'anic verse (30:7) "They Know the outward aspect of the present life [exoteric], but they are heedless of the Hereafter [esoteric]". This verse implies that the esoteric in this life leads to the hereafter, or, in other words, reaching the esoteric amounts to reaching the hereafter i.e. engaging in greater *jihad* amounts to a meta-level of spiritualism and transcendentalism that elevates man from the here and now to asymptotically reaching the hereafter. Thus, confining oneself to the exoteric dimension of living on the outer crust of the world leads to neglecting the hereafter, which also amounts to disregarding the Truth and reality in this world.[49]

Section III: Sayyid Fadlallah's possible contribution to Hizbullah's ideology and thinking

Although the late Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (1935-2010) rejected and was adamantly against Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih* (Ayatullah Fadlallah, 2001b: 17-

19)[50] and was continuously contesting Iranian religious authority, and even though Fadlallah is not Hizbullah's spiritual leader, this does not mean that his writings and thought did not influence Hizbullah's ideology[51] and thinking, especially Fadlallah's two most prominent books *Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa* (1976) and *Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya* (1984), which *al-hala al-Islamiyya* (the "Islamic Cultural Sphere") in Lebanon based its aspirations and goals upon.

In *Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa* Fadlallah addresses the logic of power in intellectual, political, social, economical, and military struggles. According to him, the revolutionary ideology of the logic of power is very important, especially when pressures mount on the *umma*, thus endangering or even jeopardizing Muslim religious beliefs, doctrinal causes, and the destiny of the *umma*. Hizbullah might have built on Fadlallah's logic of power in order to alter the notions of disinherited, downtrodden, and oppressed into empowerment.[52]

In *Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya* Fadlallah lays down the descriptions and prescriptions for Hizbullah's *umma* advocating the governance of the *umma* by itself as opposed to absolute *wilaya*, which, according to him, is idealistic and not deeply rooted in the Islamic state and society at large. (Ayatullah Fadlallah, 2001a: 65-108; 308-316). However the book as a whole constitutes a thorough research in the *shar'i* and jurisprudential foundations of Islamic politics and polity. Based on this theory and detailed vision, Fadlallah draws the milestones for any Islamic movement that bases itself on the Qur'an and the Sunna, taking into consideration the future of the Islamic movement in the wake of the chaos of conceptions rupturing the Islamic world at the time. After ten years of its publication, the book became a frame of reference to the Islamic movement since it, most likely, based its ideological conceptions on it. As such, Hizbullah identified with this collective Islamic identity as a guiding framework and precept of practice.[53]

Thus, it appears that Hizbullah's organizational-*jihadi* order concurs with Fadlallah's encyclopaedic religious and cultural authority, both from the perspective of temporary political order and in relation to the broader Islamic project[54]: "Hizbullah's deeds amplified Fadlallah's words, carrying his voice far beyond his own pulpit to a wider world. Fadlallah's words interpreted and justified Hizbullah's deeds, transforming resentment into resistance". (Kramer, 1997: 84). However, the differences between Hizbullah and Fadlallah visibly come to the fore if one delves into the particularities and specificities of each party. For instance, during the 1980s, Fadlallah has openly called for the rationalisation and routinisation of Hizbullah's

charisma arguing against Hizbullah's enthusiastic-unbalanced discourse. (*Al-Shira'*, 1984: 175-176). This criticism increased in the 1990s and reached a climax in 2005.

Fadlallah's reaction to Hizbullah's 'exploitation' of *al-taklif al-shar'i* in the 2005 parliamentary elections is a case in point. The debate started when, the back then leader of the parliamentary opposition Michel 'Aun (who repeatedly stated that the safety of the Resistance is conducive to the safety of Lebanon) criticized exploiting 'God' in the elections blasting Hizbullah's call for its supporters to vote in the elections from the stance of *al-taklif al-shar'i*. Hizbullah responded through the head of its Political Council, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, who argued that the party's *al-taklif al-shar'i* is in conformity with its strict obedience and discipline, which constitute the fulcrum of its organizational structure.[55]

Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah weighed in on the debate and blasted Hizbullah's employment of *taklif shar'i* in the elections, accusing the party of exploiting *taklif* as a commodity in the political bazaar in order to polish its reputation and boost its credentials. He cautioned that, on the long run, people would get used to these 'perverted practices' that do not adhere to religious safeguards and injunctions, an eventuality that would ultimately lead to stripping Islamic concepts and norms from their purity, authenticity, and reach out to the populace.[56] Sayyid Fadlallah clarified that Ayatullah Khamina'i considers that Hizbullah's leadership shoulders the responsibility of executing his injunctions through *taklif*, and abides by God's injunctions in both the religious and political spheres. In this way, *taklif* originates from personal choices that people are responsible for in front of God. Fadlallah added, by choosing a candidate, people are giving that incumbent a blank check. To the contrary, Fadlallah considers the people free to elect their representatives on the objective criteria of merit, probity and integrity: 'I do not consider that *al-taklif al-shar'i* amounts to electing the corrupt, the criminals, the murders, the wayward, etc.' Fadlallah concluded that Hizbullah employs *al-taklif al-shar'i* from the stance of a political-pragmatic *maslaha* (interest) in order to legitimise itself.[57] Thus, the Hizbullah-Fadlallah relationship can be characterised from the following perspective: 'Render unto Hizbullah what is to Hizbullah, and render unto Fadlallah what is to Fadlallah'. (Al-Madini, 1999: 203; Hasan Fadlallah, 1984: 83-89).[58]

Section IV: Hizbullah's application of the Basic Shi'ite Foundational Religious Ideology

3.1 BELIEF IN SHI'ITE ISLAM

3.1.1 Doctrine of the Imamate

As Twelver Shi'ites, Hizbullah's followers recognise the twelve Imams and pay homage to their established religious authority. However, since in Shi'ism emulating a dead *marja'* is considered an anomaly rather than the norm, Hizbullah stresses the absolute necessity of recognising the living Imam who is infallible and has absolute knowledge about the Qur'an, Traditions, and *shari'a*. (Qasim, 2002: 388).[59] Hizbullah specifically places heavy emphasis on this point since God, the Prophet, and the members of the House are the only ones knowledgeable about the Truth of Islam. Hizbullah acknowledges that in Shi'ite history there has always been disagreement on the issue of *marja'iyya*. As such, Hizbullah have repeatedly stated, "It is not the first time that disagreements surface over the religious authority. This is a normal issue in Shi'ite history". (Al-Hasani, 1994: 48-58; Al-Madini, 1999: 201). Hizbullah regarded highly Imam Khumayni, the official *marja' al-taqlid* of the Islamic Republic and paid homage to his religious authority as the first *faqih* after the Great Occultation and in contemporary history to assume the title of the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi.[60]

3.1.2 Taqiyya

Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah's Secretary General, argues that the *taqiyya* was a necessity imposed due to the political crackdown that was practiced against the Shi'ites during particular historical epochs. As such, persecuted Shi'ites resorted to *taqiyya* to prevent confrontation with unjust rulers. Nasrallah stated that this is precisely why Hizbullah's leaders and cadres exercised political *taqiyya* as a survival strategy and operated underground till 1984. According to him, the second reason of following *taqiyya* is to avoid *fitna* (dissention) and schism among the ranks of Muslims. From this perspective, Nasrallah declared that *fitna* should be warded off at all costs since its consequences would be catastrophic on the *umma*. As a practice of political *taqiyya*, Hizbullah has always called for unity, both in the Islamic and domestic fronts, in order to avoid *fitna*. (Salman, June 2000: 4).[61]

3.1.3 Ta'bi'a or mobilization

Hizbullah makes use of the *Karbala'* incident in order to marshal support and following through *ta'bi'a* or mobilization. Indeed in line with Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah followed the exoteric activist line of mobilization against century's backdrop of political quietism that was practiced by the majority of the Shi'ites. In line with the classical Shi'ite definition and Imam Khumayni's view of *ta'bi'a*, Hizbullah regards *ta'bi'a* as an act of mobilization whereby the community of the faithful, led by the *'ulama*, try to seize power and take control of government in order to establish the rule of God or Islamic *shari'a*, in other words, an Islamic order. This had been Hizbullah's motto and objective since the beginning, as conveyed by its first political declarations that were released in 1984-1985 and were signed as: "Hizbullah – The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon". (Hasan Fadlallah, 1994: 35; 163-183).[62]

Hizbullah outlines the framework of its method of Islamic mobilization by claiming that it is the most authentic and efficient way among the Islamists since it safeguards Muslim cultural authenticity from the materialism, consumerism, moral decadence, and cultural invasion of the East and West. As an Islamic *jihadi* movement, Hizbullah calls for mobilizing all resources in fighting the enemy as a doctrinal and practical necessity, while at the same time being balanced in this confrontation. (Al-Kurani, 1985: 9-20; 165-181).[63] Hizbullah stresses that mobilization forms the backbone of its recruitment strategy, which serves as a baptism ritual training. Mobilization and strict discipline are Hizbullah's salient features that set it apart from other movements, groups, and political parties.[64]

3.2 WILAYAT AL-FAQIH

3.2.1 Hizbullah's adoption of wilayat al-faqih

Hizbullah adopted Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih* as a major pillar of its religious ideology. Since its early beginnings, Hizbullah abided by the legitimate leadership of Imam Khumayni as the successor to the Prophet and the twelve Imams. Khumayni, who, being the most knowledgeable, had the epistemic competence and the leadership qualities, was the one who draws the general guidelines for work within the *umma*; that is why his orders and prohibitions should be enforced. Hizbullah considered Imam Khumayni as *waliyy amr al-Muslimin* (jurisconsult of the Muslims) or *al-waliyy al-faqih*, thus commanding to him absolute allegiance and loyalty in accordance with *al-mas'uliyya al-shar'iyya* (the legitimate and religious responsibility) to the *faqih*, who is the official Iranian *marja' al-taqlid*. The *faqih* specifies the *taklif* and he is the only one who determines legitimacy. (Hasan Fadlallah, 1994: 39-43; Qasim, 2002: 23).

3.2.2 Hizbullah's application of wilayat al-faqih

Hizbullah's connection to *wilayat al-faqih* falls within the domain of *taklif* and commitment, which are binding upon all the *mukalafin* (followers). The *mukalafin* might refer back to another *marja'*[65]; however, when it comes to *taqlid*, the final ordinance, in the general Islamic procession is for the *faqih*. (Qasim, 2002: 75). Qasim is making the distinction between "referring" to (consulting with) the *marja'* and emulating him. Qasim means that in terms of the private domain of *ibadat* (ritual practices) and *mu'amalat* (transactions) Hizbullahis can refer to or consult with another *marja'*; however, when it comes to the public domain of political matters, the only court of appeal and the only *marja'* to emulate is Khumayni who determines the political legal obligation. (Al-Madini, 1999: 176).[66] Qasim adds that the limitations imposed by the *faqih* take into consideration the following two main points in the chain: (1) implementing the *shar'i* edits, and not engaging in acts contrary to them; (2) respecting the specificities or particularities, which affect the circle of delegated responsibility of every community or country. Qasim affirms that Hizbullah's commitment to the *faqih* constitutes a circle in this chain: it is work in the domain of the Islamic circle and the implementation of its edits; it is behaviour in conformity with the directives and the rules dictated by the *faqih*. (Qasim, 2002: 75-76).

I learned from my interviews that in the early 1980s Imam Khumayni ordered and entrusted Khamina'i, who was at the time Deputy Minister of Defence, to be fully responsible of the Lebanese Hizbullah. Since then, Khamina'i became Hizbullah's godfather. That is why, since the beginning, Hizbullah from a religious and an ideological stance fully abides by the ideas and opinions of Imam Khumayni as communicated by Khamina'i.[67] During that period, the religious-ideological nexus between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon could be examined from the following declarations by Hizbullah and Iranian officials: "Iran and Lebanon are one people in one country…We do not say that we are part of Iran, we are Iran in Lebanon and Lebanon in Iran"; "We are going to support Lebanon politically and militarily as we buttress one of our own Iranian districts"; "We declare to the whole world that the Islamic Republic of Iran is our mother, religion, *ka'ba*, and our veins".[68]

3.2.3 Views on the Islamic order (nizam Islami) in relation to wilayat al-faqih

Sayyid Sadiq al-Musawi is a Hizbullah religious scholar (*'alim*) of Iranian origin, who has complied in 1300 pages, a two-volume work on the declarations and opinions that are supportive of immediately erecting an Islamic republic in Lebanon without any postponement. In line with *wilayat al-faqih* that enjoins the establishment of an

Islamic order under the guardianship of the jurisconsult, Imam al-Mahdi's deputy, Sadiq al-Musawi argued that the Qur'an is the eternal divine constitution of the Muslims; they ought to abide by it and act according to its injunctions because it is the revealed word of God. He added that the Muslims should obey God and his Prophet, execute their *wajib Shar'i*, and destroy every unjust ruler in order to establish *al-hukuma al-Islamiyya* (Islamic government) that will instate justice and equality and ward off the waywardness of evil and discords among the Muslims. According to him, *hakimiyya* (governance) and sovereignty only belongs to God: (12:40). God's divine law prescribes the precepts of human behaviour and the ordinances of government on a global scale. He stressed that Islam executes the injunctions through a just government in the person of the Prophet, the Imams, and the *'ulama*, the heirs of the prophets: (4:58). In line with Imam Khumayni, Sadiq al-Musawi affirmed that God commanded the Muslims to anathematise and to regard as infidel every authority or government that does not rule by what God has revealed. God has prohibited governance by tyrants deeming that as hypocrisy and vice, in this world and the world to come: (4:60-61) and (4:51). Also under the influence of Imam Khumayni, Sadiq al-Musawi argued that abiding by *al-qawanin al-wad'iyya* (positive or man-made laws and legislations) instead of Islamic *shari'a*, is totally un-Islamic. (*Al-Shira'*, 1984: 323-336).[69]

Sayyid Husayn Al-Musawi[70] stressed that Hizbullah's religious ideology dictated upon the party to establish an Islamic order based upon Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih*. He rationalised Hizbullah's choice of the religious-ideological slogan of *al-Jumhuriyya al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic republic) as it is used in Iran and the feasibility of its application in Lebanon. Al-Musawi argued that in general terms Islamic government is based upon divine principles mentioned in the Qur'an, Traditions, and the jurisprudential deductions or stipulations derived from them, which deal with man's social, economic, and political concerns. He contended that the contemporary concept of the "Islamic Republic" is an extension to the efforts of prophets and imams, and is a live personification of the long experience of the divine massages. Al-Musawi argued that the system of governance that was in existence during the Prophet's time did not bear a specific name. However, with the complexities of modern life, the Muslims used different words such as Caliphate, Emirate, or state to denote the Islamic order. He took this to imply that the door is open for the Muslims to choose the label they deem fit in expressing Islamic order and governance depending on the context. According to al-Musawi, this explains why the Muslims do not feel any discomfort in choosing the name of the system that makes it incumbent upon itself to implement Islamic Shari'a, even if it is different than the

names used by the early Muslims. Since "republic" implies a political system based on the will of the populace, and since "Islamic" means that the opinions of the people lose their credibility if they are not in conformity with the Islamic *thawabit* (immutable set of values or principles), then Hizbullah uses the slogan of "The Islamic Republic in Lebanon" to denote a system that enforces Islamic laws in Lebanon based upon God's injunctions in the Qur'an as laid down by *wilayat al-faqih*: "Whoever does not judge according to what Allah has revealed-- those are the unbelievers [*kafirun*]", evildoers (*zalimun*), and transgressors (*fasiqun*) (5:44-46). (*Al-Shira'*, 1984: 219-233).[71]

3.3 JIHAD AND MARTYRDOM

Jihad

3.3.1 Hizbullah's stance concerning jihad and its justification

According to Shaykh Na'im Qasim, Hizbullah's religious ideology depicts *jihad* as the fulcrum of belief in Islam. (Al-Manar, 2002: Vol. II, Episode 3). Hizbullah's religious ideology abides by the classical Shi'ite understanding on smaller military *jihad* as well as that of Imam Khumayni, as expressed by (22:78): "And strive [*jahidu*] for Allah as you ought to strive. He elected you, and did not impose on you any hardship in religion –the faith of your father Abraham. He called you Muslims before and in this [the Qur'an], that the Apostle may bear witness [*shahidan*] against you and you may be witness against mankind. So, perform the prayer, give the alms and hold fast to Allah. He is your Master; and what a blessed Master and a blessed supporter!" Hizbullah stresses that what is meant by *jihad* in the aforementioned verse is the general meaning i.e. *jihad* solely in the way of God. Like Khumayni, Hizbullah emphasises that by practicing *jihad* believers enter paradise, while infidels go to hell. (Qasim, 2002: 44-45).[72]

Like the classical interpretation, Hizbullah's religious ideology places *jihad* above the following eight mundane (worldly/material) relations mentioned in verse (9:24): "Say: 'If your (1) fathers, your (2) sons, your (3) brothers, your (4) spouses, your (5) relatives, the (6) wealth you have gained, a (7) trade you fear might slacken, and (8) dwellings you love are dearer to you than Allah and His Apostle or than fighting [*jihad*] in his way, then wait until Allah fulfils His decree. Allah does not guide the sinful people' ". Thus, the priority is to love God and Prophet Muhammad and practice *jihad* in their way, rather than loving the eight mundane relations and material desires mentioned in (9:24). Hizbullah stresses that this priority becomes

noticeable when there is a conflict between (1) giving money for *jihad* and keeping it because of fear of losing it, and (2) when a parent prevents his offspring from sacrificing themselves. Both cases are regarded as a deflection from obedience to God. However, in the case of sacrifice in the way of God and *jihad* in His way and the Prophet's way, there is no conflict between the eight mundane relations listed above and *jihad*. In that case, the eight mundane relations are considered as helping factors towards performing the *taklif* to the *faqih*. (Qasim, 2002: 53-54).

Hizbullah's religious ideology broadens the classical understanding of the verb *jahada* by interpreting it, as doing one's utmost in defending oneself against the enemy. (Qasim, 2002: 44). Hizbullah portrays *jihad* as a contractual dimension (tacit consent) with God based on *mubaya'a* (homage or a pledge of allegiance) to Him, in order to enter heaven in return for this sacrifice (9:111): "Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for Paradise; they fight in the way of Allah, kill and get killed [*yuqtalu*]. That is a true promise from Him in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur'an; and who fulfils his promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at the barging you have made with Him; for that is the great triumph". (Qasim, 2002: 55).

The safeguards of jihad: abiding by the injunctions of the faqih

In line with Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah's religious ideology emphasises that *jihad* is based upon sacrificing the self and possessions. The fruits of *jihad* can only be realised by the sacrifices and offerings of the fighters, their families, and the wounded because the aggressions of the enemy are founded on inflicting pain, suffering, and hopelessness in order to impose capitulation. *Jihad* is a means of defence to preclude the enemy from accomplishing its goals even though this might lead Hizbullah to pay a heavy price and a lot of sacrifices and pains, which are warranted by a competent and responsible *faqih* and based upon a clear *shar'i* objective. (Qasim, 2002: 53).

Hizbullah upholds Khumayni's assertion of obeying the *faqih* in general matters including the defence of Islam and the Muslims against the infidels, the tyrants, and the aggressors, which is in concert with the views of the jurists. The *faqih* estimates and judges objectively and contextually whether *jihad* has to be conducted only to attain victory or set special limitations on the level of sacrifice. Since the *faqih's* decision is absolute and irrevocable, Hizbullah cannot contest it using its own logic and analyses.[73]

Indeed, the stated policy of Hizbullah is that the decision to wage *jihad* is incumbent upon *al-faqih* who diagnoses if the situation that falls within the narrow confines of defensive *jihad*. He also determines the rules of engagement and its safeguards. This is of vital importance because there is a grave responsibility for spilling blood since the fighters should not engage in any battle, neither without establishing the duty of *jihad* in it, nor without a solid foundation in establishing its goals. Since it is the jurisdiction of the *faqih*, then the final say and decision is his, and it is binding upon all the Muslims who follow him. (Qasim, 2002: 51).

One Hizbullah member, who would like to remain anonymous, told me that as practice of indoctrination and as a baptism/initiation ceremony, new Hizbullah recruits had to repeatedly state: "*idha qala laka al-waliyy al-faqih 'ann uqtul nafsak, fa 'alayka dhalik* (If Imam Khumayni told you to kill yourself, then you have to do it)". This not only illustrates indoctrination, but also the total obedience to the *faqih*.

Engaging in greater jihad before smaller jihad

Hizbullah's religious ideology argues that the Islamic connotation of the word *jihad* conveys something more than militarily combating the enemy. The mandate of *jihad* could be extended to greater *jihad*, which is fighting the internal enemy of the human being. Hizbullah's religious ideology adjusts Khumayni's interpretation of greater *jihuad* by distinguishing between: (1) insinuations calling on the individual to perform all kinds of vices and (2) the Devil who enjoins committing delinquent, corrupt, and evil acts. (Qasim, 2002: 44). Nevertheless, in line with Imam Khumayni, it stresses that a person needs to prepare himself before engaging in smaller military *jihad* by showing willingness to sacrifice the most precious things a person has: his self and his possessions, rather than a part of them. This could only be accomplished after a lot of effort and *jihad* with the self (greater *jihad*). (Qasim, 2002: 55).

In line with Imam Khumayni, before engaging in smaller military *jihad*, a Hizbullahi has to undergo systematic and stringent indoctrination aimed at inculcating the spirit of greater *jihad* in his heart and mind. Thus, in order to achieve successful and efficient mobilization, for many years, Hizbullah has embarked on giving extensive lessons on the importance of self-sacrifice, and made these the centre of its educational or indoctrination movement. Hizbullah's religious ideology mobilized its followers and indoctrinated them on ideological and religious grounds through a gradual process based on a spiritual transformation, which ultimately led to fostering the inner strength required for self-sacrifice that would empower the weak over the strong, the oppressed over the oppressors. (Qasim, 2002: 59-61). Thus,

sophisticated and intensive military training (smaller military *jihad*) is not enough for the transformation of the individual who is willing to sacrifice himself. Rather, this should be accompanied by psychological mobilization and spiritual transformation as a basic indoctrination technique of greater *jihad* in order to instil the spirit of self-sacrifice in their hearts and actualise their potential strength. (*NBN*, 21 July 2002: Part I, 1979-1989).

Hizbullah's religious ideology mentioned the excessive and encumbering *ta'tir* (process of screening) that Hizbullah's prospective members undergo so that they know how to go beyond enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, to go beyond engaging in persuasive *jihad* (smaller non-military *jihad*). (Al-Kurani, 1985: 104-113). He referred to the special spiritual guidance that new recruits pass through in order to inculcate the spirit of greater *jihad* in their soul and cause a metamorphosis of the self through a perpetual process of spiritual building. Only then they can engage in smaller military *jihad* and self-sacrifice. According to Hizbullah there is an urgent need to revive the culture of *jihad*, *jihad* in the way of God, and indoctrinate its principles and injunctions to the children and the populace of the *umma*. (Al-Kurani, 1985: 143). He stressed the need to go beyond both intellectual *jihad* (persuasive *jihad*: smaller non-military *jihad*) and smaller military *jihad* since the distinguishing feature of Hizbullah's culture *par excellence* is inculcating the culture of spiritual *jihad*, greater *jihad*, the *jihad* of polishing the self to go beyond the here and now to practice *ta'bi'a* and *ta'a* (strict discipline and obedience) to the *faqih*. Hizbullah stresses that mobilization and obedience convey a religious-ideological commitment. (Al-Kurani, 1985: 171-173).

The salient feature of Hizbullah's culture of greater *jihad* is piety, spiritual renaissance, sufism, and gnosticism along the lines of Imam Khumayni's *halal shar'i* (religiously sanctioned) practices. Hizbullah's religious ideology adjusts Imam Khumayni's interpretation of greater *jihad* by emphasizing that there is a need not only to build spiritualism but also to continuously reinvigorate and strengthen it by fighting in the way of God since fighting the enemies helps to deeply and speedily inculcate this spiritualism in the soul or self. That is why God ordained religious devotion by way of hurling to the battlefield: (9:122) "Why doesn't a company from each people go forth to instruct themselves in religion" because God is fully conversant that the *umma*'s battle with its enemies is open-ended, pending the Islamisation of the whole world. Hizbullah adds that God wants the battles of the *umma* to take a global dimension where both close and remote people would hasten to join. The justification for this behaviour is that God knows that the circumstances

of facing the enemy and sacrificing the self make the self of the Muslim individual understand the truth of Islam and religious devotion without the veils of darkness and light. (Al-Kurani, 1985: 175-177).

The connection between jihad and martyrdom

Hizbullah's religious ideology affirms that the passion to martyrdom does not in any way compromise the desire to victory. Thus, in the line with the classical Shi'ite view and Imam Khumayni's perspective, Hizbullah's religious ideology stresses that *jihad* has two glorious rewards or outcomes (*husnayayyn*): martyrdom (of the self) and victory (of the *umma*) (9:52). (Qasim, 2002: 58).

Building on Khumayni's logic and argument, Hizbullah's religious ideology defends its martyrdom operations from a religious perspective as an expression of obedience to God to perform smaller military *jihad* as well as fulfilling the religious duty of martyrdom, which is incumbent on the believers in order to defend their rights and their occupied land. (Qasim, 2002: 55). Hizbullah explains that upbringing on the notion of *jihad* buttresses the spirit of martyrdom and readiness to die in the way of God. The logic of martyrdom is based upon the religious understanding and belief in another life in heaven, where the human being lives in felicity and where all his/her dreams are realized, in addition to the fruits that the *umma* reaps from his/her martyrdom. Martyrdom transcends the materialistic dimension of liberating occupied land; it is a religious duty and a testimony to abidance by Gods injunctions. That is why, it is martyrdom in the way of God. (Qasim, 2002: 61-62).

Martyrdom

Hizbullah's justification of martyrdom operations

Hizbullah's religious ideology exhorts parents to raise their children on the notion of martyrdom in the way of God. (Qasim, 2002: 58-59).[74] The logic behind martyrdom is based on a religious understanding and belief in the hereafter where people live happy and realise all their dreams in addition to the fruits that behold the *umma* as a result of martyrdom. Hizbullah affirms that martyrdom as the duty of defending and liberating occupied land transcends the material dimension. Martyrdom is an embodiment of the concept of obedience to God and it is a religious-legal obligation that leads to eternal life. Hizbullah stresses that the strong desire to martyrdom based on strong religious convictions. Hizbullah learned that upbringing on the concept of martyrdom leads to effectiveness and adoption of the curriculum of martyrdom, where remuneration is tied to the delegated responsibility of conducting martyrdom

operations (smaller military *jihad*). In line with Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah's religious ideology stresses that conducting martyrdom is a serious choice requiring belief and interaction with the prospective martyr. In order to accomplish the feat of martyrdom, a lot of indoctrination based on religious and spiritual upbringing is required; martyrdom is a religious duty incumbent upon the believer who is rewarded by going to heaven. (Qasim, 2002: 58). In this regard, it is reportedly stated that Hizbullah's Secretary General would meet with every martyr before he conducted his operation against the Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon and the *Biqa'*. "To raise their morale, he would stress that they are going to heaven, because religious war (*jihad*) was an obligation in Islam, and tell them: 'Give my regards to the Prophet Mohammed' ".[75] That is way there are so many Hizbullahis who are willing to fulfil their *taklif* by being "honoured" by martyrdom in order to receive God's blessings and acquire his obedience. Thus, there should be no astonishment in the believer's hurling towards martyrdom, for this part of the commitment and religious mobilisation. (Qasim, 2002: 58).

Building on its religious ideology Hizbullah justifies martyrdom operations by arguing that they are part of a rationale and vision, an overall vision that is based on the necessity to use all possible force in facing the Israeli enemy. That is why martyrdom operations were launched against the Israeli army occupying south Lebanon as a policy and curriculum/program, which Hizbullah considers as a practical way in order to achieve consecutive hits against that enemy, thus depleting its morale and straining its resources. The motivation behind these martyrdom operations was targeting the Israeli occupying army with violent hits that would shake its military capabilities, so that it would feel impotent and eventually it would withdraw. By this, Hizbullah would have achieved its goal of liberation of occupied land. Hizbullah stresses that martyrdom operations were part of a scrutinized plan, which came into being as the *only* possible way capable of altering the formula in facing the superior Israeli enemy. (Al-Manar, 2002: Vol. II, Episode 6).

Ayatullah Fadlallah stressed that Hizbullah's martyrdom operations rendered Hizbullahis with a sense of empowerment over the seemingly invincible Israeli army. He argued, "There is no alternative to a bitter and difficult *jihad*, borne from within the power of effort, patience and sacrifice – and the spirit of martyrdom". (Kramer, 1997: 109).[76] Ayatullah Fadlallah and Hizbullah's religious scholars could never permit the positive outcome of martyrdom operations to serve as their legitimisation. (Kramer, August 1987: 16).

Hizbullah's application of Imam Husayn's model and emulation of Khumayni's theory on martyrdom as a ticket to heaven

Shaykh Ali Yasin, a Hizbullah religious scholar, emphasized that Hizbullah's religious ideology considers those who conducted martyrdom operations against the enemies of Islam as living martyrs in heaven. (*Al-Liwa'*, 9 July 1984). Basing itself on Imam Husayn's precedent (Enayat, 1982: 181-194) and Imam Khumayni's religious-ideological stance, which regards martyrdom as a religious duty and a ticket to heaven, Hizbullah picked up and applied Imam Khumayni's slogan of "Everyday is 'Ashura, and every land is *Karbala'* ". (Khumayni, 1992a: 169-170; Khumayni, 1996a: 156-169). According to Qasim, when society is brought up on the model of Imam Husayn and his companions, it acquires *madad* (support and reinforcement) from their leading behaviour and sacrifices. (Qasim, 2003: 85-217). Hizbullah learned from the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in *Karbala'* the love of martyrdom through the love of God, and the passion for *jihad* in the way of Islam. Also Hizbullah is fully conversant with the great feats that were actualised through Imam Husayn's martyrdom after the "renaissance" in Karbala' since his major concern was with the future of Islam and the Muslims. (Qasim, 2002: 60).

Hizbullah's religious ideology, in addition to relying on Imam Khumayni's views on martyrdom, most likely has been influenced by Sayyid's Fadlallah's views. (Kramer, August 1987: 9). Building on the Shi'ite religious scholars' endorsement and sanctioning of martyrdom operations (Council of Muslim Ulama, 2002: 25-42), Hizbullah equated its martyrdom operations conducted against the Israeli army occupying south Lebanon with the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in Karbala': "Do you want to suffer with Husayn? Then the setting is ready: the Karbala of the South [Lebanon]. You can be wounded and inflict wounds, kill and be killed, and feel the spiritual joy that Husayn lived when he accepted the blood of his son, and the spiritual joy of Husayn when he accepted his own blood and wounds. The believing resisters in the border zone [the self-declared Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon] are the true self-flagellants, not the self-flagellants of Nabatiyya[77]. Those who flog themselves with swords, they are our fighting youth. Those who are detained in [the Israeli camp in] al-Khiyam, arrested by Israel in the region of Bint Jubayl, they are the ones who feel the suffering of Husayn and Zaynab. Those who suffer beatings on their chests and heads in a way that liberates, these are the ones who mark Ashura, in their prison cell". (Kramer, Autumn 1991: 42-43).[78] Thus, Hizbullah explicitly identified its martyrs as being inspired by and following the lead of Imam Husayn.

Hizbullah's religious ideology distinguishes among the four senses of martyrdom

Hizbullah unequivocally acknowledges that the four senses of martyrdom are fixities that constitute an important pillar of its religious ideology since its early beginnings. (Qasim interview, 10 October 2002).

(Martyrdom 1): *al-istishhadi al-mujahid* (the martyred fighter): The word *al-mujahid* is implied, but not directly stated. The martyred fighter corresponds to a Muslim person who – in performing smaller *jihad* – intentionally and willingly blows himself in the battlefield or keeps on fighting till he dies in order to inflict the highest amount of damage and fatalities on the enemy. In line with the classical Shi'ite perspective and Sayyid Fadlallah, Hizbullah affirms that Prophet Muhammad stipulated that this person is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud (*la yughsl wa la yukaffan*)[79], although it is generally stipulated as a religious obligation to do so.

(Ayatullah Fadlallah, 1983, 192). As it is acknowledged in the *hadith*, the "angels wash him". In line with the classical Shi'ite understanding and Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah stresses that this special treatment is done in recognition of his special status, or performed as a token of gratitude and a sign of *takrim* (special commemoration) for his great deeds. This corresponds, for instance, to the twelve Hizbullah fighters who blew themselves targeting Israeli military and intelligence personnel during the occupation of Lebanon. According to Hizbullah the martyred fighter is a hard-core altruist who performed a supererogatory act i.e. he sacrificed himself for the *maslaha* (benefit and interest) of his community and the *umma*, and his sacrifice is regarded as an act beyond the call of duty. It is supererogatory since martyrdom is not incumbent upon every individual.

(Martyrdom 2): *al-shahid al-mujahid* (the martyr fighter): corresponds to a Muslim person who, in performing smaller *jihad*, falls in the battlefield while facing the enemy. For instance, this is the case of Hadi Nasrallah and other Hizbullah fighters who confronted Israel in conventional warfare without blowing themselves. Like category one, the martyred fighter, the martyr fighter is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud. The angels wash him. This corresponds, for instance, to the Hizbullah fighters who had died in confronting the Israeli occupation.[80] Using the same reasoning as employed in (martyrdom 1), Hizbullah argues the martyr fighter performed an altruistic, supererogatory act.

(Martyrdom 3): *al-shahid* (the martyr): corresponds to an innocent civilian Muslim person who died without taking part in the fighting. He/she is washed and wrapped in a burial shroud because he/she died outside the battlefield. However, the

final evaluation is for God (*al-taqyyim 'inda Allah*). Hizbullah abides by Ayatullah Khamina'i who argues that martyrdom is a special prerogative for every person. If God responded to his/her call (*du'a'*) and considered his death as martyrdom, then God has bestowed upon him/her the highest dignity and prerogative in return for his/her essence that has gone to heaven. (Al-Khamina'i, 2002: 17). Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi seconds that arguing whosoever demands martyrdom from God in uprightness obtains the place of a martyr, even if he should die in his bed.[81] Qasim argues that the martyr is a victim who did not perform a supererogatory act.

(Martyrdom 4): *shahid al-watan* (the martyr of the nation-state) or *shahid al-qadiyya* (the martyr of a cause): corresponds to a non-Muslim who died in the battlefield fighting for his country or the cause he believes in. God is the only One who evaluates if he/she could take the *ajr* (remuneration) of a Muslim martyr and be elevated to the level of (martyrdom 2) in the full Islamic jurisprudential sense of the word. This corresponds, for instance, to the non-Muslim Lebanese Army soldiers who died in the confrontation with Israel, the same day Hadi Nasrallah and his two companions died. Also, non-Muslim fighters of the September 1997 Hizbullah formed "Lebanese Multi-Confessional Brigades" (LMCB) as well as the non-Muslim Iranian soldiers – who fell in battle in the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) – fall in the category. These are buried according to the specific rites of their respective religions. According to Hizbullah, this category of martyrdom in an altruistic-supererogatory act since it is not every citizen's duty to fight the enemy in the battlefield.

Martyrdom and ithar ("preference")[82]

Hizbullah's religious ideology explains the significance of the concept of "preference" in relation to martyrdom. It stresses that martyrdom is a voluntarily-willed act that is based on the intellectual and theoretical foundations of a religious, psychological, and cultural upbringing embedded in the Qur'anic concept of "preference", preference of life in the hereafter, rather than the here and now, and preference of the *umma* over the individual: "And they give food, despite their love of it, to the destitute, the orphan and the captive. [They say]: 'We only feed you for the sake of Allah; We do not want from you any reward or gratitude' " (76:8-9). Thus, Hizbullah's religious ideology broadens the mandate of preference – from fasting for three days and preferring to feed others, rather than the self – to include the giving of blood for the sake of the *umma*. (Qasim, 2002: 62ff; Qasim, al-Manar interview, 10 October 2002).

The distinction between martyrdom and suicide

Shi'ite religious scholars have unanimously vilified suicide as foolish behaviour leading to perdition. They extolled and sanctioned martyrdom operations carried out in the way of God against aggressive armies for the sake of liberating occupied land in wars of national resistance. Building on the consensus among medieval Muslim jurists who sanctioned a soldier or a few soldiers to attack a large hostile army, Shi'ite religious scholars affirmed if the Muslims in the early centuries of Islam had been in possession of modern explosives, they would have used them in the same manner as today's martyrs who blew up themselves in the enemy, intending to inflict the highest amount of possible casualties in its ranks. (The Lebanese Council of Muslim Ulama, 2002: 25-42). Hizbullah's religious ideology emphasizes that the carrying out of martyrdom operations is a religiously sanctioned act of self-sacrifice that is diametrically opposed to suicide, which is completely prohibited in Islam, the punishment being eternal damnation in hell. In other words, Hizbullah's religious ideology regards self-sacrifice conducted on the basis of greater *jihad* as legitimate martyrdom operations, rather than suicide. However, Hizbullah clarifies that if a person blows up himself without securing a prior authorisation from the *'ulama*, then his act amounts to suicide. (*NBN*, 21 July 2002: Part I, 1979-1989; Al-Manar, 2002).[83]

Hizbullah's religious ideology stresses that martyrdom is a voluntary-willed act conducted by a person who loves life, holds on to it, and has all the reasons to live. (Qasim, 2002: 62). Hizbullah argues that the West has been perplexed by the degree and level of volitional martyrdom operations, which it terms suicide. The West thought that for the youth to become martyrs, they definitely have been drugged, confronted with difficult living circumstances, faced with complicated psychological problems, or showered with enormous financial or material rewards. Hizbullah adds that the West has been "indoctrinated" according to its intellectual background to sanctify material life and get hold of it come what may. That is why the West is incapable of construing the meaning of the existence of martyrs except by materialistically and secularly explaining the martyrs' religious beliefs. Hizbullah stresses that the West has the right not to understand the effects of religious indoctrination on the curriculum of Islam because understanding a phenomenon (martyrdom) is not only based upon or confined to rational explanations and justifications; rather it needs real and a close encounter with, and a follow up to, the different stages that the lives of the would-be fighters and martyrs pass through. It also requires knowledge of the Islamic Milieu that gives rise to such a devotion to martyrdom based upon the spirit of greater *jihad*. Hizbullah concludes that the Westerners who have witnessed the reality of martyrdom cannot deny it, even if they

were perplexed in interpreting it because they were not able to construe the real motivation behind martyrdom. (Qasim, 2002: 58-59).

Sayyid Fadlallah delineated the distinction between suicide and martyrdom (self-sacrifice) sanctioning martyrdom by arguing that if the objective of a person who scarifies himself in a martyrdom operation "is to have a political impact on an enemy whom it is impossible to fight by conventional means, then his *sacrifice* can be part of [smaller military] *jihad*". (Kramer, Autumn 1991: 43). In line with Hizbullah's first sense of martyrdom, 'the martyred fighter', Fadlallah affirmed, "Such an undertaking differs little from that of a soldier who fights and knows that in the end he will be killed. The two situations lead to death; except that one fits in with the conventional procedures of war, and the other does not (Kramer, Autumn 1991: 43)[84]… the Muslims believe that you struggle by transforming yourself into a living bomb like you struggle with a gun in your hand. There is no difference between dying with a gun in your hand or exploding yourself". (Kramer, Autumn 1991: 43).[85] Fadlallah added, "What is the difference between setting out for battle knowing you will die *after* killing ten [of the enemy], and setting out to the field to kill ten and knowing you will die *while* killing them?" (Fadlallah, 1984: 18; Kramer, Autumn 1991: 44).

The aims and prohibitions of martyrdom operations

Since the beginning, Hizbullah placed practical safeguards on martyrdom operations; the most important was that that the number of Israeli soldiers killed should be at least thirty, in order for the operation to be religiously sanctioned. (Mustapha, 2003: 461).[86] According to Hizbullah's religious ideology, martyrdom is the epitome of self-sacrifice, which is conducted on the basis of specific religious safeguards in confronting a stronger occupying enemy. If inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy or achieving victory over it depends upon the martyrdom of a few resistance fighters, then their endeavour is crowned with legitimacy. (Qasim, 2002: 62).

Likewise, Fadlallah argues martyrdom operations "should only be carried out if they can bring a political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb". (Kramer, Autumn 1991: 43).[87] Fadlallah stressed that there are certain prohibitions tied to the act of martyrdom. According to him, a "martyrdom operation is not permitted unless it can convulse the enemy. The believer cannot blow himself up unless the results will equal or exceed the sacrifice of the believer's self. Self-martyring operations are not fatal accidents

but legal obligations [*taklif shar'i*] governed by rules, and the believers cannot transgress the rules of God". (Kramer, Autumn 1991: 44).[88]

Conclusion

The religious elements of Hizbullah's ideology centre upon the following constituents: belief in Shi'ite Islam {doctrine of the Imamate; *taqiyya*; and *ta'bi'a*}; (2) the adoption and application of the *wilayat al-faqih* doctrine; and (3) *jihad* in the way of God.

Hizbullah views *wilayat al-faqih* as its true Islamic cultural authenticity. Basing itself on the classical Shi'ite interpretation of the doctrine of the Imamate, Hizbullah recognized Imam Khumayni as the official *marja' al-taqlid* of the Islamic Republic and as the first faqih after the Great Occultation, and in contemporary history, to assume the title of the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi. Believing that Khumayni blended Imama with *wilaya* with *marja'iyya*, Hizbullah followed the religious authority of Iran and paid homage and allegiance to Khumayni as the political and a religious leader of the *umma* and abided by his *wilayat al-faqih* as a major pillar in its religious ideology.

Hizbullah practiced *taqiyya* as a socio-political necessity and as a survival strategy, but not on doctrinal grounds since it kept its name, identity, and goals secretive, so as not to risk annihilation from its enemies while it was still evolving in a rudimentary form. This behaviour is in line with Imam Khumayni who, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, banned the practice of *taqiyya* since there was no need to have recourse to it after the establishment of an Islamic order. The only exception being the preservation of life and religion in conformity with the purposes of Islamic *shari'a*. Hizbullah's religious ideology broadened the mandate of *taqiyya* and abided by it only in the specific case of avoiding dissention. This behaviour is warranted since Hizbullah is operating in Lebanon in a multi-confessional sectarian state, and not within an Islamic order.

Hizbullah's mobilized a substantial portion of its resources to fight the Israeli occupying forces, making mobilization and self-discipline the distinguishing traits of its Islamic method as well as its recruitment strategy that aimed to uphold Islamic cultural authenticity. It employed *ta'bi'a* as an act of mobilization whereby the 'sons of Hizbullah's *umma*' endeavoured to get hold of political power through a top-down process in order to establish an Islamic order governed by *shari'a* and *hakimiyya* in accordance with Imam Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih*.

Hizbullah endorsed and applied Imam Khumayn's stipulation of the necessity of engaging in greater *jihad* before practicing smaller military *jihad*. However, Hizbullah slightly adjusted Khumayni's theory by sanctioning prospective fighters to hasten to the battlefield in order to inculcate religious devotion in their souls. In line with Khumayni, Hizbullah's religious ideology affirmed that greater *jihad* metamorphoses the individual into a coalescent, spiritually refined human being. Hizbullah regarded spiritual mobilization and strict obedience and discipline to God and the *faqih* as the religious-ideological components of greater *jihad*. Mobilization and self-disciple became the two most salient components of Hizbullah's greater *jihad*. Thus, giving up the pleasures of the body through giving primacy to the spiritual dimension for the promise of heaven and God's blessings, gives the Hizbullahi a strong volition to stay firm in his belief and to defend his convictions. Hizbullah members follow specific religious safeguards when it comes to giving blood and following the way of God, irrespective of the sacrifices encountered, if the order is given from the legitimate leadership that is represented by the *faqih*.

Hizbullah stressed that the base and foundation of Islamic belief is smaller military *jihad* that is practiced against the Israeli occupation army in southern Lebanon. Thus, in line with Imam Khumayni's view of the sacrificing of the self and possessions, which he regarded as a social liberating force in this world and as a ticket to heaven, Hizbullahis engaged in smaller *jihad* and sacrificed themselves in battle against the enemy. Hizbullah claimed that it conducted *jihad* in a realistic, practical, and efficient matter because it follows the Islamic teachings and abides by the *faqih's* safeguards, guidance, and supervision.

In conformity with its *taklif*, Hizbullah conveys Islamic upbringing based on the spirit of martyrdom. Hizbullah regarded martyrdom operations launched by freely willed individual self-sacrificial martyrs against the Israeli occupation forces in the early 1980s as legitimate and religiously sanctioned operations conducted against a superior military "aggressive" army, where conventional means of smaller military *jihad* proved futile. However, Hizbullah stressed that there should always be a *fatwa* – religious justification or legitimisation – behind every martyrdom operation or else it would be regarded as suicide. Thus, Hizbullah's religious ideology does not consider blowing oneself in enemy troops or engaging them in the battlefield till death as suicide, rather as "glorified" martyrdom based upon the Qur'anic concept of preference, preference to uphold the honour and dignity of the *umma* over living in disgrace under the occupation; preference to live eternally in heaven, rather than continuously being humiliated in this world.

Building on Imam Khumayni's and Sayyid Fadlallah's religious-ideological justifications of martyrdom, Hizbullah explicitly identified the martyrs as being inspired by and emulating Imam Husayn's martyrdom in *Karbala'*. Hizbullah's argument that there is no distinction between dying while fighting in the battlefield and blowing up oneself, seems to have shattered the commonly held theological view that regards giving one's life for the faith to die as a martyr as not the same thing as blowing up oneself. However, the religious-ideological justifications of self-sacrifice and martyrdom do not rule out the political practicality of forcing the enemy to withdraw from occupied land and achieve victory, since this practicality is based upon, and sanctioned by religious-ideological grounds, which regard *jihad* as having two glorious fruits (*husnayayyn*): martyrdom of the self and victory in battle, as mentioned in the Qur'an (9:52). This is a mark of the collective identity of self-sacrifice and martyrdom whereby the community, the *umma* benefits and reaps the rewards of martyrdom.

One could argue that Hizbullah's religious ideology was to a greater extent successful in dominating the Lebanese state's identity, at least in Hizbullah's major constituencies as well in *al-hala al-Islamiyya* where it wields power. Thus, Hizbullah was triumphant in increasing Islamic influence and identity in its Islamic Milieu at the expense of the Lebanese state.

In the 1990's, Hizbullah reformulated some of its central ideas and strategies. Its former top-down strategy of forcibly imposing an Islamic state against the will of significant parts of the Lebanese society has changed toward an integrative, bottom-up strategy, not only in politics but also in the public sphere. From a *realpolitik* perspective, Hizbullah reconstructed its identity, altered its political strategy, and recognized Lebanon's new constitution of 1990. Since then, Hizbullah played within the narrow confines of the political system, by following a bottom-up integration process. All this took place, while the new winds of Arab Uprisings were shaping a new Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Hizbullah is fighting alongside the Syrian regime and lending logistical support to the Iraqi and Yemeni Shi'ite armed militias. Hizbullah seems to shift within the parameters of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, while maintaining its Lebanese national identity at the centre. Notwithstanding, Hizbullah moves between militancy and integration, the former exemplifies its hawkish policy during the Arab Uprisings, while the latter illustrates its dovish domestic face of being an integral part of the Lebanese state, from which it derives its legitimacy. This shift fuelled Sunni-Shi'a divide or discord (*fitna*), threatening a serious spill over of the Syrian civil war into

Lebanon after the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and the "Victory Front" (*Jabhat al-Nusra*) battled Hizbullah and the Lebanese Army on Lebanese soil.

Note

1. By Shi'ites is meant Twelver Shi'ites who, by the most generous estimates, currently comprise around 15% of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world.
2. Na'im Qasim, Hizbullah's current Deputy Secretary General, is the main ideologue and drafter of Hizbullah's political ideology.
3. Testimony that there is no god but Allah (God), and that Muhammad is His Prophet or Messenger.
4. A religious donation comprising 20% on a person's surplus of income over necessary living expenses, according to the Shi'ite understanding and interpretation of the Qur'anic verse (8:41): "And know that whatever booty you take [in war], the fifth thereof is for Allah, the Apostle, the near of kin, the orphan, and the wayfarer, if you really believe in Allah and what We revealed to Our servant on the day of decision [battle of Badr, decision between the forces of faith and unbelief], the day when the two hosts meet. Allah has power over everything".
5. Sayyid Husain M. Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1979, 290.
6. Arthur J. Arberry, ed., The Koran Interpreted. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964, 430.
7. Ibn Babawayh Al-Qummi is the author of Man La Yahduruhu Al-Faqih, one of the four Shi'ite authoritative collections of hadith.
8. See the article entitled: "Al-'Iqqda Al-Shi'iyya wa Zaman Al-Intiqal ila Al-Aydiulujiyyat Al-Tai'fiyya (The Shi'ite Complex and the Era of Moving to Sectarian Ideologies)". Beirut: Marasil Al-Anba', 26-27 December 1980.
9. See Bihbahani's (1706-1792) contribution to wilayat al-faqih in section 2.1.2 Historical survey of the doctrine.
10. Depending on the specialty and the level of expertise of the mujtahid, the Shi'ites employed the doctrine of summing from here and there (taba'ud) in order to follow the most knowledgeable mujtahid in the field that they seek counsel in.
11. See also Qur'an 49:13.
12. The "linkage between the divine investiture and the creation of an Islamic world order became a salient feature of Islamic ideological discourse almost from the beginning. Accordingly, the basic religious focus on the creation of just order and leadership, which can create and maintain it, orients the world view of Muslims in general and of the Shi'ite Muslims in particular". (Sachedina, 1991: 421).

13.   Muharram is the first month of the year in the Muslim AH lunar calendar.

14.   For a substantial portion of Shi'ite history, these ritual celebrations were performed underground so as to avoid confrontation with the Sunni rulers. For instance, see the section entitled, "The Vitality of Religious Experience in Islam", in (Sachedina, 1991: 407-410).

15.   Strothmann contends that "It is also to be noticed that the takiya of the Shi'is is not a voluntary ideal..., but one should avoid a martyrdom that seems unnecessary and useless and preserve oneself for the faith and one's co-religionists". (Strothmann, 1934: 629).

16.   Due to the strong impact of taqiyya and quietist waiting, most Shi'ite jurists forbid jihad during the occultation period. (Al-Katib, 1998: 292-299).

17.   It is noteworthy that ta'bi'a has been practiced among most of the Muslim sects that were put in defensive situations, or felt that they had to fulfil the obligation of launching jihad.

18.   Imam Khumayni refers to the renaissance of the Iranian people, which began since the June 1963 uprising, and is still being enlarged and deepened. (Khumayni, 1989: 19). Imam Khumayni wrote his will in 1404 AH/1983AD; he did minor editing to it after five years. It was revealed for the first time in Islamic Shura Council, on June 4, 1989, one day after his death. Since its publication, Khumayni's will has been in the curriculum of every Iranian University.

19.   In more recent years, the Shi'ite resistance in Iraq and finally the resistance of Hizbullah in south Lebanon can be seen and comprehended in this context.

20.   Kadivar argues that Shi'ite jurisprudence has laid the foundations of nine theories of wilaya. (Kadivar, 2000).

21.   Also known as al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani, a Lebanese activist from Jabal 'Amil, was one of those 'ulama who were instrumental in the dissemination of Shi'ism in Iran during the Safavid Dynasty. As mentioned earlier, under the Safavids, Shi'i Islam became Iran's official religion.

22.   Tanbih Al-Umma wa Tanzih Al-Milla fi Wujub Al-Mashruta (Awakening of the Umma and the Purification of Religion in the Constitutional Duties) is considered the enlightened ideology of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. This book is regarded as a rare document in the theory of political Shi'ism, in particular, and Islamic reformist discourse, in general. For an Arabic translation see: (Al-Khayyun, 2006). (463 pages).

23.   Hisba is a religious principle sanctioned in the Qur'an: "Those who, if We establish them firmly in the land, will perform the prayer, give the alms, command the good and prohibit the evil. To Allah belongs the outcome of all affairs" (22:41). The Qur'an stipulates hisba as a necessity for the good of the community. Since it was incumbent upon the ruler to enjoin the good and forbid the evil, he executed the hisba by obeying the religious and moral injunctions of Islam, and he made his subjects comply with these injunctions. Hisba also covered a wide range of financial,

administrative, political, and social matters. As such, hisba became a political interpretation of this religious principle. From here originates the usage of al-wilaya al-hisbiyya. See for instance "Jurisdictions based on the hisbi domain", in: (Al-'Amili, 2000: 252-256).

24.   Al-taklif al-shar'i al-Ilahi refers to the delegated responsibility/obligation of the muqalidin – followers of the muqallad (emulated) in law and ritual – towards the muqallad. Al-taklif al-shar'i al-Ilahi will be referred to as taklif, which is loosely translated (by Hizbullah) as "legitimate and religious responsibility". It is worth mentioning that the concept of taklif is a term used for legal obligation in usul al-fiqh (the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence).

25.   See also a review of Na'ini's book Tanbih Al-Umma in Al-Ghadir 2 (March 1991), 12-13, 69.

26.   See (Al-Hurr Al-'Amili, 1989: Vol. 11 "Jihad"). All Shi'ite books ultimately refer to it being the most authoritative classical compilation of the Shi'ite concordance of hadith and Shi'ite doctrines by the Lebanese Al-Hurr Al-'Amili who died in 1104 AH/1692 AD.

27.   At that time, the horses were the sign of conquest and the symbol of the military forces. It is worth mentioning that during battles and conquests, the horse riders (knights, cavaliers) were given more spoils than other fighters (infantry, for instance); the horse being the modern equivalent of a tank.

28.   This is in conformity with the specific meaning of jihad as the total devotion in performing one's religious duty, be it in action or in intention (desire).

29.   The trait of "Dignity is the opposite of humiliation, and death to humiliation" is attributed to Imam Husayn and Imam Ali. See also (Nahj Al-Balagha, 1986: 90).

30.   See the section entitled: "Secrets of Jihad".

31.   Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin bases itself on a host of authoritative Shi'ite sources including: Al-Hurr Al-'Amili's Wasa'il Al-Shi'a; Khumayni's Tahrir Al-Wasila among other books; Imam 'Ali's Nahj Al-Balagha among other books; the four prominent Shi'ite collection of hadith books (Al-Kulyami's Al-Kafi; Al-Tusi's Al-Tahdhib and Al-Istibsar; Ibn Babawayh Al-Qummi's Man La Yahduruhu Al-Faqih), etc.

32.   For the sake of clarity I have numbered the eight mundane (worldly/material) relations. As would be demonstrated later on, Qasim refers to the same Qur'anic verse in order to substantiate his argument.

33.   For instance, see (Fakhry, 1997: 118 --Lebanese Shi'ite author; I am almost always quoting the Qur'anic verses from his translation); Yusuf Ali, 1993: 456 -- Pakistani Sunni author; Al-Hilali and Khan, 1420 A. H., 1999 A.D, 252 -- Saudi Sunni authors).

34.   The Shah's regime was classified under this category.

35.   A literal traslation states, "was not present".

36.   From now on, al-waliyy al-faqih will be referred to as faqih, who is the official Iranian marja' al-taqlid (authority of emulation).

37.   Faleh Abdul-Jabar, "The Genesis and Development of Marja'ism versus the State."

38.   For instance, (14:52); (15:2); (22:49); (33:40); (36:70).

39.   Islamic law and jurisprudence regards this as a crime in its own right that has its stipulated legal penalties and punishments (hudud).

40.   It is worth noting that Imam Khumayni's infallibility is of a different nature than that of Prophet Muhammad, the Twelve Imams, and Fatima Al-Zahra'. However, there seems to be a consensus among Shi'ite jurists that Imam Khumayni has not committed any mistake. (See for instance, Khumayni, 2002). This claim is also substantiated by popular religion, where it is widely believed that Imam Khumayni conducted regular meetings with Imam al-Mahdi and did not take a decision except by consulting with him. However, according to official religion, Imam Khumayni is considered the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi in religious, social, and political domains.

41.   Tahrir Al-Wasila is Imam Khumayni's Risala 'Amaliyya.

42.   Cf. Prophet Muhammad's hadith: "The martyrs have certain dignities [karamat] that are not ascribed to the Prophets including me".

43.   Imam Khumayni, "A Speech Given to a Delegation of Customs Officials", 27 March 1979.

44.   The most salient verses are the following: (61:11-12): "Believe in Allah and His Apostle and struggle [practice jihad] in the cause of Allah with your possessions and yourselves. This is far better for you, if only you knew. He will then forgive you your sins and admit you into gardens, beneath which rivers flow, and into the dwellings in the Garden of Eden. This is the great triumph". (49: 15): "Indeed, the believers are those who have believed in Allah and His Apostle, then were not in doubt, but struggled with their possessions and themselves in the cause of Allah. Those are the truthful ones". (9:41): "Charge forth, on foot or mounted, and struggle with your possessions and yourselves in the way of Allah. That is far better for you, if only you knew". (4:95): "Those of the believers who stay at home while suffering from no injury are not equal to those who fight for the cause of Allah with their possessions and persons. Allah has raised those who fight with their possessions and persons one degree over those who stay at home; and to each Allah has promised the fairest good. Yet Allah has granted a great reward to those who fight and not to those who stay behind". (3:169): "And do not think that those who have been killed ['martyred'] in the way of Allah as dead; they are rather living with their Lord, well-provided for".

45.   Khumayni, 1 November 1979, as cited in: (Antoun, 2001: 43). Imam Khumayni offered Qur'anic substantiation on the notion of self-sacrifice.

46.   Khumayni, as quoted by (Davis, 2003: 45) "The Child as Soldier Martyr: Iran's Mohammad Hosein Fahmideh".

47.   The Bassidji comprised around half a million volunteer young Iranian boys, around the age of twelve, who fought in the front lines. These people were well known for

their self-sacrifice. They were integrated in the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), but they preserved their identity.

48.   It is very difficult for an English translation to capture the meticulous difference or the nuance between the two.

49.   Bilal N'im, "The Reality and the Concealed in Imam Khumayni's 'Irfan", al-Intiqad 1120 (29 July 2005).

50.   For instance, see "Characteristics of Marja' Al-Taqlid and Al-Waliyya Al-Faqih", in (Ayatullah Fadlallah , 2001: 17-19). See also al-Shira' 26 May and 4 August 1986.

51.   Some of the authors who subscribe to this view are the following: (Aziz, 2001: 207; Ajami, 1986: 213-218; Fuller and Francke, 1999: 28; and Kramer, 1997: 84).

52.   This and the foregoing analysis crystallised as a result of the author's personal discussions with Hani 'Ali Abdallah, Fadlallah's political and press advisor, on at least two occasions: 27 December 2001 and 14 December 2005.

53.   Hani 'Ali Abdallah as well as Faruq Rizq and Ja'far 'Aqil, Fadlallah's Al-Mabarrat Association directors, warranted this and the foregoing analysis through personal discussions with the author on 14 December 2005. Even recently, it seems that Fadlallah's thought continues to influence Hizbullah. Since Fadlallah calls for active resistance to the Israeli occupation of Arab land, his book Iradat Al-Quwwa finds a special resonance to Hizbullah, especially after the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. In this connection Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah's Secretary General, argues, "Because the power of right is not enough in a unipolar world controlled by the US, then it is imperative on us to possess the right of power along with the power of right". For instance, see his speech in the third anniversary of the liberation on 25 May 2003.

54.   Cf. "Fadlallah, who is considered close to Hizbollah but who rejects being called the organization's spiritual leader…". (Sobelman, January 2004: 117)

55.   Al-Liwa' 21 June 2005.

56.   See Hizbullah's "Weekly Stand" on 14 June 2005 entitled, 'The Islamic view towards tactical political slogans', at: http://arabic.bayynat.org/ahdathwakadaya/ahd14062005.htm.

57.   Personal interview 14 December 2005.

58.   Nabih Berri stressed that AMAL follows Fadlallah's marja'iyya. Adnan El-Ghoul, "At Shiite conclave, Berri backs Iran's nuclear quest: Observers see 'deal' to Boost AMAL prestige", Daily Star 20 August 2004.

59.   The living Imam is Imam al-Mahdi, whose occultation makes him away from people's sight. (See Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj…, 388).

60.   This continued till Imam Khumayni's death in June 1989.

61.   That is why, it is not surprising that Hizbullah allocated, in its 1985 "Open Letter" a special section dealing with the dangers of fitna: section 22: "God is With the Unity of the Muslims".

62.   As of 1998, the signature and motto changed to "Hizbullah – The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon". (Italics added for emphasis).

63.   In his book, 'Ali Al-Kurani, a Hizbullah middle rank cadre, was the first to expose the social movement's mobilization strategies.

64.   Prospective recruits have to undergo stringent mobilisational training that might last for more than one year. During that period they undergo intensive Islamic cultural indoctrination, on the basis of which they are evaluated in terms of behaviour and action that should reflect the Shi'ite religious ideological norms that Hizbullah built its method of Islamic mobilization upon. After passing this stage the recruits have to be strictly disciplined (intizam) in two important categories: (1) following the orders in the chain of command or pyramidal structure, come what may; and (2) undergo intensive military training, which is a must incumbent upon all of Hizbullah's rank and file even though some of them might not be engaged at all in smaller military jihad while fulfilling their membership. See Sharif al-Husayni's article "Hizbullah: Haraka 'Askariyya am Siyasiyya am Diniyya? (Hizbullah: A Military or Political or religious Movement?)", under the section: "Hala Mutafari'a 'an Al-Thawra Al-Islamiyya fi Iran (An Upshot of the Islamic Republic of Iran). Beirut: Al-Shira' (17 March 1986), 14-21, especially 20-21.

65.   Cf. Saad-Ghorayed even goes as far as asserting that Hizbullah's "individual members are free to emulate another marja' as some of its adherents do". (2002: 65).

66.   Al-Madini also confirms Qasim's stance and explanation.

67.   There seems to be a consensus among the following that this is the case: Prof. Masud Islami (Former Rector of School of International Relations (SIR); Prof Hemmati (Expert on religion and philosophy, specialized in development and modernity; advisor to Khamina'i); Prof. Mohammad Reza Dehshiri (Head of Regional Studies Dept. at SIR and an expert in Iranian foreign policy); and Prof. Mohammad Reza Maleki (Director of Diplomacy and International Relations at SIR the Deputy Dean of School of Law and Political Science, Azad University, Karaj. He is an expert on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict). I conducted these interviews between August 30 and September 6, 2002. I also learned that Khamina'i is fully conversant with the ebb and flow of the Lebanese political system and public sphere even more than a local. This seems to explain why Hizbullah follows Khamina'i's injunctions.

68.   Hizbullah's primary sources: Sheikh Hasan Trad; Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid; Ali Akbar Muhtashami; Shaykh Hasan Srur. Al-'Ahd, no. 146, (12 Shaban 1407 AH/ 10 April 1987).

69.   Cf (Khumayni, 1996a: 60ff).

70.   He was AMAL's deputy president. In 1982 he defected and founded Islamic AMAL, which later became part of Hizbullah.

71.   Interview conducted by al-Shira' on 26 October 1983.

72.   The explanation of the Qur'anic verse (22:78) is borne out by Tabataba'i in: (Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin, 1999: 31-37).

73.   See section 1 of the Open Letter: "The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qur'an, the infallible Sunna, and the rules and religious edicts made by the jurist (faqih), the authority of emulation. These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they need no theorisation or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application".

74.   Qasim insinuates that Islamic movements and Hizbullah employ upbringing on the concept of martyrdom; that is why they were and still are victorious. While nationalistic movements use upbringing on the concept of victory, reaping nothing but defeat and treason.

75.   See Sami Moubayed, "Lebanon guided by the Nasrullah factor", The Asia Times, 26 February 2005.

76.   Al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, "Al-Thawra Al-Islasmiyya fi Iran: Ta'amulat min Al-Dakhil [The Islamic Revolution in Iran: Reflections from the Inside]", Al-Muntalaq, 8 (January 1980), 11-12.

77.   Fadlallah is referring to those, who during the annual commemoration of 'Ashura, practice self-flagellation and self-immolation by beating their chests, slashing their scalps with swords, and whipping themselves with chains.

78.   Speech by Fadlallah, Al-Nahar 27 September 1985.

79.   Prophet Muhammad said: "The martyrs have certain dignities [karamat] that are not ascribed to the Prophets including me. If I die, I am washed and wrapped in a burial shroud; however, the martyr is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud… The Angels wash him". See (Al-Hurr Al-'Amili, 1993: 506-511), hadiths 1 to 12, abwab ghusl al-mayyit (sections of the washing of the dead), specifically ghusl al-shahid (the washing of the martyr), in bab 14 (section 14), hadith 7.

80.   Hizbullah offered 1281 martyrs from the second Israeli invasion in June 1982 until the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal in May 2000.

81.   Interview with Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi conducted by al-Shira' on 26 October 1983.

82.   Again Qasim affirmed that this is an immutable principle.

83.   From the perspective of theoretical and practical ethics, the foundation rests on the distinction between what psychological egoism calls suicide: "All voluntary human actions are selfishly motivated", and what normative ethical theories label as altruism. Suicide is the opposite of altruistic or self-sacrificial behaviour. Altruism is a supererogatory act, i.e. an act done beyond the call of moral duty or obligation. Beauchamp, 1991: 68-79, 241-244, 246-248; and Singer, 1999: 243, 321, 334).

84.   Interview with Fadlallah, Politique internationale 29 (Autumn 1985): 268.

85.   Interview with Fadlallah, Middle East Insight 4.2 (June-July 1985): 10-11.

86.   Although only Ahmad Qasir, the first Hizbullah martyr, could accomplish this goal, Hizbullah did not heed this safeguard and conducted eleven martyrdom operations after Qasir.

87.   Interview with Fadlallah, Monday Morning 16 December 1985.

88.   Speech by Fadlallah, Al-Nahar 14 May 1985.

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To what extent the theory of 'social cohesion' is applicable to the MENA region?

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Abstract

The Middle East and North Africa has hardly experienced such a complex and scary situation as it is today. A variety of religious communities in the region have been living together peacefully for centuries. However, some members of these communities are now fighting with each other and with the nations of advanced industrial societies due to sectarianism and allegiance to different political ideologies and, more importantly, in the names of 'God' and 'religion'. The main question is: 'To what extent the "social cohesion" theory is helpful in understanding and identifying the social realities of the MENA region?'

Taking inspiration from Peter Ratcliff's notion of 'social cohesion' with reference to the UK, this article aims to draw a general picture of the challenges of 'social cohesion' with reference to the MENA region at the intra-country level. Relying on the existing limited studies of the region, five types of these challenges are broadly identified and addressed, though the list is hardly exhaustive: policing and the criminal justice system; tackling racism and discrimination; housing and regeneration; education; and labour market and women's participation. It concludes that Ratcliff's notion of 'social cohesion' might be relevant to the MENA region at a theoretical level. However, practically speaking, its major elements, forms and degrees of application in

MENA are certainly different from those in advanced industrial societies. More importantly, the geo-political situation of MENA has clearly changed drastically with the advent of Daesh (so-called 'Islamic State') and there is little evidence of 'cohesion' in the region at the moment.

Key Words: Social cohesion, Middle East, Britain.

Background

Although there exist literature on the existence of parallel lives in Europe during the last decades prior to September 2001, the concept of 'social cohesion' became mainly popular after 9/11 and the London bombings. Therefore, the post-9/11 literature on 'social cohesion' mostly reflects this context and mainly focuses on governmental policies in Europe. Frankly, despite very recent developments, such a context is non-existent with reference to the MENA region and, as we will see, this will add very much to the already-existing complexity of conceptualising 'social cohesion' in relation to MENA.

However, in a boarder term, one may argue that both Europe and MENA share a common concern and challenge, which is *social stability,* though its causes, forms, and extents are different. Whilst the increasingly complex international migratory flows are considered as a major challenge to social stability in Europe, in MENA there are also other even bigger social and economic challenges that pose a threat to social stability.

As an example, look at the First Annual WANA [West Asia and North Africa] Forum Report. Putting aside economic and environmental challenges, some of the key regional *social* challenges are:

'lack of participatory, transparent and consensus oriented governance, lack of accountability, authoritative regimes, government constraints on freedom of speech and press, lack of access to healthcare and attention to preventive health, large disparities in access to quality education, unemployment, lack of strategic long-term planning, religious extremism, sectarian strife, corruption, refugees, lack of social welfare, labour migration and lack of women's participation in government and the labour market.' (FAR 2009: 9)

The report also adds that 'the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was a re-emerging theme throughout the Forum' (FAR 2009: 9).

This quotation provides a perfect backdrop to the current article because the challenges mentioned above explain the complexities of the situation and, therefore, they seem sufficient to persuade one that, indeed, they can pose a serious threat to social, societal and regional stability in MENA, in particular, and the world, in general. It is widely believed that, in such circumstances, the introduction of policies oriented towards social 'inclusion' or 'cohesion' is the way forward. Yet, there is little consensus about what these mean and how they could be achieved in practice.

This article is an attempt in this direction through addressing some of the most important policy (and as a result social thought) challenges facing MENA by giving some examples. In doing so, with much inspiration from the well-known scholar of 'social cohesion' and 'social inclusion', Peter Ratcliff (2004, 2011and 2012), it goes beyond the theories of 'Clash of Civilisations' or the 'End of History'. Although it is acknowledged that there is some truth in these theories, neither of them touches on a social scientific explanation of the challenges with reference to the notion of 'social cohesion', 'inclusion' or 'exclusion'. This article aims to identify and understand the contemporary problems of social exclusion in MENA in association with much wider complexities that are rooted in history and, where relevant, in the impacts of the Cold War, colonialism, imperialism, and post-colonial policies. To do so, it reports briefly on the causes and possible solutions of social exclusion in the UK, as a case study of Europe. Then it will focus on MENA. However, before we begin with this, let us explore briefly the interrelated concepts of 'social cohesion' and 'social inclusion'.

Social cohesion and inclusion

These concepts have widely been discussed and defined in both academic literature and some governments' policy documents. Most of writings highlight the significance of social stability and cohesion in society. However, there is less agreement on the degree of the contribution of general socio-economic and class-based inequalities, particularly the certain section of society such as women and ethno-religious minorities, to social exclusion. Due to the shortage of space, this article will avoid social scientific and policy jargon in this regard and will focus on Ratcliffe's (2004: 1-12, 2011a, 2011b and 2012) notions of social inclusion, cohesion and exclusion, on the basis of which material inequality is considered as a major source of division in society. For example, he argues that the notion of 'social cohesion' has wrongly been based largely on culturalist and ethnicist approach, rather than issues related to social class and material inequality, in tackling social exclusion in the UK since 2001(Ratcliffe 2012). In this context, 'social cohesion' and 'social

inclusion' are outcomes of a process of the material provision of certain rights and opportunities to all individuals and groups in society, such as adequate housing, access to labour market and employment, education and just judiciary system and rights for diversity (different from 'difference').

'Social cohesion' in the UK

For Peter Ratcliffe (2004), the notion of 'difference' and material inequality, which are in turn informed and influenced by the notion of 'race', are the major factors contributing to social exclusion in the UK. Attributing to Carter *et al.* (1987), he argues that 'skin colour' was a key factor in the reluctance of the then conservative government to promote the immigration of black workers from the former colonies of the Caribbean and Indian subcontinent in late 1940s, when the UK was in desperate need of workers following the Second World War. However, immigrants from these areas did arrive in the UK, mainly in the 1950s, and settled in impoverished areas of major cities. Facing discrimination, harassment, racial abuse and violence, he argues that, the first major urban disturbances took place 'unsurprisingly' as early as 1958 (Ratcliffe 2004: 18-25).

In the 1950s and early 1960s, government thinking focused on one-sided integration and assimilation. With the failure of immigrants to assimilate, a radical re-think was introduced by a Labour government in the mid-1960s, in which 'cultural diversity' and 'multiculturalism' was seen as the way forward. It may be worthwhile adding here that in present-day UK multiculturalism is ironically blamed by many as a source of community conflict. However, it was only as late as 2001, following serious disturbances that the potential relation between inequality and 'social cohesion' was accepted by the government, when they acknowledged the existence of 'parallel lives' or 'segregation' and even, with lesser prominence, poverty and inequality (Cantle 2005). In 2003, the Home Office set up the Community Cohesion Unit to identify indicators to measure the level of cohesion in a specific locality, the result of which was included in a report entitled: *Building a Picture of Community Cohesion* (Home Office 2003). Since then, the correlation between community cohesion and equality has been at the core of discussions and debates in relation to the UK government policies (Ratcliff 2011a)

Yet, Ratcliffe (2004: 59-122, 2011 and 2012) seems not to agree completely with these indicators and introduces different measures: policing; tackling racism and discrimination (both individually and collectively based and including, importantly,

government policies and practices); housing and regeneration; education; and effective access to the labour market. In brief, Ratcliffe's main argument is that 'social cohesion', synonym with 'social inclusion', requires tackling the causes of social exclusion in mainly material arenas. As we will see, there is an overlap between these variables and some of those identified by the First Annual WANA Forum Report (FAR 2009). Therefore, these variables are identified as some of the key indicators of the promotion of social inclusion and cohesion in that region.

'Social cohesion' in MENA

As is suggested by the title of the article, this section is the focus of this work. Here, we aim to identify and understand some key challenges of 'social cohesion' in MENA with inspirations from Ratcliffe (2004, 2011a, 2011b and 2012) and the First Report. We attempt to underline these challenges by giving some examples from member countries. However, it is important to note that highlighting specific challenges in one country does not necessarily mean that the very same thing does not occur in others. Nor does it mean that the very same thing occurs in all countries of MENA. Also, naming a country in one category does not necessarily mean that the given country is the worst amongst all MENA countries in the given category. Ironically, examples in some cases show the country's relative openness, at least, in terms of access to information. Likewise, not mentioning a country does not mean that it does not face any sort of challenge in the given area of cohesion and inclusion. Inevitably, there are limits as to the extent of research done with reference to MENA. 'Social cohesion' in MENA may be viewed from three different perspectives: intra-country; inter country; and inter-regional. However, due to shortage of space, this article will merely focuses on the intra-country level. We can only be hopeful that the variables highlighted at the intra-country level may be relevant at other levels too. It must be underlined that this article deliberately ignores very recent security and arguably sectarian developments at intra-country levels in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Egypt due to lack of sufficient scientific knowledge in order to avoid further complexities and to focus merely on other social aspects of everyday life in that region. Indeed, the advent of Islamic State poses the most hazardous threats to the 'social cohesion' in the region.

Intra-country level refers to 'social inclusion', particularly material inclusion', and 'community cohesion' within each of the 26 countries in MENA. Any of them may be examined in terms of the above-mentioned variables of social cohesion: policing, tackling racism and discrimination, housing, education, and labour market, although the intersectionality among these variables cannot be ignored. The role of

women in social cohesion will be included in the categories of 'education' and 'labour market'.

i) *Policing and the criminal justice system*

Ratcliffe (2004: 106-22) argues that the UK police is institutionally insensitive, at best, and racist, at worst, with respect to dealing with non-white minorities in the UK. However, this can go beyond insensitivity or racism in some countries in MENA: the police may act as a government agent, rather than a civic and crime prevention force, which will lead to social exclusion of not only minorities but also the majority. Take Pakistan, as an example.

Mohammad and Conway (2005: 631) find, following extensive interviews with members of the police, judges, torture victims, political detainees, criminal lawyers and others, that 'cynicism about law enforcement is widespread throughout the country [Pakistan] and much crime goes unreported as a result. There is a lack of faith and support for police officials and legal safeguards for criminal suspects are often ignored.' Unsurprisingly, the situation is much worse for members of religious minorities, as Human Rights (Asia) Watch reports (1990-2003). For example, the 1993 report suggests that 'government efforts to Islamicize Pakistan's civil and criminal law [by focusing only on penal aspects of Islam], which began in earnest in the early 1980s have dangerously undermined fundamental rights of freedom of religion and expression and have led to serious abuses' (HRW 1993a). Or the 2013 report mentions that 'Ongoing rights concerns included the breakdown of law enforcement in the face of terror attacks, continuing abuses across Balochistan, ongoing torture and ill-treatment of criminal suspects, and unresolved enforced disappearances of terrorism suspects and opponents of the military. Abuses by Pakistani police, including extrajudicial killings, also continued to be reported throughout the country in 2012.' (HRW 2013). This view of policing and the criminal justice system is also confirmed by Quraishi (2005: 42-5; 75-83), when he implies that some 'essentially Western-led' humanities and social sciences, such as criminology, are not even considered for teachings by Pakistani universities due to the hegemony of traditional texts informed by shari'a and fiqh: 'the governments in Pakistan have not given prominence to the study of criminology.' (Quraishi 2005: 42)

These actions can only inflame tensions and instability and undermine social inclusion and cohesion. The real problem here is the structure of the police and criminal justice system as institutions, which is impervious to any efforts aimed at

improving individual police behaviour or reducing institutional racism or lessening their dependence on governments.

ii) *Tackling racism and discrimination*

Addressing the UK, Ratcliffe (2004: 15-40 and 2012) identifies the disproportionate focus on <u>cultural difference</u>, distinctive from cultural diversity, as the core cause of social instability and the major problem of the social cohesion strategy. He views this as a culturalist approach to social cohesion, which 'is based on a fundamentally flawed interpretation of the sources of tension and conflict in Britain's towns and cities.' (Ratcliffe 2012: 262). For him, this has hindered attempts to tackle discrimination and racism in both policy and practice. Elaboration of 'cultural differences' can go beyond racism and lead to mass killings and genocide at worst. Although European history has the Holocaust in its records, the 'global south', including the MENA region, is not unfamiliar with mass killings.

Recall the Armenian genocide, widely known as the first genocide of the modern world (Ferguson, 2006: 177). This occurred deliberately by the Ottoman Empire during and after the First World War and resulted in the death of one or possibility one and a half million Armenians (Henham and Behrens, 2007: 17; Lise, 1994: 101; Marashlian, 1991; Schaefer, 2008: 90; Totten *et el*., 2008: 19). A more recent example is Saddam Hussein's Anfal Campaign of 1988 against the Kurds, which led to the deliberate murder of 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds (HRW 1993b).

A yet more recent example is Darfur, though some writers, such as Mamdani (2005), show reluctance in calling it 'genocide'. According to UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur- the peacekeeping body) and the Save Darfur Coalition's figures, between 300,000 and 400,000 people were killed and at least five million displaced from their homes in Darfur and south Sudan in 2003. As Vambe and Zegeye (2008: 792) conclude, this had 'a racial dimension … [as] the Khartoum government actively support[ed] the Janjaweed in the murder of Africans, some of whom [we]re Muslims and others not.' Al-Bashir has been charged with crime against humanity and genocide by the International Criminal court in 2009.

The origin of genocide in Africa goes back to both the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic slave trade, during which both Arab and colonial powers brought about institutions from which violence was understood to be the crucial tool to enforce their will on Africa (Armah 1973; Cabral 1966; Prah 2006: 127; and Vambe and Zegeye 2008) In this line, for Eze (2005), Johnson (2003: 159) and Prah (2007: 3), the Darfur

crisis occurred due to African resistance to assimilate into the supremacist ideology of Arabism highlighted by the Sudanese government. This is also partly rooted, as Prah (2006: 127) argues in 'the history of Arab-led slavery' in Africa.

In all three examples highlighted above, 'race' is the main driver of the respective massacre or genocide, and it is committed by privileged rulers who consider the target 'race' as being inferior to their own. It must be noted that genocides contribute to inter-ethnic tensions for centuries.

iii) *Housing and regeneration*

As Ratcliffe (2004:59-72 and 2011b: 163-189) implies, migration particularly when economically motivated, is a painful process that contributes to social exclusion. Although most literature on urbanization and internal migration contains almost no reference to these processes in MENA countries, statistical reviews and some country studies indicate the importance of internal migration in the region and the challenges that these processes have for policy makers and migrants in countries such as Egypt (Zohry, 2002; Khadr *et al,* 2010), Iran (Keddie, 1972, 1981; Beck and Keddie 1978; Ajami, 1976; Schirazi, 1993: 7-23; Velayati, 2011), Turkey (Uzun *et al,* 2010) and Lebanon (Jawad 2009a and 2009b).

Like elsewhere, structural and push/pull factors have played key roles in encouraging internal and rural-urban migration in MENA countries. Rapid and uneven modernization since 1950s in many countries, on the one hand, and the neglecting of the traditional agricultural sector and socio-economic disparities between regions, on the other, have accelerated the process of irregular migration, mostly to national capitals and major cities. In Velayati's (2011) study, some migrants from rural areas who did not own any land, called themselves as '*gara',* literally meaning "black", to indicate their position in the lowest social stratum in the rural community. In the cities, these people's living conditions in slum and squatter settlements are rarely better. An increased number of people in cities translates to increased competition for proper and affordable housing, employment, and social facilities such as health care (Ergenekon-Ozelci *et al*, 2001; Etiler *et al,* 2004) and social welfare. They often have no or very limited "rights" as citizens.

The UNDP's study (2002) of 22 member states of the Arab League in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), covering a period between 1970 and 2000, shows a considerable number of people have gained little from the massive oil income made over the decades (Stevens, 2002). This is despite a considerable progress in human development over the three decades. According to World Bank estimates, one out of

five people in MENA lived on less than $2 per day, and a further 2.5 percent of the population on or below a $1 per day income in 2002 (UNDP, 2002).

As a result of increased social inequality and regional poverty, some large cities in MENA suffer from not only internal migration, particularly rural-urban, but also international migration of economic migrants. The population redistribution within and between countries have created great inequality in housing in major cities in MENA. Empirical studies in Turkey, and Egypt show that various governmental policies to solve the housing problem have failed (Uzun *et al,* 2010; Khadr *et al,* 2010). In the case of Turkey, the upgrading policy implemented since 2003 of demolishing existing slums and constructing new residential units in the same or different area have provided ad hoc and inadequate solutions to housing inequalities and slum regeneration. Slum demolition policies have been carried out by many urban authorities either in the hope of reversing the tide of rural-urban migration or tackling urban poverty and housing problems in slums. However, as Dupont's (2008) study of slum demolition in Delhi indicates, lack of updated and reliable data on the slum population due to continuous population movement does not allow proper planning to tackle the root causes of housing inequalities and the problems of illegal settlements. In the case of Egypt, despite Egyptian government attempts to identify the main dimensions characterising slum settlements through developing an index of physical deprivation in slum dwelling areas, the inequalities are still presence (Khadr *et al* 2010). Asef Bayat (1997; 2007) has examined the relationship between the politics of slums and militant Islam by focusing on Egypt and Iran, though he denies an essential, organic and ideological relationship between them – as "the poor cannot afford to be ideological" (2007: 588). Bayat's notion of relationship between the politics of slum and Islamism is consistent with the electoral victory of Islamists in Turkey, Hamas in Palestine, Ahmadinejhad in Iran and Ikhvan al-Muslimin in Egypt.

These studies illustrate that the relationship between religion and welfare and, as a result, associated social inclusion or cohesion in the MENA region is far more elusive and challenging than in the advanced industrial societies. This is very much clear from Jawad's (2012: 205-22) chapter when she talks about the contribution of religion and faith-based welfare associations to housing and urban regeneration, in general, and the challenges of the contribution of black and minority ethnic (BME) housing associations to social cohesion in the UK, in particular.

iv) *Education*

Relevant to poor housing is the issue of inequality in education. Location of housing affects education by limiting the choice of parents when choosing schools to send

their children to. Schools in poorer areas are often poorly resourced in comparison to ones in more prosperous areas. A child's education can also be affected by poor conditions of the house and lack of space (Ratcliffe 2004: 73-88 and Osler 2011: 185-205). Velayati (2011: 146-157) has also explained how significant this was on children's education among slum dwellers in Tabriz, Iran, when she conducted her fieldwork there in 2001.

Inequalities in education may also be influenced by gender and ethno-religious differences that are not necessarily related to social class gaps or migration. In terms of gender gap in literacy, there were 65 million illiterate adults in Arab states in 2002, of which two-thirds were women, according to UNDP data. In addition, UNDP 2009 data show that Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Morocco with 36.5, 30.5, 28.1, and 25.5 percent, respectively have the highest gender disparity in literacy. In the case of UAE, however, the gender gap in literacy favours women by 2%. The lowest gap in literacy has been recorded in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Palestine with 2, 3.4, 4, and 6.9 percent respectively (UNDP, 2009).

Children of unrecognised ethno-religious minorities in some, if not all, countries in MENA suffer from inequality at least in the field of religious education. Even if they are recognised constitutionally, equality is not guaranteed in practice. The Iranian educational system is an example of this. Although Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians are constitutionally recognised and their independent religious education is safeguarded in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic (Article 13), their children read the same state-provided religious education textbooks as Shi'ite pupils in primary school. In addition, in secondary school, their so-called 'special' religious education textbooks, which are anonymously-written, are again provided by the state, the content of which are very much influenced by Shi'ite ideology. This is more or less the same for children from Sunni background in Iran. There are also some other religious groups in Iran, who do not enjoy constitutional recognition at all, such as Hindus, Sikhs, Sabeans, even the Shi'ite group of Ismailis, and others.

As a part of the 'global south', countries in MENA suffer, with different degrees, from a distinctive problem that is generally missed in the countries of the North, i.e. illiteracy. According to UNDP 2009 data, in terms of adult illiteracy, MENA countries stand out as having some of the highest rates of illiteracy. Afghanistan has the worst rate with 72% of the adult population being illiterate. On average, adult illiteracy in MENA is 23.6%. In MENA, Kuwait, Palestine, and Qatar with 5.5%, 6.2%, and 6.9% respectively, have the lowest adult illiteracy and Pakistan, Morocco,

Mauritania, and Yemen with 45.8%, 44.4%, 44.2%, and 41.1% respectively have the highest illiteracy rates after Afghanistan.

A further distinctive challenge for MENA, which undermines intercultural understanding within the Islamic framework, is the traditional, educational system of *madrasahs* and *maktabs* that are routinised in the minds of many as the only acceptable and legitimate way of understanding 'Islam'. As we will see below, there is some degree of correlation between traditional schooling and un-/under-development, which has in turn affected both internal and international migration.

v) *Labour market and women's participation*

While Arab countries suffer little from dreadful poverty in the globe, they have inadequate human development leading to other dimensions of poverty at both macro and micro levels limiting the capacity of the people and governments to use their resources properly. Education and knowledge are important aspects of human capability in terms of access to a good job with a decent wage and working conditions. They are also fundamentally linked to social equity and economic development and help reduce all forms of exclusion. Apart from relatively high adult illiteracy in many MENA countries, there is a major incompatibility between educational outputs and labour market demands due to rapid changes brought about by globalization and technology. Hence the quality of economic governance remains a primary challenge. The 2002 UNDP report estimates the average unemployment across Arab countries to be 15%, although it acknowledges that the region lacks sufficient detailed data and information necessary to embark on a all-inclusive study. However, assuming the 15% unemployment rate to be close to reality, a minimum of 5% annual growth in the economy is needed to absorb the unemployed and create jobs for newcomers.

A further challenge for most MENA countries, in terms of labour market participation, is that states remain the largest source of employment and sometimes recruit more than is required. Many of states have adopted important policies to liberate the private sector. However, proper macroeconomic policies, better implementation strategies, adequate training opportunities, better access to employment opportunities; and greater regional and inter-regional economic cooperation are needed for both human- and economic –development.

With regard to gender inequality in labour market; this exists in most parts of the world, as Sen (2001) states, though not homogeneously. In order to rank countries or regions in terms of gender equality, UNDP uses the gender empowerment measure (GEM). It 'measures the participation of women in economic, professional and

political activities using the indicators of income per capita, women's percentage share of professional and technical positions, and women's percentage share of parliamentary seats, respectively.' Applying these criteria to Muslim countries, UNDP report (2002) revealed an evident shortfall in women's empowerment in Arab countries (0.3). This score was very close to sub-Saharan Africa that had a slightly lower score (0.2) (HDR 1995; and UNDP, 2002: 28).

In Muslim countries, gender discourses and questions on women's place in a modern society have taken different forms. Often, the discourse has taken place within an uneasy triangle of Islam, Westernisation/secularisation, and Nationalism (Tohidi, 1994; Abu-Lughod, 1993; Moghaddam, 1993). Because of the so-called 'secular' nature of early twentieth century nationalism in many MENA countries such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Syria and Turkey, an interest in women's liberation brought some slow changes to traditional values with respect to women's socio-economic status in society and their access to education and employment. However, many authors argue that the trend of Islamic fundamentalism and the revival of political Islam in many Muslim countries, including some in MENA, since 1970s has had reverse affects on Muslim women and their status. This is because their anti-feminist approach and belief in patriarchal religious doctrines, which put restrictions on women and defines their place in the domestic sphere, has led to women's deprivation of their social rights.

Despite important measurable improvements with respect to building women's capabilities, particularly in terms of education, the achievements have not translated into change in social attitudes and norms in terms of tackling gender disparity. Therefore, the share of Muslim women's political and economic participation remains the lowest in the world. The factors that hinder or permit women's socio-economic participation are:

- prevalent negative traditional and patriarchal attitudes towards women's participation in the labour force (Abu-Lughod and El-Solh, 1988; Al-Khayyat, 1990; Balaa; Hoodfar, 1997; Kandiyoti, 1988; Gohari, 2000; Mernissi, 1984,and 1985; Etemad Moghdam, 1994, 2001; Velayati, 2011);

- strict gender dynamics leading to *purdah* system, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia (Balaa; SIGI), and Afghanistan during the Taliban (Gohari, 2000)

- state gender policies that have played a crucial role in determining women's socio-economic position in society, sometimes with very

contradictory outcomes for women from different social backgrounds, particularly in case of Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (Afshar, 1994; Tohidi, 1991; Najmabadi, 1991; Paidar, 1996; Poya 1999; Gohari, 2000; Tekeli, 1991; Narli, 2009);

- women's household and family responsibilities;

- lack of marketable skills or far less access to education or professional training opportunities (UNDP 2002; Velayati, 2011);

- society's definition of appropriate types of economic activities for women;

- definition of 'work' as a result of which women's work in income generating activities at home remain invisible and excluded from employment regulations;

- penetration of capitalist relationships into national economies (Abdel Taher, 1987; Moghdam, 1993);

- women as a pool of cheap labour force;

- attitude of employers towards women's labour participation;

- gender segregation and/or sex-segregated workplace;

- contradictory models of womanhood presented by religious/cultural values and imported Western values for educated women (Tohidi, 1991; Afshar, 1994).

Overall, female participation in oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, compared to other Muslim countries such as Indonesia, is lower. This illustrates that 'Islam' is not the sole factor in determining women's labour participation.

Conclusions

It would be naive to think that the categories raised in this article are the exhaustive list of variables concerning the concept of 'social cohesion' in both MENA and advanced industrial social contexts. This article is only an attempt to draw an overall picture of 'social cohesion' to see how it could be perceived in relation to MENA. A great deal of research is needed to address more precise elements of 'social cohesion' special to MENA as well as their diversity in forms and extents. However, considering the vast topic of the article, we found insufficient space to cover many

other important issues that we were aware of, particularly health and social welfare. Important events at the intra-country level, notably the Israel - Palestine conflict or other sectarian or non-sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and terrorist activities in other parts of MENA, such as Egypt, also need to be accommodated into the discussion, let alone at the inter-country and inter-regional levels.

We do think that, at least parts of the variables raised above are relevant to 'social cohesion' at both inter-country and inter-regional levels, though other factors such as land disagreements, diverse national political inclinations and international interests do complicate the picture of 'social cohesion' in MENA. For example, we do not know how we can identify the real causes of the bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq war to prevent a similar one from happening in the future. Also we cannot even imagine a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, this has proved to be a global, rather than regional, challenge and therefore only a global answer can solve this problem.

Finally, we observe that the diversity of nations and communities is not per se problematic. Nor is 'Islam', which has caused much confusion in both regional and global levels. Regarding diversity, we draw attention to the findings of a research team at the University of Oxford, led by Anthony Heath, who investigated the multi-level modelling of data from the 2005 Citizenship Survey. Out of these findings, two are particularly interesting: firstly, 'it is … deprivation that undermines cohesion, not diversity' (Lawrence and Heath 2007: 47) and, secondly, 'individual level disadvantage (i.e. low socio-economic status) is … a negative predictor of cohesion' (Lawrence and Heath 2007: 47). As Ratcliffe's account of the UK and other studies, particularly Ali's (2008), illustrate, in order to promote 'social cohesion', both material and intercultural factors need to be addressed.

In brief, the theory of 'social cohesion' defined and addressed to the UK by Peter Ratcliff (2004, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) *may be* applicable to the MENA region at a theoretical level. However, its major elements, forms and degrees of application are certainly different in practice in the context of MENA. More importantly, the geo-political situation of MENA has clearly changed drastically with the advent of Islamic State (IS) and there is little evidence of 'cohesion' in the region at the moment.

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Islamic Civilization between Crisis and Revival

A Comparative Appraisal of the Works of Abul Hassan Al-Nadwi and Ali Allawi

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Abstract

The article comparatively analyzes two major aspects of Islamic civilization in the writings of Allawi and Nadwi. Apart from broadly introducing Nadwi as one competent theoretician of civilization studies in general and Islamic civilization, in particular, it analyzes the crisis and revival of Islamic civilization along intellectual, institutional and political domains. To this end, I argue, firstly, that Allawi's appraisal of the crisis of Islamic civilization lacks holism both in his articulation of crisis and potentials for possible revival; secondly, Nadwi presents a relatively realistic, multilevel, and solution focused diagnosis of Islamic civilization; and finally, unlike Allawi, Nadwi's extensive engagement with Islamic civilization allowed him to envisage the actuality of revival in Islamic civilization. He believed that reform efforts directed at education, finance, industry and military can potentially pave the way for the revival of Islamic civilization. However, Allawi's imagination of the future of Islamic civilization is overtly melancholic and colored by pessimism. The article concludes by pointing out the importance of intellectual, institutional and political factors in the study of both crisis and revival potentialities in Islamic civilization.

Keywords: : Islamic civilization, crisis, revival, intellectual, institutional and political domains.

Introduction

The crisis of Islamic civilization has long been one of the most recycled states of affairs in the social sciences in general and in the study of Islamic civilization, in particular. An overall academic trend in this direction can be easily discerned especially since the end of the nineteenth century. Colonialism, being one of the key transformative moments in this period, played some important roles. One among others is the obvious role that it played in facilitating the encounter of the Occident and the Orient (Ernst & Lawrence 2002). This encounter in the different parts of the Muslim world, from North Africa, Asia to the Fertile Crescent, paved the way for the advent and expression of an academic spirit or consciousness that preoccupied, in one way or another, the minds of the hosting and the strangers: the crisis of Islamic civilization.

One way of dealing with this academic trend is to look at it from two simple vantage points. On the one hand, how the west, or more generally, the outsiders view the crisis of Islamic civilization, and how the Muslims themselves appraise the state of Islamic civilization, on the other. In the former context, an extensive body of knowledge, through history, Anthropology, sociology and Islamic studies, has been produced and owing to this, naturally, it remained as a dominant scholarship and *modus operandi* to these days[1].

Of those who had been closely studying Islamic civilization, H.A.R. Gibb, Arnold Toynbee, and Marshal G. Hodgson, and most recently, Albert Hourani and Bruce Lawrence, constitute forerunners in the study of Islamic civilization from the west. Needless to say, though diverse it might have been their version of the crisis of Islamic civilization, it still stands as an outsider, western perspective. In the latter instance, the consciousness and growing interest in the crisis of Islamic civilization can be traced back to works in the second have half of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. From the late Ottoman grand *wazir*, Said Halim Pasha's *Burhanlarimiz* (our crisis), to the writings of Ziya Gokalp, Shakeb Arslan, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, Rashid Ridah, Taha Hussien, Qasim Amin, Ali Abderazik, Syed Qutub, Syed Ahmed khan, Mohammed Qutub, Muhammad Iqbal, Abul A'la Maududi, Abul Hassan Al Nadwi, and very recently, to Ali Allawi, the crisis of Islamic civilization has been, for the most part, a principal cause of concern. Here too, the appraisal of the crisis of Islamic civilization does not necessarily assume and follow a similar set of causations and explanations; rather, it reflects a multiplicity of perspectives embedded both in time and space.

Muslim Thinkers and the Crisis: Nadwi and Allawi as Examples

Unlike the aforementioned thinkers in the west, most of the Muslims who have studied and wrote about Islamic civilization in general and its crisis, in particular, were not only thinkers, but also practitioners and reformers to varying degrees. Of these individuals, Abul Hassan al-Nadwi and Ali Allawi are contemporary-recent examples. Abu Hassan al-Nadwi, apart from being one of the most distinguished scholars of the Muslim world, wrote and lectured extensively on civilizations, Islamic and western, and their rise and fall for many decades. Unfortunately, unlike any of the Muslims and non-Muslim thinkers in civilizations studies, he did not receive much of an attention for reasons not yet clear. While a close engagement of his works is literally absent, some of the books he wrote were translated into many languages and being read to these days. One of the most widely circulated and well-received is his book *madha khasaral alam bi inhitat al-muslimeen* (1950 Cairo), which was later translated into English under *Islam and the world: The Rise and Decline of Muslims and Its Effects on Mankind* (2005, UK). It was also translated into Urdu, Persian, Turkish and other languages[2]. In addition to significant contributions to civilizations studies, he lectured and wrote over a multitude of issues concerning Islam and Muslims.

Another dimension of Nadwi's peculiarities is the role he assumed as a reformer. In the words of Adamec (2009, 234), Nadwi was "an Indian Islamist philosopher and theorist of revivalist movement". This can be seen in two ways. For one thing, being one of the contemporaries of the well-known Pakistani reformer Abul A'la Maududi and the Egyptian reformer Seyd Qutb, Nadwi could exert significant influences in his circles. One among others was his influence on Qutb's "Islamic thought" (Claeys 2013, 664). To showcase the degree of correspondences in Islamic thought between the two, especially about the nature and future of Islamic civilization, one would see Seyd Qutb's commendation of Nadwi's *Islam and the world: The Rise and Decline of Muslims and Its Effects on Mankind*. In a long preface, Qutb appreciated the book saying, "The author succinctly describes the reasons for the material and spiritual decay of the Muslims and identifies the harm the Muslims sustained by deviating from the principles of their faith and turning away from the responsibilities it entailed"(Nadw 2005, viii).

A close engagement of the writings of Nadwi also reveals that he was, being a Sufi who belonged to the Sufi Silsila Qadiriya Naqshbandia, influenced by the ideas of the Sufi and reformer Muhammad Iqbal (Biography 1999, 2). Iqbal's ideas, as reflected in all his writings in general and his poems, in particular, are recycled in

most of Nadwi's discourses (see, for instance, Nadwi 1979; 1986; 2005). Similarly, as Nadwi was initially involved in the activities of the Jamaat-I Islami (which was then under the leadership of Maududi) around 1940, he was exposed to the influence of Maududi. However, due to differences in Islamic thought, Nadwi left the Jamaati in 1978 (Adamec 2009). Interestingly, despite having held different views concerning the Jamaat-i and its activities, he gave due credits to the indispensable and positive roles that the Jamaat-i movement had played (Nadwi 1979). By the same token, Nadwi was also involved in the Tablighi Jamaat which was founded by Maulana Ilyasi (Biography 1999). The other way in which his leadership role can be seen is in the Nadwatul Ulama at Lucknow, India. In this institution of higher prestige and influence in the region, he not only studied as a student and taught Islamic sciences, but also served as a secretary and later as a rector who supervised academic and administrative tasks. Due to this and related other engagements, Nadwi earned good reputation in the Muslim world.

Ali Allawi, on the other hand, an Iraqi politician turned academic, is known for two of his works. These were: *'The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace'* (2007) and *'The Crisis of Islamic Civilization'* (2009). Before he came to the National University of Singapore as research professor, he served his country as Minister of Trade in 2003; Minister of Defense in 2004; and Minister of Finance in 2005. However, he is introduced to the social sciences in general and the history of Islam and Islamic civilization, in particular, through his writings. Published both at Yale University Press, 'The occupation of Iraq' and 'The Crisis of Islamic civilization' had been well received among western media platforms and institutions alike and earned him, among other things, the fourth of World's Original Thinkers in 2013 (by The Prospect Magazine)[3]. Of a particular interest, the present reflection examines the later work.

Nadwi and Allawi: The Connections

Nadwi and Allawi share some important traits. The first and obvious one would be that they represent Muslims invested in their own common traditions and history despite the fact that the former one belongs to Sunni school while the later one to Shia. The second, and the most important, convergence point would be their exclusive focus on the crisis of Islamic civilization. To my knowledge, except for the late Ottoman Empire's politician and thinker Said Halim Pasha and Shakeb Arslan's works, an exclusive focus on the crisis of Islamic civilization among Muslim thinkers is rather a rare phenomenon. Besides, unlike any other works that preceded theirs,

given the very engaging and inclusive nature of their works and the practitioner cum thinker background of the authors well-molded their writings. Due to this, for instance, Allawi's *'The Crisis of Islamic Civilization'* aroused responses and reviews with criticism of varies contents and nature in the Muslim World and beyond[4].

Thirdly, unlike the so called most of the 'modernist' thinkers of the Muslim world, their writings reveal a greater appreciation for Sufism and its importance in Islamic civilization. In other words, thinkers like Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Ridah and few others said to have held that Sufi practices, in some ways, caused or speeded the decline or crisis of Islamic civilization[5] (Hourani 1983). However, if the writings of Allawi and Nadwi were to speak for themselves, at least comparatively, it would appear clear that Sufi ideas, individuals, experiences and examples dominate Allawi's *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization* (2009). Lastly, as most thinkers in the field of Islamic civilization would agree, both thinkers underscored that the crisis of the Muslim intellectuals, the elite group was an important precedent to the overall crisis and decline of Islamic civilization.

Despite these parallels between Allawi and Nadwi, the divergences may actually outweigh points of convergences, especially in issues pertaining to the nature and form of the crisis and revival of Islamic civilization. As I will discuss shortly below, some of these divergences include the temporal and spatial dimension of the crisis of Islamic civilization; the levels of analysis employed; and revival domains, challenges and possibilities. In order for closely exploring these and related ideas of Allawi and Nadwi, the present article critically examines works written on the crisis of Islamic civilization. To this end, Allawi's *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization (2009)* and Nadwi's *Religion and Civilization* (1975), *Western Civilization, Islam and Muslims* (1979), *Islam and Civilization* (1986), and *Islam and the world: The Rise and Decline of Muslims and Its Effects on Mankind (2005)* will constitute the principal focus of the proceeding discussions. While the principal emphasis remains on these works, attempts have been made to contextually explore the discussion, and for this purpose, the article draws broadly from literatures in the emerging civilizations studies.

An Overview of the Crisis in Allawi and Nadwi

The genesis of Allawi's *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization* is historically located in the seventeenth century. However, the analysis, and generally the book, is primarily confined to the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. He argues that "this crisis has been going on for well over two hundred years" (2009, 1). As for the nature of this crisis, at least some three major dimensions to this crisis can be discerned in Allawi's

imagination: firstly, the general discordance between what he called the "outer" and "inner" enclaves of Islam in general and Islamic civilization, in particular; secondly, the discordance between the pious and ideal traditional past and the corrupting modern temporal and spatial factors; and thirdly, the gross and inside out encroachment by the west and a sort of appetite loss for creativity in the Muslim world. The following paragraphs briefly discuss these dimensions.

In the context of the first dimension, he argued for the absence of "room for the notion of the individual balancing between the demands of an inner ethic and an outer code of action" (Ibid, 33). He extended this discordance at the societal level (Islamic, Ummah) by equating the outer dimension with "Islamization of public life" in terms of state encouraging wearing Hijab; elevation of the status of Ulema; proliferation of Islamic TV programs; and even Sharia having lesser or no efficacy in the regeneration of Islamic civilization unless of course they simply "produce a false appreciation of the significance of the public life" [6] (Ibid, 256). Consequently, unless some form of Islam with the touch of Allawi's inner aspect, the outer aspects are worthless manifestations of, groundless, shaky, and deceptive civilization (when it should ideally be an outer manifestation of a strong inner foundation) and the example of which, for him, is the modern Middle East and Arab Emirates.

The second dimension broadly includes the proliferation of reformers, especially of western minded, "modernists," "secularists," "fundamentalists," "Islamists," and "radical terrorists," who, by confining Islam to a certain sphere, marginalized and corrupted the inner vitality of Islamic civilization and thus the crisis. Allawi's ideal traditional Islamic reformers well balanced in the outer and inner aspects of Islam, however, are only legacies in the past except for today's Nasr and Al-Attas.

Lastly, Allawi appraises the paralyzing effects of colonialism, modernity, secularism and the impacts of overall stagnation of cultural creativity in the Muslim world. For him, what is worrying is not necessarily what happened some centuries ago to Islamic civilization but, most importantly, the recurrence and persistence of the contents and forms of underdevelopment in the Muslim world; domination along socio-economic and political planes; intellectual hypocrisy and dependence; conservatism and imitation at the expense of Ijtihad; the unsettling cyclic trend of western encroachments in the Muslim world; and related other dimensions. Closely related to this is also, adopting the logic of Nasr, Allawi underscored that "the loss of the creative impulse in Islam to the inversion and then displacement of the traditional perspective which had underpinned the civilization of Islam" (2009, 231). Lastly, except for occasional references to cases from Iran and Turkey, the political

dimension of crisis in Islamic civilization in the Muslim world barely received Allawi's attention in his quasi-academic writing.

All in all, Allawi's *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization* provides a relatively valuable presentation of the crisis of the Muslims, particularly Muslim intellectuals in Islamic civilization, despite its latent and manifest flaws. Perhaps the gravest mistake of all would be that he left the book unfinished, and in that, despite his commendable reflections and diagnosis of the nature and causes of the crisis in the Muslim world, he failed to squarely confront the second integral and inseparable part of the equation, the possibilities of revival in Islamic civilization. Due partly to these, a closer scrutiny reflects that Allawi's imagination of the future of Islamic civilization is overtly melancholic and colored by pessimism.

Nadwi's *Islam and the World: The Rise and Decline of Muslims and Its Effects,* on the other hand, is a much less academic, but more ambitious and penetrating venture into Islamic civilization than Allawi's. Like Allawi, some three major dimensions of Nadawi's "decline" or "decadence" can be unearthed. The first aspect includes crisis in Muslims' minds. Here, he closely articulates the degeneration of intellectual elites' competence in the Muslim world, especially in the area of *Jihad* and *Ijtihad*. Jihad, broadly appraised as any form of struggle directed at injustice, self-deception, worldly temptations, and self-worship, has constantly been downplayed among the Muslim intellectuals and Ulema for centuries. These intellectuals, since the end of the Four Caliphs in Islam up until the nineteenth century, have been losing their religious, intellectual and moral grounds as a result of at least three interrelated factors: firstly, moral corruption because of their unjustified support for corrupt leaders (2005, 30-31); secondly, due to the massive blow of Mongols' invasion and its enduring painful echo, the Muslim intellectuals and *Ulema* developed an attitude of extreme rigidity, imitation and conservatism (Ibid, 89-92); and thirdly, starting from the decline and dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, the advent of apologetic, western minded, modernist and intellectually "immature" dependent scholars and elites (1979, 147). As for Ijtihad, due primarily to these historically evolving decadences among Muslim intellectuals and Ulema, the dynamisms of Islam and its temporal and spatial trajectories have long been left untouched. The natural consequence of conservatism and ignorance of changing circumstances in Islam led to blind imitation and dependence on the modern west[7].

The second blow to Islamic civilization came primarily from the incompetent and morally degenerated ruling elites, starting from the Umayyad period down to the present. From personal moral corruption; evils of monarchs (Nadwi 2005, 80);

worthless philosophical speculation yielding no social progress (Ibid, 83); accompanied by a deliberate corruption of dependent Ulema and intellectuals; to slowly dissolving of the Islamic content and form of social life, institutions and administrations at various levels, the ruling elites destroyed Islamic civilization from inside out. The problem even gets worse, especially in the post eighteenth centuries as it coincides with the advent of western domination, colonialism, nationalism, nation state, socialism, capitalism and other developments alien to Islam and its civilization.

The last dimension to the crisis is well articulated both in the sixth chapter of *Islam and the world* as 'Mankind's Real Loss under Western Domination' (2005, 157-174) and, more broadly and eloquently, under the other book exclusively allotted for this purpose, *Western Civilization, Islam and Muslims* (1979). Here, Nadwi closely analyzes, apart from the direct crisis brought to the Muslim world by the west and its civilization, how the Muslims reacted back to it. For him, the Muslim world, mainly political leaders and intellectuals and Ulema, responded in three fundamental ways to western civilization. The first way through which the Muslim world responded to western civilization was by rejecting the west in *toto*. For him, this response, however, is very catastrophic for:

> It is bound to cut asunder the Islamic countries from the rest of the world and reduce them into so many islands, walled-in and detached from life . . . . Such an attitude, however, can result only in the total isolation from the main current of time . . . [and it is] foolish and short sighted. Such a frame of mind always cripples the natural potentialities of a man or community. It also runs contrary to the spirit of Islam (1979, 11).

Unfortunately, by rejecting the west in *toto*, the Muslim world, mainly Afghanistan and Yemen, were unable to check on the forcefully penetrating tendencies of western civilization. The second way by which the Muslim world confronted the west was through unresponsiveness, a state of indifference to it. This, much like the first one, did not, however, save the Muslim world from the slowly penetrating and overwhelming invasion and attack of western civilization. The third way in which the Muslim world responded to western civilization was through imitations, modernization, and westernization. This response, which, unfortunately, was adopted by the majority throughout the Muslim world, from Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Indonesia to Iran, was not qualitatively different from the first response. In other words, measured by consequences, by adopting the first

and last approach, the Muslim world was, in effect, sawing the seeds of its own destruction, annihilation of Islamic civilization.

Interestingly, however, it is here where Nadwi's reflection stands different from Allawi. For one thing, he does not consider the west constituting an integral whole that has an inherently repulsive aversion against Islam and Islamic civilization. Secondly, due to his general view that civilizations, Islamic civilization included, constitute mixtures of elements from those that preceded or contemporary with them, albeit having their own unique traits, give-and-take in civilizations is the norm not the exception. Accordingly, Muslims' systematic and refined adoption of ideas, institutions, and mechanisms from the western civilization is not only acceptable but also highly encouraged. In fact, Nadwi believed that there is nothing "western" about useful and beneficial institutions and ideas (2005, 20). This is partly because, he argues, what we call the "western civilization" itself is the product of systematic and creative synthesis of ideas, institutions and mechanisms from Islamic civilization, the Greeks and Romans' past, and others[8]. This last point being part of Nadwi's revival strategies that sets him apart from Allawi, is also posited alongside with two other processes (Ibid, 174-193).

The first is the "Renaissance of faith" through which "the world of Islam will have to discover its spiritual roots. It will have to re-dedicate itself to Islam" (2005,184). Furthermore, the possibility of reinstituting Islamic civilization becomes more obvious as "the west is becoming increasingly worried" about its inner force (Ibid, 185). The second process is more programmatic and involves two driving forces behind the reformation of Islamic civilization, intellectual and political elites (Ibid, 185-189). In this regard, he recommends that,

> The major task before the Muslim leaders and thinkers today is to rekindle the flame of faith in the hearts of Muslims. They should do all that the early preachers of Islam did, and at the same time avail themselves fully of all the opportunities the modern age has put into their hands (2005, 185).

The Crisis: Contending Temporal and Spatial Contours

Although the rise and fall of civilizations have always been the recurrent themes recycled by many in the field, there are some thinkers who argue that these were only constructs, often selective in time and space, which do not necessarily have any practical bearings. World historians like Edward Gibbon, Arnold Toynbee, Oswald

Spengler, William McNeill and others wrote about the "rise," "fall," "decline" or "crisis" of civilizations. However, another group of thinkers comprising Marshal G. Hodgson, Bruce Lawrence and others-happened to be younger thinkers-held different views. Lawrence, for instance, argued that "We reject all these agendas, and we therefore also question the basis of for assuming that Islam . . . rose, then fell . . . followed by another period of stagnation and decline" (Earnst & Lawrence, 2002, p.12). Similarly, Hodgson (1974 Vol.II, 372-375; Vol.III, 165-248) argued against the "stagnation" "decadence" or "decline" of the Islamic civilization thesis. However, although he attempted to account for the "rise" of the west through the *relative parity* thesis preceding what he called the *Great Western Transmutation*, he failed to vividly account for why other civilizations, like Islamic Civilization, lagged, in some ways, behind and why should the west exceptionally undergo the *Great Western Transmutation*. Any ways, the debate may continue in either direction for the unforeseen future, but as my two authors accepted, and also generally taken as axiomatic among the media and public circles alike, that Islamic civilization is undergoing a crisis, and also at least one of the authors under investigation moved one step ahead to revive it, I will limit my discussion within the crisis model within which they conceived their works.

Ali Allawi begins his book by unequivocally asserting that the crisis of Islamic civilization has been started through the *decline* of Islamic civilization since the seventeenth century. However, he barely discusses what really *"went wrong with Islam"*, Islamic civilization or Muslims in this period except for mentions in passing, allotting a maximum of two paragraphs in a three hundred pages book primarily written to uncover the 'crisis' of Islamic civilization, colonial companies working their way out for effective domination in the later periods. He fell short of words to exactly appraise the very foundation of the book that,

A universal consensus has evolved, however, to the effect that Islamic civilization has been in decline since the seventeenth century and that the community of 'World of Islam'-the huge hemispheric 'Islamicate' space-has been under serious assault, both from within and without (Allawi 2009, 23).

Undeniably, any historian of the Muslim world would attest to the fact that the seventeenth century represents one of those equally important periods in the history of Islamic civilization. Yet, it appears that Allawi left it for readers to have a leap of faith and jump with him to the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries which, compared to the former one, are what the book is principally all about. Among other things, his beyond-average focus and the unbalanced skepticism and criticism directed at most

Muslim reformers of various variants, who lived between the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth-centuries in the Muslim world, is a good reminder. In addition to this obvious sheer relegation, one would still posit at least two relevant points that can, time and again, put the overall thesis into question. For one thing, it is far-fetched to argue that there is "a universal consensus" over when the decline of the crisis of Islamic civilization has begun. This, broadly speaking, is much less the characteristic feature of the social sciences in general and history, in particular.

From a strictly substantive point of view, historians and those who spent a considerable time studying the history of Islam in general and Islamic civilization in particular do not, however, agree as to when exactly the crisis, decline or decadence of Islamic civilization has begun. A leading world historian, well received by Muslim and non-Muslim academics alike, whose works are currently being recycled in various academic circles and discourses about Islamic civilization, is Marshal G. Hodgson. His ground breaking three volumes on *The Venture of Islam*, unlike any other work preceding it in the west, presents a transformative paradigm shift in the study of Islam and Islamic civilization. There, especially in the third volume, Hodgson, firstly, casts doubts on the plausibility of the idea of any decadence, stagnation, or decline of "Islamicate" (which he himself styled) civilization; and secondly, by pointing towards "decline" and "stagnation", thinkers in the field conflate two "different phenomena at two different periods" (Hodgson 1974, Vol. II, 372). These "two different phenomena at different periods" included, on the one hand, in Islamic civilization along with "accentuating trends in the Early Middle Periods, there was a period of economic contraction in the Later Middle Period", and on the other hand, starting with in the seventeenth century but becoming more drastic only in the eighteenth century, there was a second period of deterioration (Ibid, 371-373). Owing to this, he rather concluded "The 'stagnation' or 'decadence' of Islamdom, if there ever was such before the eighteenth century, must surely be placed in the Later Middle Period" (Ibid, 373). This can, for instance, simply rule out the seventeenth century decline "consensus" of Allawi[9].

Still, Hodgson is pretty cautious of his claims in that he acknowledged that while some of these deteriorations were happening, equally important regenerations were taking place in different parts of the Muslim world. Among other things, there was an advent and strengthening of an "Iranic" civilization (Toynbee's appellation) with "a creative ferment in the arts and in related aspects of life which bears many striking analogies to contemporary life in Renaissance Italy, and which issues in the new life of the sixteenth century" (Ibid, 372). Put differently, in the centuries between the fifth

and fifteenth centuries, Islamic civilization was rather undergoing reconfigurations both in time and space, developing "international civilization" until the Modern Age sets in when Islamic civilization underwent drastic changes as the overwhelming *Great Western Transmutation* was to exceptionally favor the west at the expense of the rest in the Oikoumene.

The second point relates to Allawi's decision to accentuate the seventeenth century may have other intended or unintended dimension (s) than simply of assigning temporal symbol to the crisis in Islamic civilization. To this effect, for instance, he deliberately negates the massive blow of Mongol's invasion and its subsequent impacts on the fall of Baghdad in the thirteenth century. In the words of Allawi, this transformative moment is reduced to "a discredited thesis" in accounting for the decline of Islamic civilization. The attempt to associate this decline with the fall of Baghdad is, he understood, "perpetuates the dangerously deceptive conflation of Islam with Arabs, ignoring the continuing vitality of the post-Abbasid empires and states based in Iran, Central Asia, North Africa and, of course, the Ottoman world"(Allawi 2009, 23). Here too, I would like to raise some two further observations.

Firstly, obviously Tartars' invasion and destruction in the mid thirteenth century might have not necessarily caused *the* decline in Islamic civilization. However, by invoking and then discrediting the Mongol's invasion as a thesis for the decline of Islamic civilization, Allawi, in an invisibly euphemistic tone, communicates a fainted idea downplaying the degree, intensity and legacy of the scar left by this overwhelming phenomenon which, in the words of some of the thirteenth and fourteenth century Muslim historians, had otherwise never happened to human race before on the face of the earth. The Arab historian, Ibn al-Athir wrote (quoted in Browne 1902, 427-431) of the destruction as,

> It is a disaster without parallel in history. It affects the entire human race in general and the Muslims in particular. If anyone were to claim that there has been another event like it from the time of Adam to this day, it would be incorrect, for history cannot produce a single instance that could be compared with it, nor, perhaps, will anything like it happen again till Doomsday (except the appearance of Gog and Magog). The savages took pity on none. They slaughtered men, women and children ruthlessly. They ripped up the abdomens of pregnant women and killed the children in the wombs. ('To God do we belong and to Him do we return. There is no fear or power but with God'.) It

was a world-consuming tragedy. For these were a people who emerged
from the confines of China, and attacked the cities of Turkestan, like
Kashghar and Balasaghun, and thence advanced on the cities of
Transoxiana, such as Samarqand, Bukhara and the like, taking
possession of them, and treating their inhabitants in such wise as we
shall mention; and of them one division then passed on into Khurasan,
until they had made an end of taking possession, and destroying, and
slaying, and plundering, and thence passing on to Ray, Hamadan and
the Highlands, and the cities contained therein, even to the limits of
Iraq, whence they marched on the towns of Adharbayjan and
Arraniyya, destroying them and slaying most of their inhabitants, of
whom none escaped save a small remnant; and all this in less than a
year; this is a thing whereof the like has not been heard.

By the same token, Browne himself described this devastation as "one of the most
dreadful calamities which ever befell the human race" (1928, 7). Unlike Allawi,
Nadwi closely appraised this invasion and its potential hindrance effect on Islamic
civilization[10]. He argued that "The Muslims world suffered a grave setback as a result
of the Tartar invasion. Its intellectual progress was arrested and a general feeling of
pessimism was created among the Muslims about the future of Islam."(Nadwi 2005,
92). Furthermore, due to this pessimism, he argued *Ijtihad* slowly withered away;
more sheer conservatism developed; and a general intellectual stagnation became
widespread. Put differently, Nadwi underscored that the Mongol invasion was a
significant rupture in the history of Islamic civilization. Unfortunately, Allawi did not
do any justice to this mega issue having mega effects rather than mention in passing
for the purpose of discrediting it in favor of the seventeenth century thesis which,
again, he failed to render as I will show below.

Secondly, it is true that one cannot simply reduce the magnificent Islamic
civilization to Arabs and the making of Islamic empire under the rule of Abbasids.
What he, however, perhaps unintentionally, has done is that he relegated the fall of
Baghdad in the thirteenth century to the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the
seventeenth century, for the beginning of the crisis of Islamic civilization. In other
words, most ottoman historians, the ardent western orientalist, Bernard Lewis
included, agree that the seventeenth century marks the beginning of the decline of the
Ottoman Empire that was ruling a significant proportion of the Muslim world (See,
for instance, Lewis 1962; Hourani 1983; Inalcik & Quataert 1994). In this regard,
Allawi's proposal is by no means different from those of whom he criticized from
root to branch in his book. For instance, Abduh believed that Islamdom sharply

declined under the rule of ottomans. He held them responsible for the impurity of Arabic language; the corruption of the Ulema and rulers alike; the unintelligent conservatism; and imitation devoid of any place for reason (Hourani 1983, 149-151).

Although Nadwi held a relatively relaxed temporal and spatial ranges responsible for the decline or, in his words, "the beginning of decadence", he believed, like Allawi, that the fate that befell the Muslims under the Ottoman Empire "in the 18th and 19th centuries could easily have been predicted in the 16th and 17th centuries" (Nadwi 2005, 101). He, unlike Allawi, however, believed that the decline was not necessarily started in the seventeenth century; rather, it was happening in the centuries between the end of the first four caliphs and the emergence of Arab imperialism and nationalism. These flexible temporal and spatial ranges enabled Nadwi to closely reflect up on multiple factors, often embedded in different geographical, cultural and temporal contours while appreciating the various ups and downs in Islamic civilization down the road. However, one would question as to whether Islamic civilization achieved its climax or achieved a full sense of 'civilizational integrity' before, or by the end of, the four Caliphs or not. Besides, many conceptions of the idea of 'civilization' assume high cultural complexity, urban culture, strong economy and political power, and advances in science, philosophy and art. The extents of these changes, however, were not arguably developed and visible in this period. Contrary to this, the conventional understanding to these days assume "Islamic golden age" appearing during the Abbasside period and beyond. We need, therefore, to explain why Nadwi chose the beginning of the shining of Islamic civilization as marking the beginning of the crisis.

The answer to this question must be sought, in addition to the above two books explored, in the *Religion and Civilization* (1975) of Nadwi as well. Here, Nadwi divides, subsuming fundamental differences in ontology, epistemology and methodology, world civilizations into three: Materialistic, Intellectual and Mystic civilizations (1975, 44-71). He argues that Islamic civilization, unlike western civilization along with Roman, Greek, Buddhist, and Hindu civilizations, is neither intellectual, materialistic, nor mystic in *toto*; rather, with its metaphysical bond with the ultimate reality informing its ontological and epistemological formulations, it is a civilization based principally on prophets, revelation, and the dynamic interplay of Jihad and Ijtihad (Ibid, 72-114). Understood in this manner, Nadwi's conception of Islamic civilization greatly demands religious integrity than, say material wealth or "philosophical mind games" and "speculations" [11] (2005, 83).

Revival: Intellectual, Institutional and Political Domains

Both Nadwi and Allawi closely explored various revival, reform and modernization efforts in the Muslim world. However, the level of analysis adopted various depending on which aspects of Islamic civilization is deemed foundational for revival and reform. For Allawi, the level of analysis is limited mainly to reformative efforts of intellectuals and various movements and institutions; much less emphasis is given to the political domain. In relative terms, however, Nadwi proportionally addressed the crisis as well as the revival at three closely interrelated levels: intellectual, institutional and political levels. Furthermore, as I have briefly argued above, the revival dimension of Islamic civilization constitutes the other principal concern of Nadwi's venture into the crisis of Islamic civilization. The same thing, however, cannot be said for Allawi. In spite of these differences, both of them saw and shared the dangers and opportunities in the west. A brief discussion on some of these aspects is in order.

The Intellectual Domain

To begin with Allawi, the intellectual dimension is not clearly defined as he indiscriminately deploys various, and sometimes conflicting, appellations. From "secular elites", "fundamentalists", "modernists", "wahabi", "salafi", "sufists", "Islamist", "radicalalists", "radical islamists", "radical secularists", "rationalist muslims", to "salafist jihadists" shows, to a larger extent, lack of consistence, and unless carefully examined based on the individuals he personally names or mentions, the impression it leaves is a massive disorganization. Essentially, for Allawi, however, there are two groups of personalities: those who were busy importing whatever from the west and those who resisted and clashed with the west, on the one hand, and those traditional-reformers and revivalists with Sufi bents on the other. The former ones were not only unsuccessful but also brought significant loss to the Muslim world, both in the past and present. Individuals included Seyd Ahmed Khan, Rifa'al-Tahtawi, Muhammed ibn Abdelwahab, Taha Hussien, Rashid Rida, Ibn Taymiyah, Seyd Qutb, Mahmud Mohammad Taha, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, and Mohammad Abduh. He, for instance, completely negates the politico-religious reform efforts of Afghani, Ridah and Abduh. He says "Modernists such as Afghani, Abduh and Ridha neither upgraded the capacity of Islam to respond to the encroachments of the West nor succeeded in harmonizing their version of Islam with the percepts of the modern order" (Allawi 2009, 250). The later groups of reformers are, however, endowed with "authentic understanding of Islam" (Ibid, p.62). These individuals included Seyd

Mohammed Naqib al-Attas, Mohammad Iqbal, Said Nursi, Baqir al-Sadir, Malik Binnebi, Ibn Arabi, Hussein Nasr, Seyd Abdel karim Sourush, and Shah Waliullah Dahlawi. Time and again, except for mentions in passing, revivalism in this domain also remains absent.

Nadwi's reformers are, however, more precisely defined and their role as reformers is comparatively weighed and acknowledged. Here too, they can be classified into two groups of thinkers: on the one hand, there are reformers such as Syed Ahmed Khan, Taha hussien, Ziya Gokalp, Syed Ameer, Muhammad Abduh, Qasim Amen, and Ali Abduraziq. These are defined as modernists, brainwashed apologists, and most, if not all, western orientalist educated, and dependent intellectuals. While he negated some of these traits of the modernists, he acknowledged, for instance, Seyd Ahmed Khan's Aligarh College for "It did produce some fine writers . . . and a number of excellent administrators" (1979, 74). Similarly, he gave credits for their efforts in "the unity of the Muslim world . . . up on which stress was laid by leaders like Syed Ahmed Shaheed, Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, and Muhammad Iqbal" (Ibid, 136).

Nadwi's ideal intellectual reformers included Abul A'la Maududi, Mohammad Akif, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyah, Muhammad Iqbal, Namik Kemal, Mohammad Asad, Indian scholars and others. Of these individuals, however, the Pakistani Muhammad Iqbal and the Young Ottoman reformer Namik Kemal, I would argue, represent Nadwi's own vision for the revival of the Islamic civilization. Nadwi, for instance, shares the three foundational elements that, according to Namik Kemal, can potentially revive Islamic civilization. These elements are, firstly, the religious, moral and legal institutions of orthodox Islam; secondly, the political and administrative institutions of the Ottoman Empire at the time of its prime; and thirdly, aspects of western civilization that had given progress, prosperity, and superiority to the European nations (Ibid, 47-49). In other words, the synthesis of what the west can offer, Islam, and together with Muslim's actual and ideal potentialities, Nadwi and Namik Kemal thought, could reinstate Islamic civilization to its deserved place in the world.

The Institutional Domain

At institutional level, both Allawi and Nadwi comparatively explored various Islamic movements and universities. It ranges from the Khilafat movement in India; Jamaati movement in Pakistan; the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere; Aligarh College in India; Islamization of knowledge movement in Asia and America, Zaitun

College in Tunisia; Al-Azhar University in Egypt; and to the Ghulen movement in Turkey. Unlike Nadwi, Allawi considers these movements, especially the Jamaati Islami, Tablighi Jamaat, Muslim brotherhood, and Ghulen movement as inherently political movements which failed to live up to their words (Allawi 2009, 66). However, Nadwi rightly considered them as socio-religious, intellectual, and political movements, not less, not much. Compared to these movements, Allawi claimed,

> But no modern mass movement in Islam has been able to fill the void left by the decay of the classic Sufi and Futuwwa orders that seamlessly integrated the sacred with the profane in the quotidian experience of a huge number of people (Allawi 2009, 270).

Unlike Allawi, Nadwi rather believed that the Muslim brotherhood ". . . unmistakably was the most powerful Islamic movement of modern times and a fast progressing religious endeavor. The liquidation of the *Ikhwan* was, without a doubt, an irreparable loss to the Arab and the larger Muslim world"(Nadwi 1979, 112). In short, although Allawi favored informal Sufi circles accompanied by traditional reformers with a significant dose of Sufism, he failed to spell out and evaluate: firstly, the relative merits of adopting this approach in the twenty first century; and secondly, programmatic or normative proposals of revival in this and other domains. Unlike Allawi, Nadwi's view of these institutions and movements is all sided. As social movements encompassing social services, intellectual, religious and political aspects of Islam, these activities can assume greater role in reviving Islamic civilization. However, Nadwi is cautious of programmatic interventions and stepwise revival efforts. In fact, in its earlier periods, the Muslim Brotherhood partly failed because,

> The leaders of *Ikhwan* decided a little too early to step down into the arena of active politics, and this coupled with the coming into power of the self appointed champions of socialism and Arab nationalism in Egypt, who lost no time in crushing it down ruthlessly deprived the Arab countries and, eventually, the entire Islamic world, of services of unmistakably was the most powerful Islamic movement of modern times (Nadwi 1979, 112).

Again, of the three key revival recommendations which I will address shortly below, Nadwi believed that these institutions, intellectuals and social movements can help Islamic civilization in the "educational reorganization" sector. In this regard, he pointed out that the educational framework of the Muslim world will have to be "thoroughly overhauled in the light of Islamic ideals and percepts" and must learn to adopt the scientific and technological aspects of western civilization (2005,191).

However, while he advocates for "a crusading efforts have to be made in all branches of learning. This, obviously, cannot be achieved by few individuals and institutions. Muslim states should take the task of intellectual regeneration seriously" (Ibid, 192). This last recommendation also relates to the last domain of revival in Islamic civilization, responsibilities of ruling elites and politics in the Muslim world.

The Political Domain

When it comes to the political dimension of Islamic civilization, Allawi and Nadwi differ on the level of depth and relevance attributed to it. While Nadwi's discussion of Islamic civilization, both in its crisis and revival, and the multiplicity of instances drawn from the Muslim world are wide in scope and penetrating in depth, it is hardly the case for Allawi. In fact, Allawi recycles Iran and Turkey throughout the text as though no other part of the Muslim world is equally responsible for the rise, crisis or revival of Islamic civilization. On the top of this, his appraisal of Iran and Turkey's case is barely detailed and sufficiently accounted for, except for points mentioned here and there. In addition to these countries, he talks about countries like Saudi Arabia, but primarily with the intention of closely aligning them, particularly both the ruling elites and Ulema, with fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, terrorism and massacres of Shiite groups. On the whole, however, he believed that,

> The last crisis of Islamic civilization-the one that will put a definitive end to civilizational cycle which began with the establishment of Islam as a distinct cultural, political, and religious community-will not come from the mass abandonment of religious faith. The fortunes of Islamic civilization are linked more to the success or demise of political Islam (Allawi 2009, 252).

Allawi is, however, rarely satisfied with the favorably changing political landscapes both in Iran and Turkey. In fact, what Allawi sees is a growing "politicization of Islam and its turning into an ideology for achieving power" (Ibid, 252). Furthermore, he rarely distinguishes between groups of individuals who, by claiming Muslims and advocating for the return of the Caliphate, are killing thousands innocents all around the world, on the one hand, and those who, using peaceful political means, advance a more pro Islam-Muslim programs and agenda, on the other. Unfortunately, "political Islam", "Islamists", and "Islamism" are invariably and equally applied to Al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the AKP alike[12]. This uncritical approach to Islam affiliated institutions, movements and political groups is much more misleading and harmful than its analytical importance.

In short, Allawi fears that "political Islam" would end up the beginning of the last vanishing point of Islamic civilization, not its revival.

Unlike Allawi, Nadwi's treatment of the political dimension, comprising ruling elites, politics and political order in general is more lengthy and dealt with in the context of both crisis and revival. Nadwi examined the relative efficacy of ruling elites and political orders in such countries as Tunisia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Algiers, Iraq, Indonesia, and Egypt. In addition to various failures attributed to intellectuals and Ulema in these countries, Nadwi concisely articulated how nationalism, socialism, capitalism, uncontrolled westernization and modernization efforts, dependence on the west and Russia destroyed remnants of Islamic civilization in the ninetieth and twentieth centuries. Some of the key representatives figures of corrupted and misguided ruling elites in the Muslims world included Houri Boumedienne's anti-Islamic reforms in Algeria; the nationalism, socialism and dictatorship of Nasser in Egypt; secularization, whole sell modernization and westernization in Turkey under Ataturk, and to some extent, of Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi; and nationalism, secularism and anti-Islam sentiment in Indonesia under Soekarno and in Tunisia under Bourguiba. Under these political leaders, their political arrangements, reforms and ideologies, the Muslim world not only wasted its time and energy, and thus lagged behind, but also its hope for recovery was arrested and destroyed.

However, if Islamic civilization is to be rejuvenated, then its political leaders must reclaim their Islamic qualities, both Ijtihad and Jihad. Nadawi's best leaders, apart from the prophet and the first four Caliphs, included Salahudin Al-Ayyubi, Muhammad Al-Fatih, and some others. In addition to these ideal Islamic qualities, three foundational requirements must be met; otherwise, Muslims will not be able to reassert and give life back to their civilization. The first is educational reorganizations. Here the culture of education, including aspects western civilization, and creative learning must be broadly perused and should be taken on by the political leaders, competent institutions and intellectuals (Nadwi 2005, 191). The second recommendation emphasizes the need for the Muslim world regaining its "self sufficiency in finance, commerce and industry" (Ibid, 198). The last important strategy focuses on building "industrial and military self sufficiency" in the Muslim world (Ibid, 192). The cumulative effect of these reforms, Nadwi believed, could pave the way for the remaking of Islamic civilization in the years to come.

Conclusion

The article comparatively appraised the ideas of the Indian Muslim reformer, Abul Hassan al-Nadwi, and Iraqi academic, Ali Allawi concerning two major aspects of Islamic civilization, crisis and revival. In relative terms, the discussion has shown that Allawi's assessment of the crisis in Islamic civilization reflects and envisions a pessimistic future, and despite his claims for its genesis in the seventeenth century, it is limited scope wise to the last two hundred years. On top of this, contrary to Allawi's claim for any consensus regarding the beginning of the crisis of Islamic civilization, current scholarship presents wide, and sometimes conflicting, temporal as well as spatial contours. Furthermore, his analysis of the crisis in Islamic civilization is largely confined to intellectual and institutional levels while the same degree of focus is missing in the political domain.

Nadwi, on the other hand, locates the beginning of the decline of Islamic civilization between the end of the first four Caliphs in Islam and the development of Arab nationalism in the nineteenth century. Although, following conventional civilizational yardsticks (like science, philosophy, art, material wealth, political power, and etc.), one would rightly question whether Islamic civilization, in the first place, was developed and achieved a full sense of 'civilizational integrity' in this period or not, it becomes clear when Nadwi's own conception of Islamic civilization is understood. Nadwi saw the breakdown of religiosity and spirituality, which are foundational elements in his conception of Islamic civilization, in the years following the end of the last Caliph and went through various ups and downs since then.

Unlike Allawi, Nadwi's studies of Islamic civilization, both in the context of crisis and revival, taken into account three interrelated domains: intellectual, institutional and political. Even though the revival of Islamic civilization is literally absent in Allawi's study, he saw in the traditional reformers with Sufi bent an ideal revival strategy. Nadwi, however, gave half of his attention to the revival in as much as the crisis of Islamic civilization. For him, reviving Islamic civilization must take into account reform efforts focusing on three major institutions in the Muslim world: educational reorganization; self-sufficiency in finance, commerce and industry; and finally, industrial and military self-sufficiency. In spite of these similarities and differences between them, it is at least clear and also safe to conclude that the key elements in the crisis as well as the revival of Islamic civilization remain in the intellectual, institutional and political domains.

Note

1. Edward W. Said's seminal work, Orientalism (1978) offers a fairly complex account. The knowledge production was not limited to these fields of studies, it also included travel accounts, diaries and ethnographic monographs (which, in turn, had played significant roles in the advent of (and in informing) the aforementioned fields) produced by colonial operatives.

2. Ludwig W. Adamec (2009, p.234) indicated that the Islam and the world of Nadwi "has been of a considerable influence in the Islamic world   ."

3. Allawi's personal website: http://www.aliallawi.com/biography.php (Monday, 18 April, 2016)

4. Allawi's book received the attention of more than ten world class book reviewers, from The Economist, The Guardian to Foreign affairs (see the above personal website for more information). This is besides the usual book reviews by academics in various social science journals   .

5. Sufism and its link to Islamic civilization is one of the most contested issues in the literatures of Islamic civilization. On the one hand, there are those who took the position that unless it is for secular modernists, orientalist and fundamentalists, the rise and fall of Islam along Sufism makes little sense (see, for instance, Ernst & Lawrence, 2002; Allawi, 2009); on the other hand, there are those who partly attributed the crisis of Islamic civilization to Sufism (see, for instance, Trimingham, 1971; Hourani, 1983; Al-Faruqi, 1986).

6. Allawi's inner aspects, unlike the outer aspects, are rarely defined and detailed unless for his occasional references to spirituality, Sufi tendencies, and a general tradition informed reform approach to Islam in general and Islamic civilization, in particular. On top of this is his inability to vividly relate this to the revival of Islamic civilization, which is literally absent throughout the book although, time and again, he considered it as a springboard of Islamic civilization. In this regard, I will have something to say in later sections   .

7. It is also worth mentioning the role of non-Muslim actors like "Michael Aflak" in the Muslims world, especially in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, to the crisis in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Nadwi, 1979, p.123 & p.126). The list of individuals goes to include Shumayl, Antun and potentially other non-Muslims (Hourani, 1983). In short, these and other individuals are held responsible for nationalism, secular ideologies and alien cultural and political tendencies that have been considered potentially dangerous to the established Islamic normative order   .

8.   This resonates with the "cultural parity" thesis of Marshal G. Hodgson in the Ecumene (see the three volumes of The Venture of Islam (1974). Recent scholarships are also questioning the "western" qualifier of western civilization (See, for instance, The Eastern Origin of Western Civilization (Hobsons, 2009) and The Theft of History (Goody, 2006).

9.   For instance, Malik Bennabi locates the beginning of the crisis in the eleventh century (Basha, 1992) while Mian Muhammad Sharif (1963) argued that Islamic civilization experienced a significant rupture between the end of the eleventh century and the thirteenth century. According to Sharif, Islamic civilization rose again from the thirteenth century up to the seventeenth century and started falling again at the beginning of the eighteenth and the middle of nineteenth centuries. In short, the temporal dimension of the crisis in Islamic civilization remains highly contested, far from any "consensus   ."

10. For a closer assessment of how the Mongols destroyed (many of the key intellectual and scientific centers of Islamic civilization), materials costs and human massacres, see Abdul Shakoor (in Mian, History of Muslim Philosophy, 1963, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, Vol.II, Esp. p.789-795).

11. One of his criticisms posited against modernist and western-minded thinkers in the Muslim world is their inability to bring practical sciences like chemistry, physics and biology instead of humanities, literature, art and philosophy. As he saw it, this was also one of the very inherent failures of the Aligarh College and its movement (Nadwi, 1979). Interestingly, however, Allawi argues that without philosophy imagining Islamic civilization is not possible (2009, p.104). The demise of which, according to Allawi, partly owes to Ghazali's negation of philosophy. In this regard, he says that "we have to blame Ghzali for this unfortunate condition" (Ibid, p.104). In other place, he appreciated him as "Islam's greatest scholarly figure" (Ibid, p.103). On the whole, however, Allawi stands indifferent to Ghazali's 'reformer' personality   .

12. For anyone who closely follows developments in the overall political dynamisms of AKP'sTurkey, one hardly finds AKP only emphasizing the "outer aspects" of Islamic civilization as Allawi would have us believe; rather, I would argue although it may seem too early to predict, there are some strong and encouraging signs of intellectual, socio-economic and political reforms and engagements within Turkey and Turkey's role in the Muslim world. In fact, I would argue, contrary to Nadwi (2005, p.193-206), who believed in the necessity of the Arab world for the leadership of the Muslim world in reviving Islamic civilization, Turkey may unexpectedly come out victories and potentially lead the Muslim world. Among other things, a relatively stable and growing economy, center of the currently reviving Islamic thought and world Islamic movements, political independence, ottoman experiences, and strategic locations are all assets that make Turkey the ideal candidate for the position.

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The Methodology of Ayatullah al-Khū'ī in his Mu'jam al-Rijāl

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Abstract

The paper will focus on the Mu'jam Rijal al-Hadith of the late Ayatullah al-Khu'i. My paper will examine the importance of this seminal work and its contribution to modern Riajl Studies. Having done my doctoral dissertation and written my first book (The Heirs of the Prophet) on the Rijal, I am well positioned to write on the subject.

More specifically, the paper will initially examine the first volume of Mu'jam where Ayatullah al-Khu'i examines and critiques the principles of the studies of the Rijal. He challenges some of the erstwhile opinions offered on the rijal and offers distinctive views on how to authenticate some of the hadith transmitters. I will also compare this work with other erstwhile and contemporary studies on the rijal .

The paper will then examine al-Khu'i's process of harmonization of the contradictory remarks uttered by the Imams regarding some of the eminent companions of the Imams like Zurara b. A'yan and Muhammad b. Muslim al-Thaqafi. It will also examine other salient features of this work including tracing the turuq to the early fiqh authors like those of Shaykh Tusi and Kulayni. Overall, the paper will assess the contribution of al-Khu'i's work to modern biographical studies.

Key Words: Mu'jam, al-Khu'i, Rijal, Biographical, Tarajim.

Introduction

Ayatullah Abū'l-Qāsim al-Khū'ī (d. 1992) was recognized by many Shīʿī scholars as the most prominent Shīʿī jurist of his time (Sachedina 1998: 3-22). For over twenty years, he was regarded as the highest religious authority by those Shīʿīs who emulated him. He is reported to have composed more than fifty titles in various fields. This paper will examine the methodology he employs in his seminal biographical text, *Muʿjam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth*. It will argue that the text exemplifies a hermeneutical process, an interpretive activity that indicates the ability of a biographer to impact the present by idealizing the past. It will also show that al-Khū'ī engages in a text-based hermeneutical enterprise, on occasion extending the authority of some of the companions of the Imams (*rijāl*) he profiles beyond the intent of earlier works.

Al-Khū'ī's erudition and methodology is best discerned in his Qur'ānic exegetical work, *al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. One of the most controversial issues regarding Qur'ānic studies is the question of the occurrence of alteration *(taḥrīf)* in the scripture. The controversial nature of the subject is evident from the polemical tone of most of the works written by Sunnī scholars of the Qur'ān. In the disputations between the different Muslim groups, extremist Shīʿīs alleged that Muslim rulers, whom they deemed to be unjust, had omitted or inserted things in the Qur'ān with the object of falsifying evidence of the truth about the Shīʿī position in the matter of the successor to the Prophet (Sachedina 1998: 16). The Sunnī response made the same charge against the Shīʿīs that they had introduced in their reading of the Qur'ān: arbitrary alterations of the text by omitting parts of it, interpolations, or a wrong exposition of the true sense. Such charges and countercharges implied that the Prophet had left more than what may be found in the Qur'ān. These intrafaith disputations led to the inevitable and extremely dangerous conclusion for the future authority of the scripture that there is either material missing from the Qur'ān that ought to have been included or material added to it that ought to have been excluded. Obviously, if any Muslim admits alteration in the Qur'ān, it vitiates its evidential status for Muslim life. Ayatullah al-Khū'ī, using his extensively knowledge of Islamic biographical literature, refutes many of these allegations to demonstrate that Shīʿīs believe the present Qur'ān to be the authentic word of God without any adulteration.

Al-Khū'ī's Methodology in his Muʿjam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth

Al-Khū'ī's monumental, multivolume study known as *Muʿjam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth* (*Biographical Dictionary of the Narrators of the Traditions*) is a unique contribution

in the field of the science of biographical literature (*'ilm al-rijāl*). In this work he proposes a new method of ascertaining the reliability of traditions that were questioned, for instance, for lack of corroboration or were vitiated because of a missing link in the chain of transmission. The intellectual process of authentication is based on a juristic presumption about the transmitter's good intention, as long as the substance of the report does not contradict the ethos of Islamic revelation. Al-Khū'ī identifies this method of establishing the admissibility of a tradition as a proof of the derivation.

Al-Khū'ī notes in his introduction to *Mu'jam* that interest in the biographical literature has waned among later scholars, as if *ijtihād* and the derivation of *shar'ī* rulings did not depend on it. Due to this, he had decided to compose a work that would bring together all the main features of this discipline (Al-Khū'ī 1983: 1/11). He goes on to mention various distinguishing features of this work. For example, for every reporter, al-Khū'ī mentions all his traditions and who he reports from in the four canonical and other works, especially in the *Rijāl* of al-Kishshī (d. 367/978). He also mentions every person who reports a tradition in the four books whether that person is mentioned in the biographical texts or not. He also mentions the difference in *asānīd* (chains of transmission) between the four books.

In the *Mu'jam*, al-Khū'ī projects an almost hagiographical account of the disciples of the imams. The reasons for the idealisation of the *rijāl* will become apparent during this discussion. A good example of this is the concept of *al-tawthīqāt al-'āmma* (general authentications). The time of al-Ḥurr al-'Āmilī (d. 1099/1688) marks the beginning of discussions about the possible significations of various statements made by the earlier scholars. Through various forms of interpretation, thousands of *rijāl* are authenticated. An example of the 'mass authentication' is what has been inferred from remarks made by Ja'far b. Muḥammad al-Qawlawayh (d. 367/978) at the beginning of his work entitled *Kāmil al-Ziyārāt*. The work pertains to the salutations to be recited when visiting (*ziyāra*) the shrines of the Imams. Ibn Qawlawayh states:

> We realize we cannot cover all that which has been transmitted from the Imams on this subject [the salutations at the shrines], nor on any other issue except that which has been related to us by reliable [transmitters] from our companions, may God bestow His mercy upon them. I have not cited a tradition in it [the book] which has been transmitted by reporters who are rarely mentioned (*shudhdhādh*)..... (Ibn Qawlawayh 1938:4).

According to al-ʿĀmilī, Ibn Qawlawayh's statement means that all the transmitters in this work are to be considered reliable (*thiqa*), (al-Amili 1965: 20/68) a view that is endorsed by al-Khūʾī (al-Khuʾi 1983: 1/50). In all, 388 transmitters appear in Ibn Qawlawayh's work (Subhani 1987: 298). By this inference, all of them are authenticated. Others like Mirza Ḥusayn Nūrī (d. 1316/1898) construe Ibn Qawlawayh's statement as suggesting that only his teachers are reliable, a point which reduces the number of those authenticated by his statement to 32 (Nuri 1964: 3/777).

By claiming that all persons who feature in Ibn Qawlawayh's works are reliable, a tradition reported by any of these figures could be admitted into the juridical corpus with the justification that the transmitter has been pronounced reliable by virtue of being cited in this work. This may be construed as a radical form of the authentication of the *rijāl* since, by such deductions, hundreds of *rijāl* are authenticated and their traditions admitted as authoritative and binding. Behind this form of 'mass *tawthīqāt*' lies the desire to admit more traditions to the juridical corpus even though such interpretations are conspicuously absent in the biographical texts before al-ʿĀmilī's time.

The consequences of authenticating all those who appear in Ibn Qawlawayh's work can be demonstrated in the case of ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Qāsim al-Ḥārithī. Al-Najāshī states that he was *ḍaʿīf* (weak) and a *ghālī* (extremist) (Najashi 1976: 156). However, al-Khūʾī states that al-Najāshī's remark refers to al-Ḥārithī's beliefs, not to his reliability as a *ḥadīth* transmitter. Moreover, he continues, as al-Ḥārithī appears in Ibn Qawlawayh's work, he is to be considered reliable (al-Khuʾi 1983: 10/284). ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥārithī's appearance in Ibn Qawlawayh's work negates al-Najāshī's pejorative remarks. Instead of ruling for *tasāqut* (canceling out due to the contradiction), al-Khūʾī rules in ʿAbd Allāh's favour. Thus, a transmitter who has been unequivocally deemed 'weak' and extremist by al-Najāshī is, due to his appearance in Ibn Qawlawayh's work, authenticated.

Similarly, Ismāʿīl b. Murār has not been authenticated in the biographical works. However, he has been cited by ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī (d. 307/919) in his *tafsīr* work. Al-Qummī is believed to have cited traditions from reliable reporters only. Due to Ismāʿīl's inclusion in one of al-Qummī's *asānīd*, al-Khūʾī maintains that he is authenticated and a reliable transmitter of traditions (al-Khuʾi 1983: 3/183).

However, al-Khūʾī was not averse to changing his position when the situation demanded it. In a reversal of his earlier statement, al-Khūʾī subsequently issued a rescript in which, after quoting Ibn Qawlawayh's statement, he states:

> After examining the traditions of the book and investigating its *asānid*,
> it appears that it [the book] contains many traditions - maybe more than
> a half [of the traditions in the book] - which do not accord with his [Ibn
> Qawlawayh's] description in his introduction [that the work contains
> reliable transmitters only]. Moreover, the book contains many
> traditions whose *asānīd* are not complete or which do not culminate in
> a *maʿsūm* (the infallible one). Persons who are not from our
> companions also occur in the *asānīd*. Some figures who are not cited
> in our biographical works at all are also mentioned, others who are
> known to be weak like Muhammad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Miḥrān are also
> cited. Therefore, there is no alternative but to alter [our stated position]
> and to maintain that only his [Ibn Qawlawayh's] *mashāyikh* (teachers)
> from whom he reports directly (*bilā wasiṭā*), are reliable.[1]

The ramifications of such a revision in the status of the transmitters of the Imams'
traditions are felt in the juridical and theological tracts. As indicated above, there are
instances where al-Khūʾī authenticates an extremist as he appears in one of Ibn
Qawlawayh's traditions. An evaluation such as this would therefore have to be re-
examined in the light of the above rescript. The above case is further proof that
inferential deduction of the *withāqa* (reliability) of hundreds of figures, if not verified,
could lead to the authentication of many liars and figures unknown in Shīʿī *ḥadīth*
and juridical literature.

The key concern in the authentications is to raise a person to the level of *thiqa*, a
topos in the authentication processes. By his interpretations of earlier statements, al-
Khūʾī could verify hundreds of figures. The authenticated *rijāl* performed a critical
function insofar as the *asānīd* in which they appeared linked a jurist to the authentic
source of all knowledge, the Imams. Stated differently, the authentications linked a
jurist, through an authenticated chain, to the original source, the Imam. The important
rijāl therefore had to be shown as being reliable, if not in the earlier biographical
literature, then at least in the later one.

The Different Forms of Idealization

Al-Khūʾī idealizes the companions of the Imams in different ways; for example, when
he examines reports that are favourable to Ḥumrān b. Aʿyān (n.d.), a disciple of the
fifth and sixth Imams, al-Khūʾī notes that most of these contain *asānīd* (chains of

transmission) are defective since they are transmitted by persons who have been pronounced as weak. Rather than discounting these reports, al-Khūʾī claims that the gist of these reports (*al-muʿtabara minha*) is sufficient to indicate the elevated status of Ḥumrān. Since there are no pejorative reports on Ḥumrān, al-Khūʾī does not defend him against any accusation and pronounces him to be reliable (al-Khuʾi 1983: 6/260).

Another feature of al-Khūʾī's work is it assumes polemical undertones. This is to assure the Shīʿīs that they represent the correct and 'orthodox' version of Islam and to establish the preponderance of the Shīʿī community over other sectarian groups. In the polemical genre, the literary compositions, discourses, excellences and traditions favorable to the *rijāl* are interwoven into a historical narrative. These are important factors in the crystallization of beliefs and in establishing the preponderance of a school. In the process, the authority of the disciples who represented the Imams in the Shīʿī community is tacitly enhanced.

Polemics in the *Muʿjam* takes different forms. In enumerating the literary achievements of the disciples of the Imams, al-Khūʾī indicates not only the extent of the Shīʿī compositions available in their times, but also that, due to these texts, Shīʿī beliefs, practices, and *ḥadīth* can be traced to the times of the Imams.

Apart from providing an appraisal of the companions of the Imams, Shīʿī biographical literature also sought to establish the preponderance of these Shīʿī scholars, who were engaged in the production of a formidable literary output. Thus, the biographies had apologetic and polemical undertones. They were apologetic in that they asserted, defended, and idealized the character and loyalty of the associates of the Imams. The biographies engaged in polemics by proclaiming the preponderance of the arguments of the *rijāl* over their interlocutors. By stressing their polemical functions, the authority of the *rijāl* and their pivotal roles as the exponents and defenders of Shīʿī beliefs and praxis became more pronounced. It is here that the polemical function of the biographical works became evident.

The Case of Mu'min al-Ṭāq

The polemical tone in the *Muʿjam* is discernible in the case of another prominent disciple, Mu'min al-Ṭāq (n.d.), also known as al-Ahwal . In Shīʿī biographical literature, al-Ahwal is depicted as an important defender of Shīʿī beliefs. He is also portrayed as one who confronted and defeated the adversaries of the Shīʿīs in his debates. According to al-Kishshī, he argued and overcame Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 119/737) on the question of the need for an Imam to whom obedience was obligatory (Kishshi

1969: 186; Ibn al-Nadim 1970: 1/8). Due to his polemical disputations, al-Aḥwal is also described by the heresiographer al-Khayyāṭ (d. after 300/913) as among the *shuyūkh* (teachers) of the Rāfiḍīs (al-Khayyat 1957: 14, 48).

One of his greatest adversaries is said to have been Abū Ḥanīfa with whom he had discussions on the Imamate and on the doctrine of the *raj'a* (belief in the physical return of the Imams before the day of resurrection). The poet Sayyid Ḥimyarī (d. 173/789) praised al-Aḥwal for his discussions with Abū Ḥanīfā, whom he defeated (al-Asqalani 1988: 5/340-1). According to the Sunnī biographer, Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī (d. 853/1449), al-Aḥwal would discuss with Abū Ḥanīfa, among other things, the *faḍā'il* (excellences) of 'Alī (al-Asqalani 1988: 5/340-1).

Al-Khū'ī stresses the polemical role that disciples like al-Aḥwal undertook and, in the process, portrays an idealised image of him. He dismisses the pejorative traditions that al-Kishshī cites against al-Aḥwal, saying that their *asānīd* are weak. In refuting one report against al-Aḥwal he states it is weak as it has been reported by Mufaḍḍal 'Umar (d. 180/796) who has been condemned by the Imams (al-Khu'i 1983:18/245; 17/39). Al-Khū'ī is not consistent for he authenticates the same Mufaḍḍal when he profiles him elsewhere in his biographical work (al-Khu'i 1983: 304). As mentioned earlier, al-Khū'ī accepts traditions that are reported in Ḥumrān's favour even though they are weak since, he says, the purport of these traditions indicate the elevated status of Ḥumrān. However, al-Khū'ī rejects traditions that are against al-Aḥwal on the same basis, that is, weak *asānīd*. In his assessment of al-Aḥwal, al-Khū'ī does not consider the numerous reports in both Shī'ī and Sunnī literature on al-Aḥwal's anthropomorphism. Al-Aḥwal is thereby rehabilitated by al-Khū'ī and the reservations expressed by earlier scholars like al-Kishshī are dismissed.

Al-Khū'ī then cites the favourable remarks on al-Aḥwal including those on his polemical discourses with Abū Ḥanīfa to project a certain image of al-Aḥwal. Another Shī'ī biographer, Mamaqānī (d. 1351/1932), uses different hermeneutical constructs to idealize disciples like al-Aḥwal. He differs from al-Khū'ī in that he states that it is not sufficient to examine the *asānīd* and their deficiencies. For example, in examining the numerous negative remarks against Zurāra (d. 150/767), another eminent disciple of the fifth and sixth Imams, Mamaqānī states, "how can we reject more than thirty unfavourable traditions [against Zurāra] based only on weak *asānīd* especially when the purport of these traditions (condemning Zurāra) is repeatedly transmitted (*al-mutawātir al-ma'nī*)," he asks? (Mamaqani n.d.: 1/441). The only way to explain these remarks is by appealing to *taqiyya* (dissimulation). For Mamaqānī,

the pejorative remarks against the disciples are meant to act as a camouflage, to conceal the close links that the Imams had with their associates.

By stressing their polemical functions, the authority of disciples like al-Aḥwal and their pivotal role as the defenders of Shīʿī beliefs and praxis becomes more pronounced. Through various forms of hermeneutics, al-Khūʾī is able to accommodate al-Aḥwal and other important disciples. He juxtaposes the appraisal of erstwhile biographers and attempts to resolve inconsistencies and anomalies in the profiles of various *rijāl*. In examining the denigrating remarks that were reportedly uttered by the Imams concerning some of their closest associates, al-Khūʾī points to weak figures in the chains of transmission (*isnād*). For example, in his profile of Mufaḍḍal b. ʿUmar , al-Khūʾī quotes the views of some past scholars and notes some damaging reports regarding him. Mufaḍḍal was, according to Ibn al-Ghaḍāʾirī (d. 411/1020), *ḍaʿīf* and a follower of Abūʾl-Khaṭṭāb, a reported extremist. "As the *ghulāt* have ascribed many traditions to him," Ibn al-Ghaḍāʾirī adds, "It is not permissible to transmit Mufaḍḍal's traditions." (al-Khuʾi 1983: 18/293). Al-Najāshī states that Mufaḍḍal was *fāsid al-madhhab* (deviant in his religious persuasions). Al-Najāshī further pronounces his traditions to be unsound and states that his books should not be depended upon (Najashi 1970: 295).

Al-Khūʾī dismisses most of the denigrating reports against Mufaḍḍal as having weak chains of transmission. However, he also notes that some of these reports against Mufaḍḍal have strong *isnāds*. Al-Khūʾī rejects them too, claiming that they must have arisen from *taqiyya* (dissimulation) or that they cannot oppose the numerically superior traditions that are in favor of Mufaḍḍal. Moreover, al-Khūʾī continues, al-Ṣādiq is reported to have given a book named *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* to Mufaḍḍal. This points to the confidence and eminent position Mufaḍḍal enjoyed with al-Ṣādiq. In dismissing al-Najāshī's unfavorable comments on him, al-Khūʾī states that al-Mufīd's (d. 413/1022) remark that Mufaḍḍal was among the upright jurists is enough justification for rejecting al-Najāshī's statement. At the end of his section on Mufaḍḍal, al-Khūʾī proclaims him to be reliable, a conclusion that is in stark contrast to earlier assessments on him al-Khuʾi (al-Khuʾi 1983: 18/304).

Biographical narratives and the authentications they provide are also important because they construct and identify a normative reading of the historical lives of the *rijāl*. The authority of the disciples in the biographical literature is premised on their characterisation as the bearers of Islamic canonical tradition and the embodiment of correct juridical praxis. By citing the disciples' functions and providing an appraisal of their veracity or mendacity, Shīʿī biographers construct a sense of "orthodoxy" and

express a normative evaluation of the *rijāl* so as to insert them in the body of tradition that is utilized by the biographical culture.

Hermeneutics in the Profile of Jābir b. Yazīd al-Ju'fī

Similarly, in the case of another prominent disciple, Jābir b. Yazīd al-Ju'fī, al-Khū'ī attempts to exonerate Jābir from the derogatory remarks reportedly uttered by the Imams against him thereby presenting a hagiographical image of him. Al-Khū'ī claims that many traditions against Jābir are weak in their chains of transmission. He then quotes Ibn Qawlawayh, 'Alī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī, Ibn al-Ghaḍā'irī, and al-Mufīd, all of whom considered Jābir to be reliable. Al-Khū'ī argues that the authentications provided by these figures surpass al-Najāshī's statement that Jābir was confused in his traditions (Najashi 1970: 94-4). Al-Khū'ī then cites the favorable remarks on Jābir including those on him preserving thousands of traditions that he received from al-Bāqir and his reference to the Imam as the "legatee of the legatees." Al-Khū'ī admits, however, that most of the favourable traditions have weak *isnāds* too. Despite this, he authenticates Jābir.

As for al-Ṣādiq's statement that he had seen Jābir with his father only once, and that Jābir had never gone to see him, al-Khū'ī asserts that this statement must be attributed to *taqiyya*. In any case, al-Khū'ī continues, the report that Jābir had never gone to visit al-Ṣādiq does not preclude the possibility that the Imam had met him at some other place where Jābir could have acquired the Imam's teachings. Al-Khū'ī also expresses amazement at al-Najāshī's statement that very few traditions pertaining to the *halāl* and *harām* (that which is religiously prescribed and prohibited) are reported by Jābir. On the contrary, he argues, there are many reports from Jābir on this subject in the four major Shī'ī *fiqh* manuals. Al-Najāshī may have thought that these were ascribed to Jābir later, al-Khū'ī suggests. It is to be remembered that al-Najāshī must have been aware of the existence of these traditions in the Shī'ī juridical works, because they were compiled before his time. Jābir is thereby rehabilitated by al-Khū'ī and the reservations expressed by the earlier scholars are dismissed (al-Khu'i 1983: 4/25). By resorting to various forms of interpretations, al-Khū'ī is able to accommodate Jābir. Al-Khū'ī concludes that Jābir is reliable (*thiqa*) and dependable in his traditions, evaluations that clearly contradict earlier Shī'ī assessments of the same figure.[2]

Biographical Discourse in the Muʿjam

In a sense, *rijāl* works like *Muʿjam rijāl al-ḥadīth* have become a means of positing principles through which thousands of *rijāl* can be authenticated. In the later works, the earlier assessments are reproduced, and the principles of authentication evolve so that more *rijāl* are added within the ambit of reliable transmitters. The claim that the traditions of numerous *rijāl* are reliable is a later biographical innovation, designed, as many of the later authentications are, to authenticate more disciples and to justify the inclusion of their traditions in the juridical manuals. In the process, the image of the *rijāl* is idealised and their authority affirmed.

The two major features of al-Khūʾī's *rijāl* work are the portrayal of the *rijāl* as the ideal disciples of the Imams and the refutation of all accusations leveled at them, elevating them, in the process, to a higher level than in the earlier works. Al-Khūʾī enhances the authority of the *rijāl* by adopting polemic and salvific undertones. He identifies the faithful disciples, and tries to demonstrate that these disciples were the most accomplished in various Islamic disciplines. Not only does al-Khūʾī's text construct the authority of the *rijāl* by stressing the preponderance of Shīʿī beliefs, practices, and figures, it also cements the authority of the *rijāl* by stressing their contributions in the office of charisma and by claiming that they were more accomplished than their Sunnī counterparts.

Al-Khūʾī's biographical discourse reveals the multi-layered hermeneutical texture that is a prominent feature in his biographical enterprise. He constructs the building blocks of his discourse by interventions, counter-arguments, and frequent refutations of erstwhile biographical texts. In this way, he is able to determine how a disciple is portrayed and constructs the disciple's authority in his text.

Biographical dictionaries like *Muʿjam rijāl al-ḥadīth* are historical exempla of homogenizing the profiles of the disciples and portraying their ideal traits based on preconceived ideas of the characteristics of the Imams' disciples. Through his intervention, the biographer decides how the disciples are to be depicted in the biographical discourse, and how their authority is to be constructed. The appraisals of biographers lay claim to an exclusivist hermeneutic, which can become sufficiently entrenched to impose an authoritarian construction on the history of those profiled. The imposition of normative or canonical evaluations in the biographical literature also has the effect of reducing subsequent biographical pluralism.

Shīʿī biographical literature is a good example of how exemplum, polemic, rejection and marginalization all combined in biographical portraits. The confluence of these literary devices are used to construct the authority of the *rijāl* and to portray

ideal traits of these disciples. Citation of favourable reports from the Imams, their alleged loyalty to the Imams, epistemic knowledge, rejection of denigrating remarks even if they have strong *asānīd*, the development of ideal models based on their contribution to the Shī'ī community, and proselytization became important motifs in constructing and cementing the authority of the *rijāl* in the biographical texts.

Biographers like al-Khū'ī promote personal convictions and affirm postulates regarding the Shī'ī worldview of leadership and doctrines by a confirmation of past representatives of those traditions. The authentications provided in the biographies often reflect the juridical and social world of the *rijāl* as perceived by the biographers writing in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. This paper has demonstrated how al-Khū'ī restates a "normative version" of the definition of discipleship and promotes a later understanding of loyalty and commitment.

Conclusion

I have argued that in biographies like those of al-Khū'ī's *Mu'jam rijāl al-ḥadīth* there is a clear concern to depict the Shī'ī community in the second/eighth century as a well-disciplined and largely monolithic unit. There is also a palpable attempt to embellish and idealise the past. In exonerating the *rijāl* from all blame the functions of the biographical expositions included those of generating and embellishing a portrait of the *rijāl* as the loyal disciples of the Imams.

Biographers can, in this way, define a profile and, at the same time, create an authoritarian reading of a disciple's life. According to Khaled Abou el-Fadl, the term authoritarian refers to "a heuristic methodology that usurps and subjugates the mechanisms of producing meaning from a text to a highly subjective and selective reading." (Abou El-Fadl 2001: 5). Stated differently, the authoritarian reading of a text is interwoven with the closing of the interpretive process, restricting, thereby, the text to a specific determination. This determination is then submitted as the final and only possible interpretation of the text (Abou El-Fadl 2001: 92). In this sense, biographical hermeneutics are no different from the interpretive activities evident in other fields. The interpretive strategy can shape both future readings and the texts themselves, thus constructing the texts rather than arising from them.

Note

1.   I am grateful to Ayatullah al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Madadī for sharing this rescript with me .

2.   For other examples of embellishment in the tarājim (biographical profiles) see Liyakat Takim, The Heirs of the Prophet: Charisma and Authority in Shīʻīte Islam (Albany: SUNY, 2006), chapter 5.

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Malcolm X and the Emancipative form of Social Theory

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Abstract

To study the history of any science is a form of conceptualizing the limits and possibilities of an intellectual discourse. This is to argue that when a historian looks at the course of ideas s/he constructs a form of imagination which could not be easily disputed unless we bring other vistas and perspectives into the games of historiography. Talking of Malcolm X is not a preoccupation with an individual per se but it is a form of overcoming the dichotomies and limits of eurocentric vision of social theory which has made other forms of unthinking unthinkable. In this article, I have tried to look at the emancipative form of social theory which has been elaborated in the thought of Malcolm X based on a cordetive form of imagination.

Key Words: Cordetive, Cartesian, Rumi, Field, Emancipation, Malcolm X

Introduction

I divide world-class theorists within the context of social theory into two broad categories of "heart theorists" and "mind theorists." Although I have never seen anybody to classify social theorists into heart versus mind but I find this distinction a very useful analytical category which enables me to step beyond the disciplinary categories which, by definition, is Cartesian, i.e. cognitive rather than Rumian, i.e. *cordetive*. If this distinction is of any relevance then I like to argue that Malcolm X is more of a cordetive theorist rather than cognitive which is deeply indebted to the Cartesian mentalité which imbues the total frame of disciplinary reference. Although one may argue that there is no textual reference in the works and letters of Malcolm X to Rumi then how could one argue that he has incorporated the Rumian perspective in his social outlook? First of all, when it is argued that Malcolm X is not a Cartesian theorist it does not mean that he does not employ cognitive categories in his frame of analysis. Secondly if one argues that Malcolm X is a Rumian social theorist this does not mean that he has employed Rumi's ideas in his social analyses as what is meant by being a Rumian social theorist is an attempt to distinguish the overall orientation of Malcolm X rather than arguing that he did not use rational categories in his approach. These are different arguments. Thirdly, what it is meant by the cognitive orientation versus the cordetive approach is an onto-epistemic question which alerts us to see the differences between fields of knowledge in undisciplinary fashions. In other words, this analytical distinction would permit us to see forms of knowledge beyond the parameters of disciplinary forms of epistemes. Of course, this is not to argue in a reified fashion that certain social theorists think solely by their mind without realizing that they have other forms of acquiring knowledge but this argument is surely based on the assumption that some social theorists prefer to exclude the epistemological importance of cordetive dimensions. This is an epistemological conflict which has ontic root and I think the Cartesian mode of understanding represents the *cognitive form of perception* while the Rumian model of comprehension demonstrates the *cordetive modality of engaging* with reality. Why is this distinction important within social sciences discourses? In other words, what is the benefit of arguing that Malcolm X is a Rumian social theorist and not a Cartesian social scientist? What are the consequences of such an analytical distinction? I think both of these models and forms are informative and formative for human societies but the difference I guess it lies in the fine line which may exists between different kinds of beneficiaries. In other words, who is the prime beneficiary of social knowledge? Is the human individual or state actors or corporate agents? In my view, cordetive modality of engagement is a form of knowledge that benefits

individual citizenry while the cognitive form of knowledge is useful for different forms of controlling social regimes-which are best represented by state apparatuses or corporate companies nowadays. Malcolm X represents the cordetive form of knowledge which equips oppressed individuals who have been under panoptican spell of stupification (in Shariatian sense) and desperately look for liberation. But liberation cannot come about if we put collective liberation before the individual self-realization and personal self-consciousness. The disciplinary mode of knowledge seems to focus on grand entities such as "History," "Nation," "State," "Civilization," "Humanity," "Culture," "Society," and "God" and so on and so forth. These concepts are useful analytically but when they are perceived as realities then we are lost as we think when society is progressing this should automatically mean that we, as individuals, are becoming better people in comparison to our predecessors. Dostoevsky argues about the paradoxes of disciplinary mode of engaging with reality in his Brothers Karamazov, where he talks about the mother of Liza in the presence of Father Zosima. She confides before Father Zosima that she loves humanity but she cannot tolerate people who live around her. In other words, her love for humanity as a grand concept is limitless but when it comes to her neighbour she has zero tolerance. To put it in Dostoevsky's own words, where he argues through the mother of Liza's character by arguing that

> I, generally, love humanity but I am surprised by my own stance as when I look carefully . . . I realize that more I love humanity in general less I feel sympathy towards individual human beings. In my dreams, I always see myself as a philanthropist who is incessantly ready to be at the service of humanity but I find myself unable to share a room with someone during daytime even for a short while. By experience I have come to realize that whenever someone approaches me I feel he has injured my sense of dignity and violated my sense of freedom. It is not hard to imagine that I may lose interest and grow feelings of hatred and enmity toward the world's most perfect man . . . after a day of being at his presence . . . I may hate someone for having his lunch slowly . . . or another one due to his running nose . . . or as soon as someone touches me I feel hatred toward all people. However what I want to say is that more I love humanity as a general idea but my feelings toward individual human beings are full of revulsion and resentment (Dostoevsky, 2009. 72).

Why is she like that? What was Dostoevsky trying to say by using these different characters? I think he was implicitly making distinction between the Cartesian mode of engaging with reality and the Rumian model of mentalité which are expressed as cognitive approach versus cordetive approach .

Tutelage and the Riddle of Subjectivity

How does a personality come to reality? In other words, what are the constitutive elements of personal realization? There are many studies on identity-building in human sciences discourses but if we could generalize the nub of these important researches one may be able to summarize it with one broad concept of "subjectivity." But what is subjectivity? Is it a contradictory concept which stands in contrast to "objectivity" or a complimentary concept to the latter? Subjectivity is the condition of being a subject: i.e., the quality of possessing perspectives, experiences, feelings, beliefs, desires, and/or power. Authors such as Dallmayr (1981), Farrell & Farrell (1994), Lauer (1958), Ellis (1992) and Bowie (1990) conceptualize subjectivity as a repertoire which is used as an explanation for what influences and informs people's judgments about truth or reality. In this line of reading it is the collection of the perceptions, experiences, expectations, personal or cultural understanding, and beliefs specific to a person. However what makes this line of interpretation peculiar is the fact that it is often used in contrast to the term objectivity, which is described as a view of truth or reality which is free of any individual's influence. Although we agree that subjectivity belongs to a person's particular vision of reality based on various contingent aspects but this concept is not in contrast to objectivity if by that contradistinction one attempts to have a subjectivistic interpretation of subjectivity. On the contrary, when we use the concept of "subjectivity" in this context we refer to the importance of individual assessment of objective conditions which one may find oneself in. In this line of reading there is no insistence upon binary opposition or superiority of one over against the other. In addition, subjectivity could be better understood when its lack is observed, i.e. when one is unable to have an interpretation of reality based on her/his own perception and instead relies on others' vision of reality. Here a sense of tutelage may emerge which could have grave sociopolitical consequences when the destiny of a group of people is at stake. To put it differently, when in social conditions where there are various contrasting interests and conflicts involved if a particular group gets the upper hand by consolidating its own perceptions of reality as the criteria of reality as such then seeds of oppressions and suppressions may emerge. This could be formulated in other fashions too namely if

the subjectivity of a particular group becomes equal to objectivity of all groups and this is what Shariati conceptualizes as stupification, i.e. the lack of authentic subjectivity. Of course, one may ask how this could occur. In other words, how could alienation be perceived as actualization without using brute force? In my reading of Malcolm X I have come to realize that he is one of the contemporary primordial social theorists who have paid consistent attention to the question of individual alienation and collective estrangement. Of course, he has used particular terms such as "Black," and "Negro" and his focus has been on specific contexts such as America and Afro-Americans but one could deconstruct these specific terms and reconstruct them in global as well as universal frames of references. Malcolm X talks about two kinds of mentalities or forms of subjectivities. The first one is house-negro subjectivity which is based on the other's subjectivity and surprisingly is construed as objectivity. In other words, the house-negro understands deep affection but projects his love toward his master. The master who happens to be a white is the core of house-negro's reality. The house-negro associates his sense of selfhood with the other or what Malcolm terms as "master." Malcolm uses a figurative language by arguing that the house-negro would renounce all he has at his disposal just for the simple reason of being close to the master. In other words, the house-negro does not have any sense of being in an authentic sense and there is nothing that he would like to associate himself by except the subjective sense of the master which is the only objective reality that he can perceive as a twisted human personality. Malcolm explains this twisted sense of being in the following fashion, i.e .

> House Negro loves his master. He wants to live near him. He'll pay three times as much as the house is worth just to live near his master, and then brag about I'm the only Negro out here. I'm the only one on my job. I'm the only one in this school." You're nothing but a house Negro. And if someone comes to you right now and says, Let's separate, you say the same thing that the house Negro said on the plantation. What you mean, separate? From America, this good white man? Where you going to get a better job than you get here? I mean, this is what you say. I ain't left nothing in Africa, that's what you say. Why you left your mind in Africa" (1966. 11).

Malcolm X knew that you cannot unshackle an imprisoned folk who is not only physically enchained but mentally enslaved without waking them up to a different kind of consciousness. In other words, slavery annihilated the sense of being a subject in the hearts of Afro-Americans and the only thing which could change the status quo

was revolution. But what kind of revolution could bring such a drastic sense of transformation in the hearts and minds of enslaved people who could not even realize that they have lost their sense of humanity? In the eyes of Malcolm X what could qualify an individual as a human person it is his sense of subjectivity but once you lose that and you do not even realize that you have lost your own humanity then no political revolution could occur. Because the house-negro mentality is tantamount to stupification which entails a *total loss of subjectivity* and in Malcolm X's perspective it was conceptualized as a sense of assimilation which is symbolized by the concept of America. In other words, Malcolm X uses two concepts of America and Africa as symbols of stupification and emancipation .

Symbolism Unthought

Many have tried to understand the concepts of *America* and *Africa* in concrete sense but the symbolical dimensions of Malcolm X's interpretations have been lost for various reasons and one of the most important reasons is that scholars on X are not clear about how one should read the legacy of Malcolm X. In order to understand the lack of proper reading strategies vis-à-vis Malcolm X we need to look at three factors; the first one is the dominance of the Whites in America which created a sense that Malcolm should only be understood in White terms but in a *reversed fashion*; the second question is the presence of *total racism* which gave a false sense that the sole mission of Malcolm X was to combat racism by all means necessary; the third issue is related to hegemonic dominance of the Cold War discourses which could not even imagine the birth of alternative discourses outside the parameters of left or right. To put it differently, we have few scholars who are able to read the legacy of Malcolm X in alternative fashions namely in terms of symbolic interpretation. I can give an example by reference to one of the passages where Malcolm X talks about America, Africa, Separation, Mind, and Exodus. In his speech entitled as *Message to the Grassroots* he talks about "separation" between the whites and blacks in America and even proposes that the black community should get back to Africa. In addition, he construes the arguments of his opponents who refute this idea as a foolish strategy by arguing that Afro-Americans have not left anything in Africa. In other words, the opponents of Malcolm X were surprised that he had still an African mentalité. Malcolm X puts these issues in the following passage by stating that

> If someone comes to you right now and says, Let's separate, you
> say . . . What you mean, separate? From America, this good white man?
> Where you going to get a better job than you get here? I mean, this is

what you say. I ain't left nothing in Africa, that's what you say. Why
you left your mind in Africa (1966. 11).

American scholars both white and black due to their closeness to the issues which
Malcolm X was addressing and discussing about took everything literally and this
made impossible for them to discern symbolical nuances in Malcolm X's thought. In
addition, due to the fact that Malcolm X's frage turned into a national security
question then any research on him was deeply clouded by a vulgar reading of this
visionary thinker of 21st century. To put it otherwise, Malcolm X was talking about
different symbols and each of these symbols represented something for him; i.e.
America represented *tutelage*; Africa stood for *emancipation*; Separation referred to
the possibility of a kind of dialectic, i.e. alienation from the master and actualization
into new modes of being; and the African mind was a symbol of *authentic
subjectivity* .

Many scholars who have worked upon Malcolm X seem to disregard these novel
dimensions in his intellectual legacy due to the a priori perspectives which they hold
even before entering the intellectual world of Malcolm X. What we need to do as
field intellectuals is that we have to de-white him, de-black him; de-left him and
instead establish new strategies of readings which could enable us to unthink the
legacy of Malcolm X .

Field[1] Strategies of Resistance

We have argued that a human personality needs to be built upon an authentic sense
of subjectivity which, in turn, is founded upon experiences, feelings, beliefs, and
desires among many other pivotal issues. One of the salient characteristics of human
being is her/his ability to love and hate. But the question is what is love or hate? There
are many different definitions of these terms within social sciences and humanities
discourses but here we are interested in this question in regard to Malcolm X's
perspective on field-negro mentalité which is a form of self-actualized personality
that Malcolm X developed to explain strategies of resistance before the hegemonic
power of the other—which reduces you to an objectified nothing. In this context, we
are interested in Malcolm X's approach to "hatred" as it seems the concept of field-
negro is construed in a dialectical mode which is based upon hatred as a sense of
keeping away one's suppressed self from the destructive treatment of the other. James
W. Underhill, in his *Ethnolinguistics and Cultural Concepts: truth, love, hate & war*,
(2012) discusses different forms of hate in various languages. He stresses that love

and hate are social, and culturally constructed. For this reason, hate is historically situated. Although it is fair to say that one single emotion exists in English, French (haine), and German (Hass), hate varies in the forms in which it is manifested. A certain relationless hatred is expressed in the French expression *J'ai la haine*, which has no equivalent in English. While for English-speakers, loving and hating invariably involve an object, or a person, and therefore, a relationship with something or someone, *J'ai la haine* (literally, I have hate) precludes the idea of an emotion directed at a person. This is a form of frustration, apathy and animosity which churns within the subject but establishes no relationship with the world, other than an aimless desire for destruction. Based on Underhill's approach one could argue that Malcolm X's forms of anti-Americanism is a specific form of cultural resentment (Underhill, 2012). In other words, the kind of hatred which Malcolm X talks about is a relational hate which is directed at a group that has imposed certain forms of oppressive regimes upon, in this Malcolmian context, the Black Community in America. Malcolm X uses the concept of "hatred" in a psychoanalytic fashion, i.e. as an ego state that wishes to destroy the source of its unhappiness (Freud, 1915). Malcolm X did not consider the source of unhappiness of the Afro-Americans in the United States of America as a matter of rationalization or capitalism but he thought the source of misery is systematic racism which imbues the system in all its dimensions. When you are in such an inhumane context then you look surely for ways to liberate yourself and this is the question which lied before Malcolm X as a visionary social thinker. His explicit answers may be of parochial importance but the implicit dimensions of his discourse are important too as they could be employed for building up alternative modes of knowledge. In other words, he attempted to create a sense of unease in the minds of black people in America who seemed to be happy with their stupefied state of social life due to what Malcolm termed as the house-negro mentality, i.e. the state of being benumbed or unable to use their faculties in full capacities. But the question is how to create such a form of awareness within the hearts of people who are so deeply benumbed that they cannot realize the true reasons of their cultural tutelage? Malcolm X uses history as a means to bring forms of awareness to the minds of people who have lost touch with their own facticities. Sometimes he argues that one of the main problems with assimilated people is that they think they are one with their masters and in so thinking they lose their authentic sense of identity. He argues that during the slavery era we had two kinds of identities among slaves, i.e. the house Negro and the field Negro. Then Malcolm goes on explaining the features of the Field Negro. He argues that on

That same plantation, there was the field Negro. The field Negroes—those were the masses. There were always more Negroes in the field than there were Negroes in the house. The Negro in the field caught hell. He ate leftovers. In the house they ate high up on the hog. The Negro in the field didn't get anything but what was left of the insides of the hog. They call it chitt'lings nowadays. In those days they called them what they were—guts. That's what you were—gut-eaters. And some of you are still gut-eaters. The field Negro was beaten from morning to night: he lived in a shack, in a hut; he wore old, castoff clothes. He hated his master. He was intelligent. That house Negro loved his master, but that . . . field Negro . . . remember, they were in the majority, and they hated the master. When the house caught on fire, he didn't try to put it out; that field Negro prayed for a wind, for a breeze. When the master got sick, the field Negro prayed that he'd die. If someone came to the field Negro and said, Let's separate, let's run, he didn't say Where we going? He'd say, Any place is better than here. I am a field Negro. The masses are the field Negroes (1966. 11).

In other words, the house Negro was trapped in a false sense of consciousness and therefore he loved his master, i.e. he was happy with his own state of wretchedness. On the other hand, Malcolm presents another form of Negro who is able to distinguish between the state of tutelage and the state of enlightenment and that is what he conceptualizes as the Field Negro. But this kind of social type could not emerge if one is unable to demarcate between one's true sense of being and one's enslaved state of being in society. Malcolm X argues that the field-negro-mentalité is based on indignation because the field Negro "hated his master" (X, 1966. 11), i.e. he was aware that what the social source of his unhappiness was and wished to "destroy the source of [his] unhappiness" (Freud, 1915. 111). But it is wrong to assume that Malcolm X's social philosophy is based on hatred as hate is a strategy to raise consciousness among a benumbed group of people who are not aware of their state of tutelage. In other words, we should distinguish between strategy and vision of Malcolm X as far as fundamentals of his social theory is concerned. To put it differently, the politics of Malcolm X employs abhorrence to destroy political obstacles which exists on the way of erecting an egalitarian society but the critical theory of Malcolm X is not based on hatred. This is a fine issue which seems to be missed in Anglo-American literature on Malcolm X as a social theorist.

Note

1. It should be realized that the concept of "Field" in this study is employed in the Malcolmian sense which is epitomized in the two concepts of House Negro versus Field Negro. In other words, the concept of "Field" in the Malcolmian paradigm means emancipation, self-actualization, biophilic rather than necrophilic.

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